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While the search for models and explanations of cognitive phenomena is a growing 
area of research, there is no consensus on what counts as a good explanation in 
cognitive science. 
This Ph.D. thesis offers a philosophical exploration of the different frameworks 
adopted to explain cognitive behaviour. It then builds on this systematic exploration 
to offer a new understanding of the explanatory standards employed in the 
construction and justification of models and modelling frameworks in cognitive 
science. Sub-goals of the project include a better understanding of some theoretical 
terms adopted in cognitive science and a deep analysis of the role of representation in 
explanations of cognitive phenomena. Results of this project can advance the debate 
on issues in general philosophy of cognitive science and be valuable for guiding 
future scientific and cognitive research.  
In particular, the goals of the thesis are twofold: (i) to provide some necessary 
desiderata that genuine explanations in cognitive science need to meet; (ii) to identify 
the framework that is most apt to generate such good explanations. 
With reference to the first goal, I claim that a good explanation needs to 
provide predictions and descriptions of mechanisms. With regards to the second 
goal, I argue that the neurocomputational framework can meet these two desiderata. 
 In order to articulate the first claim, I discuss various possible desiderata of 





mechanisms are necessary features of good explanations in cognitive science. In 
particular, I claim that a good explanation should advance our understanding of the 
cognitive phenomenon under study, together with providing a clear specification of 
the components and their interactions that regularly bring the phenomenon about. 
I motivate the second claim by examining various frameworks employed to 
explain cognitive phenomena: the folk-psychological, the anti-representational, the 
solely subpersonal and the neurocomputational frameworks. I criticise the folk-
psychological framework for meeting only the predictive criterion and I stress the 
inadequacy of its account of cause and causal explanation by engaging with James 
Woodward’s manipulationist theory of causation and causal explanation. By 
examining the anti-representational framework, I claim that the notion of 
representation is necessary to predict and to generalise cognitive phenomena. I reach 
the same conclusion by engaging with William Ramsey (2007) and Jose Luis 
Bermudez (2003). I then analyse the solely subpersonal framework and I argue that 
certain personal-level concepts are indeed required to successfully explain cognitive 
behaviour. Finally, I introduce the neurocomputational framework as more 
promising than the alternatives in explaining cognitive behaviour. I support this 
claim by assessing the framework’s ability to: (i) meet the two necessary criteria for 
good explanations; (ii) overcome some of the other frameworks’ explanatory limits. 
In particular, via an analysis of one of its family of models — Bayesian models — I 
argue that the neurocomputational framework can suggest a more adequate notion of 
representation, shed new light on the problem of how to bridge personal and 
subpersonal explanations, successfully meet the prediction criterion (it values 
predictions as a means to evaluate the goodness of an explanation) and can meet the 
mechanistic criterion (its model-based methodology opens up the possibility to study 
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The subject of the thesis can be summarised by the following questions and answers: 
 
Q1: Which norms and values are used to construct, evaluate and justify models and 
explanations in cognitive science? 
A1: Currently there are at least four different frameworks that try to explain 
cognitive phenomena. Each of these frameworks adopts different values and 
standards. 
Q2: What are the necessary desiderata of a good explanation of cognitive behaviour? 
A2: A good explanation in cognitive science should be predictive and 
mechanistic. 
Q3: How can we make progress in our understanding of cognitive behaviours? 
A3: Adopting the neurocomputational framework is one way to make progress 
in our understanding of cognitive behaviours and their underlying processes. 
 
Clarifying these questions and justifying these answers are, in essence, the goals of 
this thesis. 
In this thesis, I will call cognitive those behaviours that result from the 
processing of some kind of information. Examples of cognitive behaviours are: the 






different from reflexes, which are, instead, straight pathways from stimuli to 
responses that don’t require any information processing. 
On the one hand, understanding the processes underlying cognition is the 
primary goal of many disciplines of study, but, on the other hand, there is no 
consensus on what counts as a good explanation in cognitive science. 
It is unclear whether cognitive behaviours need to be explained by adopting a 
mental or intentional vocabulary, and whether, and to what extent, the dynamics 
between brain, body and world are required to understand our cognitive life. 
There are currently at least four different frameworks that try to explain 
cognitive behaviour: 
 
1. The folk-psychological framework focuses on mental states and their 
rationalising connections. According to this framework, a cognitive agent’s 
decision to order a glass of water is explained in terms of her desire to have a 
drink and her belief that water can quench her thirst 
2. The anti-representational framework. This framework focuses on dynamical 
loops between brain, body and world. An anti-representational explanation of 
an animal’s wings beating behaviour identifies the dynamic interplay 
between external feedback from the wings movements (i.e. the couplings 
between the animal and the environment) and internal regulatory factors as 
the responsible process for the behaviour 
3. The physiological subpersonal framework. This framework focuses 
exclusively on the physical makeup of brains. According to this framework 
social memory is explained by specifying the roles of a certain neural area 
and of a specific protein that can be found in it 
4. The neurocomputational framework. This framework focuses on the 
informational transactions among neural states. Explaining perception 






specific brain areas and how activities in populations of neurons can transmit 
relevant information within the cognitive system 
 
It is not clear whether these frameworks are incompatible ways of accounting for 
cognitive phenomena or whether they (or at least some aspects of them) should be 
seen as somehow complementary attempts to gain a better understanding of the 
mind.  
 What is required for a good explanation of cognitive behaviour in the first 
place? When is an explanation justified? These are crucial problems that I tackle in 
this thesis by drawing on the main philosophical positions on the nature of scientific 
explanation. While answers to the questions above depend, in part, on specific details 
about the phenomena under study, they also depend in large on the explanatory 
standards and goals that investigators adopt to determine when explanations succeed 
and when they fail. 
A first goal of the thesis is to examine the various frameworks to make these 
standards explicit and to show to what extent they depend on different views about 
the norms governing explanations. By looking at various models at work, the project 
identifies the norms that the different explanatory frameworks endorse. Results of 
this analysis provide a better understanding of the nature of the relations among the 
different frameworks of explanation and of some theoretical terms central in 
cognitive science, and, in particular, the notion of representation. 
A second goal of the thesis is normative. The thesis suggests two necessary 
features of good explanations of cognitive behaviour: the ability to make predictions 
and the ability to identify mechanisms. These two criteria are justified by looking at 
their application to the study of various cognitive capacities. I claim that the 
neurocomputational framework is the only current framework that can meet both 
criteria and advance our understanding of cognition. Results of this project are 
intended to: (i) advance the debate on the explanatory values and standards adopted 






guide further research into the nature of cognitive phenomena. The past few years 
have witnessed an increasing amount of interest by scientists in the distinctive role 
that Bayesian neurocomputational models play in explaining cognitive phenomena. 
This has been made possible because of the mathematical advances in identifying 
predictions from complex probabilistic models. Despite this interest, there is still 
little philosophical analysis on the neurocomputational framework and its 
explanatory pay-offs. This thesis is intended to shed light on this framework and on 
its role in advancing our understanding of cognitive behaviour. 
Given the existence of various different perspectives on the study of cognition, 
it is important to specify what is included in the thesis and what is beyond its scope. 
The project is not concerned with the localisation of specific functions in the brain. I 
do not attempt to provide a taxonomy of cognitive versus non-cognitive behaviour. 
The project is not a conceptual analysis. I do not identify the precise relations that 
might hold between mental states and brain states. I briefly discuss mental causation, 
but only in the context of the causal dimensions of psychological explanations. The 
aim is not to understand how the domain of the mental can be accommodated in that 
of the physical. The project does not offer a new definition of mechanism. I am also 
neutral on whether we should be realist or anti-realist about neural mechanisms, 
whether the component parts of these mechanisms are real parts of the system or 
artefacts necessary to explain cognitive behaviour. These are all important topics, but 
they are not directly relevant to the main theme of the thesis. The project is an 
investigation of the various frameworks and methodologies currently employed to 
explain cognitive behaviour. My intention is to make their standards and goals 
explicit and to indicate necessary features of adequate explanations of cognitive 
phenomena. It is then not the truth of particular models that is defended in this thesis, 










Outline of the thesis 
 
The problem that the thesis aims to address concerns what is required for a good 
explanation in cognitive science. 
 The goals of the project are twofold: (i) to provide some necessary desiderata 
that explanations of cognitive behaviour should meet to count as good explanations; 
(ii) to make the goals and standards adopted by the investigators working within the 
different frameworks explicit, and to identify the framework that is most apt to 
generate good explanations. 
Chapter 1 introduces the problem and starts to motivate why predictability and 
identification of mechanisms are two necessary criteria for good explanations in 
cognitive science by examining the folk-psychological causal framework of 
explanation. 
I argue that folk psychology cannot provide good explanations of cognitive 
phenomena because it favours predictive power at the expense of mechanisms. In 
addition to this, I claim that folk psychology offers an inadequate account of cause 
and causal explanation by engaging with James Woodward’s manipulationist theory 
of causation and causal explanation (e.g. 2003, 2008). 
 I then conclude that the truth of psychological causal claims cannot be justified 
by remaining solely at the level of folk psychology, but can be evaluated by 
descending to the level of mechanism. 
Chapter 2 examines the anti-representational framework. In particular, two anti-
representational accounts are analysed: Dynamical Systems Theory (e.g. van Gelder, 
1995; Chemero, 2000) and Behavioural Systems Theory (e.g. Keijzer, 1998, 2005). 
 I identify predictability and unification as the main goals of anti-
representational explanations. I then claim that they are insufficient to distinguish 
descriptions from genuine explanations by drawing on general debates on the nature 
of scientific explanation. I also show that anti-representational explanations are 
grounded on a weak realisation relation between models and modelled systems, 







 I therefore conclude the chapter by arguing that: (i) the identification of 
localised mechanisms is necessary to complement the predictive power of anti-
representational descriptions; (ii) the notion of representation is required to make 
cognitive behaviour intelligible.  
Chapter 3 provides further reasons why representations are necessary to make 
cognitive behaviour intelligible and to allow generalisations by engaging with 
William Ramsey's (2007) partial eliminativist claim. 
I argue that we can consider a system as trafficking in representations when we 
explain its cognitive success in terms of internal models that the system employs to 
draw inferences about the world. 
Chapter 4 tackles the so-called "interface problem" (Bermudez, 2005) and analyses 
the explanatory goals, methodologies and vocabularies of personal- and subpersonal-
level explanations of mental phenomena. 
I argue that personal-level autonomy theorists' arguments do not succeed 
because subpersonal information can and sometimes does provide answers to 
constitutive questions and because a purely normative redescription of a 
phenomenon runs the risk of being only a hermeneutic but not an explanatory 
strategy. 
At the same time, I claim that purely subpersonal explanations cannot 
adequately account for cognitive behaviour: (i) certain personal-level concepts are 
often integral parts of successful explanations of mental phenomena; (ii) folk 
psychology is not a false theory, but a theory that needs to be enhanced. 
I then argue that the methodological autonomy of both personal and 
subpersonal accounts provides an insufficient starting point to properly explain 
cognitive phenomena and that both levels are needed. 
Chapter 5 discusses Jose Luis Bermudez's tripartite account of rational behaviour 
(2003) to further argue in favour of mechanistic explanations. In particular, I show 






results from a range of alternatives and the behaviour matches some normative 
standards — i.e. the maximisation of some kind of utility) are inadequate to 
understand the nature of rational behaviour. Adequate explanations of rational 
behaviour are only possible when external behavioural criteria of analysis are 
complemented by internal mechanistic ones: details about how information is 
encoded and manipulated inside our brains, I claim, are essential to confirm or 
disconfirm hypotheses about the role and nature of reasoning processes and, 
ultimately, to evaluate hypotheses about how rationality is naturally possible. 
Chapter 6 examines the neurocomputational framework of explanation by analysing 
the application of Bayesian neurocomputational models to the study of different 
cognitive behaviours. 
I especially focus on various cognitive behaviours that appear to result from 
some sort of prediction-error minimisation process, which seems to be the main 
building block of a mechanism that allows agents to perceive what is in the 
environment, to learn how to predict the consequences of their behaviours, and to 
perform in a nearly-optimal way. 
I then discuss certain experimental data that speak in favour of the existence of 
some correlation between variables in the models and states in the brain. 
Chapter 7 argues that the neurocomputational framework can meet both necessary 
criteria for good explanations in cognitive science. 
In particular, I show that predictions play a central role in neurocomputational 
explanations and that the framework’s openness to an analysis of the possible 
implementation of cognitive processes together with the growing operationalisation 
of some of its central claims makes it the most adequate framework to progress in 






















1.1 – Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will begin motivating two necessary desiderata in cognitive science: 
the ability to predict and to identify mechanisms. In the following chapters I will 
provide further arguments for this view. 
This chapter starts by examining the folk-psychological framework. The folk-
psychological framework is typically adopted to make sense of behaviour that cannot 
be accounted purely in terms of stimulus-response associations. The central idea of 
the folk-psychological framework is that beliefs, desires and other mental states 
explain behaviours because they cause them.  
I will then engage with James Woodward (e.g. 2003, 2008) who has developed 
an influential defence of the goodness of folk-psychological explanations. His 
manipulationist theory of causation and causal explanation can be used to vindicate 
the truth of folk-psychological causal claims and the adequacy of folk-psychological 
causal explanations. The main assertion to be considered is that folk-psychological 
explanations are good and appropriate explanations of cognitive behaviour because 
they show how a complex event (i.e. a certain combination of beliefs, desires and 






satisfying certain counterfactuals. According to Woodward, mental states are real 
causes because they support true counterfactuals and folk-psychological causal 
explanations are good explanations because they answer what-if-things-had-been-
different questions. Throughout the chapter I will refer to Woodward’s strategy as 
the “same-level strategy”, given that he believes that no further information, beyond 
that found at the level of the agent, is needed to account for cognitive behaviour. 
I attack the view according to which folk-psychological explanations are good 
explanations of cognitive behaviour by drawing on an analysis of Woodward’s same-
level strategy. I will argue that: (i) causal claims couched in neural terms can support 
counterfactuals; (ii) causal explanations couched in neural terms can answer what-if-
things-had-been-different questions; (iii) counterfactuals are useful epistemic tools, 
but they are insufficient to establish the truth of causal claims and the goodness of 
causal explanations. 
At the end of the chapter, I briefly advance the proposal according to which 
explanations of cognitive capacities don’t need to be just predictive, but also 
mechanistic. I will argue that the identification of mechanisms is necessary to 
distinguish useful descriptions from good explanations. I will then highlight some 
pay-offs of lower-level mechanistic explanations with respect to folk-psychological 
ones and I will defend the thesis according to which the ability to predict is a 




1.2 – Explanatory desiderata 
 
A first step to tackle the question of which framework can offer good explanations of 
cognitive behaviour consists in identifying the necessary desiderata that such 
explanations need to meet. As I will show throughout the thesis, this question has no 






explanation a good one. Rather, there are various accounts of explanation, each one 
stressing some possible candidates. 
In this section I will briefly introduce two main families of philosophical 
theories on the nature of explanation. Although they have been originally elaborated 
to examine explanations in chemistry and physics, they are useful starting points to 
understand what explaining cognitive phenomena means. 
The first family of philosophical theories is that of the so-called ontic theories. 
According to these theories, a good explanation identifies the real aspects of the 
world that are in a special relationship with the explanandum phenomenon. This 
particular relationship is a causal relationship. According to ontic theories, a good 
explanation identifies the causes of the phenomenon under study (e.g. Salmon, 1984; 
Woodward, 2003) or its underlying causal mechanism (e.g. Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 
2008).  
The second broad family of philosophical theories on the nature of scientific 
explanations includes the so-called epistemic theories. According to these theories, a 
good explanation identifies a special link between what needs to be explained (i.e. 
the explanandum) and what does the explanation (i.e. the explanans). Such link has a 
special epistemic nature: a good explanation of a phenomenon x offers information 
about x that is beyond that already provided by the phenomenon x itself. In 
particular, a good explanation provides reasons to expect a certain phenomenon 
given specific circumstances. The deductive-nomological model of explanation (e.g. 
Hempel, 1965) advances this idea: to explain a phenomenon is to show that, given 
certain conditions, the phenomenon is to be expected. Rational expectation is here 
the mark of a good explanation. 
Other epistemic theories have emphasised different desiderata of good 
explanations, such as the ability of an explanation to unify apparently disparate 
phenomena (e.g. Friedman, 1974; Kitcher, 1981). According to this view, an 






phenomenon fits into a wider framework that can already account for some other 
familiar phenomena of the world.
1
 
This brief description of the current philosophical theories of the nature of 
explanation shows the lack of consensus on which features make an explanation a 
good one. The followings are some of the possible desiderata: 
 Unification 
 Predictability and possibility to control 
 Scope 
 Identification of causes 
 Identification of mechanisms 
This lack of consensus, however, doesn’t prevent us from identifying those criteria 
that can, better than others, guide research in methodologically adequate ways. 
Indeed, we are left with a strong belief that not every methodology or framework of 
explanation is compatible with our idea of good science. 
What are, then, the necessary desiderata of good explanations of cognitive 
behaviour? 
In this chapter I put forward the idea that explanations in cognitive science 
should be predictive and mechanistic. Explanations should be predictive because 
good explanations should provide a cognitive advantage, that is, they need to provide 
information beyond that already offered by the cognitive phenomena themselves. 
Many philosophers and scientists, with few exceptions
2
, indeed agree that predictive 
power (i.e. the amount of data that corroborates a certain hypothesis) is a necessary, 
                                                 
1
 These accounts are not necessarily exclusive; rather, some features highlighted by 
one account can also figure in another. 
2
 James Woodward (e.g. 2003) and Carl Craver (e.g. 2007) believe that good 
explanations in the life science do not need to be predictive because it is not possible 
to identify laws or regular interactions that are responsible for certain cognitive 
behaviours and that do not admit exceptions, that are not limited in scope and that 
apply in all times and spaces. For a more detailed discussion on the role of 






although not sufficient, feature of good explanations. When we observe that a 
phenomenon happens quite regularly under certain conditions, we usually tend to 
explain it by citing those conditions (i.e. whenever conditions X happen, 
phenomenon Y happens too). Adequate explanations should also be mechanistic, that 
is, they should identify the components and their interactions that regularly bring the 
behaviour about. The identification of mechanisms, I will argue, allows to 




1.3 – The folk-psychological framework 
 
The framework that is most commonly employed to explain why humans can 
perform cognitive behaviour is that of commonsense or folk psychology. 
Folk-psychological causal explanations employ certain concepts to make 
intelligible what someone is doing or did by behaving in a certain way.  In particular, 
they appeal to a class of mental states that are about things, events or states of affairs 
extrinsic to them, and that figure in explanations of human behaviour. Examples of 
mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions and expectations. They are often called 
“propositional attitudes” because it is possible to express them as propositions: belief 
that something, desire something, and so on. Folk-psychological explanations make 
reference to these mental states by treating them as causes of behaviour.
3
 
                                                 
3
 Not all folk psychologists believe that mental states are causes and that their 
connections with behaviour should be understood in causal terms. Some, in 
particular the so-called autonomy theorists, claim that mental states are reasons and 
that their connections with behaviour are rational connections (e.g. mental states 
must be consistent and their connections must be governed by familiar deductive 
principles of logic). I leave this interpretation of folk psychology aside for the 






A certain behaviour is explained in folk-psychological terms by employing a 
generalisation of the form “if a person A desires B and believes that by doing C she 
will get B, then, ceteris paribus, she will do C”. 
Imagine we want to explain why Sara applied for a job in academia. By 
employing a folk-psychological explanation, we could say that Sara applied for the 
job in academia because she desired a job in academia and believed that, by applying 
for it, she could eventually get it. What makes us able to explain Sara’s behaviour is 
the fact that we can rely on a generalisation of the form “a person A applies for a job 
because A wants that job and believes that by applying for it she will get it”.  
These kinds of generalisations have a certain degree of success in predicting 
future behaviour.
4
 If we know that Sara desires a job in academia and believes that 
by applying for jobs in academia she will eventually get one, we can predict that she 
will apply for them. This prediction can then be confirmed or disconfirmed by Sara’s 
future behaviour. 
A natural move at this point would be to motivate this degree of success in 
terms of the truth of folk-psychological causal claims: causal explanations involving 
mental states are often predictive because the causal claims figuring in those 
explanations are true (e.g. Woodward, 2008). Relatedly, folk-psychological causal 
explanations are good explanations of cognitive behaviour because they properly 
capture how we work: humans behave as if they are guided by beliefs, desires and 
other mental states because they are actually guided by them. 
In what follows, I will argue that we should resist these conclusions when they 
are based on folk psychology’s predictive power alone. The reason for this caution 
has to do with the fact that predictive power is necessary but not sufficient to validate 
the adequacy of causal explanations. Predictability is a necessary feature of a good 
explanation because a good explanation should provide us with information about 
                                                 
4
 Not everyone agrees that folk-psychological explanations are highly predictive. 
Churchland (e.g. 1981), for instance, stresses how folk-psychological explanations 
often fail to explain and predict many of our cognitive behaviours. I will say more 






the explanandum phenomenon that we couldn’t have before (i.e. I need to know that, 
given certain conditions, I should expect the cognitive behaviour). The ability to 
predict is, however, not a sufficient feature of a good explanation. Recalling briefly 
the critiques to the deductive-nomological (DN) model of explanation (e.g. Salmon, 
1984) will help me justify why predictability is not also a sufficient condition. 
According to the DN model of explanation, explaining an outcome is simply a 
matter of exhibiting nomologically sufficient conditions for it. A good DN 
explanation has the form of a valid deductive argument that provides one with a 
rational expectation. Consider the following example: 
1. All men who take birth control pills fail to get pregnant 
2. Jones is a man who takes birth control pills 
3. Therefore, Jones fails to get pregnant 
This argument is valid (i.e. if the premises were true, the conclusion would be true), 
but it is not explanatory. The argument is not explanatory because it cites 
nomologically sufficient but not causally relevant conditions. 
A legitimate question arises: given their degree of success, how can we judge 
whether folk-psychological causal explanations are genuine explanations that pick 
out the real causes of cognitive behaviour, rather than mere redescriptions of 
people’s behaviour that help us navigate the world? 
I will now examine a powerful proposal according to which folk-psychological 




1.4 – Woodward’s same-level vindication 
 
One possible way to justify the goodness of folk-psychological causal explanations 
consists in showing that the causal claims that figure in them support true 






caused Sara to apply for the job because, if Sara had believed or desired differently, 
she would have behaved differently. This form of justification holds that there is 
nothing more to the truth of the causal claims than the truth of their counterfactuals 
(e.g. Lewis, 1973). 
One of the major advocates of this idea is James Woodward. In Making things 
happen he develops a defence of same-level explanations in terms of counterfactuals 
by arguing that folk-psychological causal explanations are good explanations 
because they can answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions. He claims that 
mental states are genuine causes of cognitive behaviour because we can intervene 
and manipulate them successfully. 
Woodward affirms that many of the arguments typically employed to show that 
mental states are not causally potent rest on mistaken assumptions about what it is 




When can we say that X is the cause of Y? According to Woodward, since a 
cause is something that must make a difference to its effect, X is the cause of Y if 
and only if were X to be different Y would be different.
6
 
                                                 
5
 Woodward admits that some philosophers draw a clear distinction between 
providing a causal explanation of a phenomenon and making true claims about the 
causes of that phenomenon. On his account, however, the two goals are closely 
related: providing a good causal explanation of a phenomenon requires making true 
claims about its causes. 
6
 The notion of “difference” is here understood in terms of interventions or 
manipulations, which are, again, causal notions. The fact that Woodward doesn’t 
provide a reductionist account of causation has raised various critiques. An 
influential one is put forward by Stathis Psillos (2007). He claims that an 
independent account of the truth-conditions of counterfactuals is required to make 
manipulationist causal explanations good causal explanations. Consider the 
following causal claim: 
• B0: X causes Y 
• For B0 to be true, the counterfactual C1 should be true:  







The notion of difference and the associated notion of difference-maker are 
central in Woodward’s account. Here, a relation between X and Y is a genuine causal 
relation if, were an intervention I changing X, the relation between X and Y wouldn’t 
change, while the value of Y would change. A causal relation is then an invariant 
relation. According to this account, it is possible to distinguish causal from merely 
correlational relations because only the former can be potentially exploitable for 
purposes of manipulation and control.  
Consider the relation between attending a private school in the U.S. and 
scholastic achievement (Woodward, 2008). People tend to believe that students who 
attend private schools score higher in their final exams than students who attend 
public schools. Is the attendance at private schools the cause of higher scholastic 
achievement? Is their relation merely correlational? Answers to these, and similar, 
questions are not obvious. We can imagine various other possible causes of higher 
scholastic achievement. For example, we could say that parents of private schools’ 
students tend to value more the importance of scholastic achievement and that this 
directly influences the students’ performances or that it is the parents’ social-
economic status that directly influences scholastic achievements. Let me redescribe 
the example by means of some variables: 
 P: student attending private or public school 
 S: measure of the scholastic achievement 
 E: parents’ social-economic status 
                                                                                                                                          
• For C1 to be true, the causal claim B1 needs to be true:  
o B1: the intervention I doesn’t change the value of Y directly (i.e. by a 
route independent of X) 
“Establishing that certain counterfactuals are true is [then] necessary for establishing 
that other counterfactuals are true or false.” (ibid., p. 101) According to Psillos, 
counterfactuals provide only an extrinsic way of identifying causal relations. Being 
causal is, instead, an intrinsic property of a relation. Accordingly, the truth of causal 







 A: parents’ value of student’s scholastic achievement 
Within a manipulationist account of causation we can ask whether it is P that causes 
S by wondering what would happen to S if P were different. Under some 
interventions on P, if P were the actual cause of S, then S would change. If S does 
not change under interventions on P, then E or A might be the real cause of S. 
Which kinds of interventions or manipulations can we perform on P to judge 
whether it is the real cause of S? We could run the following experiment. We could 
divide a group of random students in two sub-groups, and then send one sub-group to 
attend a private school and the other sub-group to attend a public school. If, 
independently from the parents’ attitude and socio-economic status, the group sent to 
the private school achieves better results, then we could conclude that P is the cause 
of S. If this is not the case, we could run other experiments to test the roles of E and 
A. 
To be sure that P is the cause of S, we need to be sure that the intervention 
occurred on P and not on another variable. Both real and hypothetical interventions 
can prove the existence of causal relations. Only if interventions are “impossible for 
(or lack any clear sense because of) logical, conceptual or perhaps metaphysical 
reasons, then that causal claim is itself illegitimate or ill-defined” (Woodward, 2008, 
p. 225). 
When we conclude that P causes S, we are offering a type rather than a token 
causal claim. This means that, within Woodward’s manipulationist approach, we can 
justify the truth of the causal claim “attending a private school causes a higher 
scholastic achievement”, but we might not be able to justify the truth of the claim 
“Lisa’s attendance to Gonzaga private school causes her scholastic achievement to 
improve”.  
According to this account of causation based on counterfactuals and on the 
idea that causes are difference-makers, a good causal explanation can answer what-
if-things-had-been-different questions: we can explain an outcome by identifying 






information are about changes and they can be used to manipulate or control the 
outcome. In Woodward’s own words: 
“[…] a successful causal explanation consists in the exhibition of 
patterns of dependencies (as expressed by interventionist counterfactuals) 
between the factors cited in the explanans and the explanandum — 
factors that are such that changes in them produced by interventions are 
systematically associated with changes in the explanandum outcome.” 
(ibid., p. 230) 
In order to distinguish causally relevant from causally irrelevant (or nomologically 
sufficient) information, then, we need to assess whether any change in them brings 
about a change of some sort in the explanandum phenomenon. If a change in the 
antecedent does not modify the consequent, then the antecedent cannot be considered 
a relevant cause of the consequent. Accordingly, the main reason why the deductive-
nomological (DN) model of explanation doesn’t offer a good causal explanation is 
that it states that certain conditions should figure as causally relevant for an 
explanandum although they are only nomologically sufficient for it; in other words, 
deductive-nomological explanations are not good explanations because they cannot 
answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions. 
Consider again the example of Jones discussed above. On Woodward’s 
account, the putative cause is not a real cause because an intervention on it (e.g. 
Jones doesn’t take control pills) doesn’t imply any change in the effect (Jones fails to 
get pregnant). A good causal explanation must, instead, account for counterfactual 
scenarios. 
From the notion of causes as difference-makers and from the claim that there is 
nothing more to the truth of causal relationships than the truth of the associated 
counterfactuals, it follows that mental states employed in folk-psychological 
explanations are the relevant causes of a certain behaviour if their associated 






“[…] all that is required for a change in a mental states M1 to cause a 
change in a second mental state M2 (or in a behaviour B) is that it be true 
that under some intervention that changes M1, M2 (or B) will change. 
Common sense certainly supposes that episodes like these are very 
widespread.” (ibid., p. 234) 
According to Woodward, the folk-psychological framework can provide causally 
relevant claims, while a reductionist framework often identifies only nomologically 
sufficient but not causally relevant information. 
 
1.4.1 – Nomological sufficiency and causal relevance 
 
Woodward argues that at the folk-psychological level it is clear that a difference in 
mental states makes a difference in the outcome behaviour, but that the same cannot 
be said of lower-level neural activations: a difference in certain neural activations 
does not always make a difference in the outcome behaviour. 
Suppose we want to explain why the pressure of an ideal gas increases from 
time t1 to time t2. We know that at t1 the gas has temperature T1, pressure P1 and that 
it is in a container with volume V1. We also know that, after applying heat to the gas, 
the gas has a new and increased pressure P2 at time t2. 
One possible explanation, which Woodward calls macroscopic explanation, 
consists in explaining the new pressure by employing the ideal gas law (PV=nRT). 
This law describes how the macro-variables T, V and P relate to each other and 
change accordingly. By following the law, if the volume of the gas remains stable 
while the temperature changes, the new pressure P2 can be explained by the formula 
P2= nRT2/V. 
We can also explain the new pressure by applying a microscopic strategy. We 
can analyse the molecular configurations and trajectories (G1) of the gas at time t1 
and its new configuration (G2) at time t2. We can then explain P2 in terms of the force 






Woodward argues that, even granting that these micro-level measures are 
possible, G2 can’t be considered the real cause of P2: given that there exist many 
other molecular configurations that could correspond to the same pressure, knowing 
just one of these configurations is not useful to explain why the gas has pressure P2 
rather than P3, P4, and so on. 
He applies the same argument to behaviour: we could employ a microscopic 
strategy to explain, for instance, reaching behaviour by citing the neural correlates of 
the subject’s intention to reach. But then again, given that the same intention could 
be associated with numerous and different neural configurations, these neural 
activations are only nomologically sufficient but not causally relevant for the 
reaching behaviour. The reason for this is that a microscopic explanation in terms of 
neural activations does not hold true counterfactuals: if the neural configuration had 
been different, the reaching movement wouldn’t have changed.
7
 On the contrary, a 
macroscopic explanation holds true counterfactuals: we can explain a certain 
reaching behaviour in terms of a specific intention (its cause) such that, if the 
intention had been different, the grasping behaviour would have been different. 
According to Woodward, then: 
 X causes Y if and only if an intervention changing X would change the value 
of Y and their relationship would remain invariant 
 There is nothing more to the truth of causal claims than the truth of the 
counterfactuals that hold 
 A good causal explanation can answer what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions and place the explanandum phenomenon into a web of 
counterfactual dependencies 
 A macroscopic causal explanation should be preferred to a microscopic 
(neural) causal explanation because: 
                                                 
7
 This example refers to some studies carried out by Richard Andersen and 
colleagues (Musallam et al., 2004). Woodward discusses them as empirical 






o The microscopic causal explanation often contains extremely fine-
grained and causally irrelevant nomologically sufficient information 
o The microscopic causal explanation can’t usually answer what-if-
things-had-been-different questions 
In the next sections, I will argue that Woodward’s same-level strategy is inadequate 
to vindicate the goodness of folk-psychological causal explanations and the truth of 
their causal claims. In particular, I will show that not only folk-psychological 
explanations but also lower-level explanations can answer what-if-things-had-been-
different questions and that lower-level causal claims can support counterfactual 
statements too. In addition to this, I will argue that Woodward’s strategy is 
inadequate to establish the goodness of causal explanations because counterfactual 
statements are insufficient to justify the truth of causal claims. 
In the final section of the chapter I will then briefly argue in favour of lower-
level mechanistic explanations that can account for both functional and structural 
features of components whose regular interactions are responsible for various 
cognitive phenomena and I will show why good explanations of cognitive behaviour 
need to be predictive. 
 
1.4.2 – Criticism of Woodward’s same-level vindication 
 
It is said that, contrary to the deductive-nomological model of explanation, the 
relevant cause of a macroscopic behaviour belong to a level where the cause, if 
changed, would make a difference to its effect: if Sara’s belief that by applying for 
an academic job she will eventually get it were changed, her resulting behaviour 
would change too. 
In this section, I claim that the capacity to support true counterfactuals is 
indicative of the possible goodness of an explanation, but insufficient to establish it. 
Consider the example about the neural correlates of intentions to reach that I 






explanation in terms of mental states as causes and counterfactuals must be preferred 
to an explanation that contains only fine-grained details about the nomologically 
sufficient conditions for a grasping behaviour. Let us look at the example in more 
detail.  
Andersen and colleagues (see Musallam et al., 2004) ran experiments on 
macaque monkeys to identify the neural correlates of intentions to reach for an 
object. They recorded the electrical signals of individual neurons in the monkeys’ 
posterior parietal cortex and developed a program to correlate variations in the 
features of the aggregate firing neurons to differences in intention to reach. Such 
differences in intention where then observed in the monkeys’ overt movements.  
The correlations between neural features, associated intentions and consequent 
reaching movements turned out to be highly predictive: by observing the features of 
the neural firings, Andersen and colleagues could predict which reaching behaviour 
would have followed. 
Woodward examines these experiments and claims that the identification of the 
pattern of neural activation (A1) that corresponds to a specific intention (I1) to reach 
for an object (R1) is not sufficient to conclude that A1 is the real cause of R1. We are 
not allowed to conclude this because, according to Woodward, other neural patterns 
(A11, A12, A13, A14, …) might get activated in other occasions in correspondence to 
the same intention to reach for the same object. Knowing A1 can’t explain why a 
monkey performs the behaviour R1 rather than R2 (A1 doesn’t inform one about any 
counterfactual scenarios: were A1 different, R1 would still be the same), but it can be 
nomologically sufficient for R1. 
Despite Woodward’s belief that lower-level explanations often provide only 
nomologically sufficient conditions, a closer look at the methodology adopted in 
neuroscience reveals that similar experiments are designed to identify repetitive 
commonalities among neural activations. Once a certain neural pattern is identified 






Consider Ma and colleagues’ study on cue integration (2006). They run different 
experiments to tackle the following questions: 
 How could human perform cue integration of different sensory modalities? 
 How could neural activity cause cue integration?  
Their aim was to test whether humans performed cue integration by updating the 
belief about the cause of their sensory input on the basis of sensory information in a 
Bayesian way. If this were the case, neural activity should encode probabilistic 
representations of sensory stimuli and integrate them in a Bayesian fashion. 
By focusing on the integration of tactile and visual sensory stimuli, they found 
that cue integration was performed when the activities of cortical neurons, which 
varied highly from one trial to the next, could be described by Poisson-like statistics. 
To get clear on what a Poisson-like distribution is, consider the following example. 
Imagine you normally receive five phone calls each day. There will be days in which 
you receive less than five phone calls, other days in which you receive more than 
five phone calls, and days in which you receive none. If we assume that the process 
responsible for these variations is random, then a Poisson-like distribution tells you 
how likely it is that you receive a certain number of phone calls during a specific 
period of time. 
Ma and colleagues hypothesised that the presence of Poisson-like variability in 
certain cortical neurons could enable the brain to carry out Bayesian integration over 
them.  
This study allowed them to generate precise predictions about neural 
activations and outcome behaviours, and to consider counterfactual scenarios. They 
could predict that, if the variability of certain cortical neurons were Poisson-like, the 
subjects’ responses would be compatible with those of a Bayesian ideal observer. 
They could also imagine and test counterfactual scenarios: if the variability of neural 
activations were not Poisson-like, the performance of the subject in the task would be 






certain neurons, they could observe a change in the outcome behaviour, then, by 
following Woodward’s account, a causal explanation of cue integration could cite 
certain Poisson-like neurons as causes. The explanation would be able to answer 
what-if-things-had-been-different questions and it would make true claims about cue 
integration’s causes.
8
 Woodward himself seems to agree with this conclusion: 
“[…] insofar as the aggregate profile […] of the firing rates that realizes 
or corresponds to the different ways […] of realizing I1, and [this 
aggregate] leads to R1 and [it] contrasts with whatever aggregate profile 
of neural activity A2 corresponds to the different intention I2, it will be 
equally appropriate to cite A1 as causing or figuring in the causal 
explanation for the monkey’s exhibiting R1.” (ibid., p. 245–246) 
If we were to remain within Woodward’s account, we would say that both folk-
psychological and lower-level explanations adequately explain cognitive behaviour 
when they can answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions and support true 
counterfactuals. For folk psychologists, this conclusion would already be a problem 
because they would have to provide further reasons for why their explanations 
should still be preferred to the ones couched in neural terms. However, a more 
pressing and distinct problem is that Woodward’s account cannot be adopted to 
justify the goodness of any causal explanation given the role he attributes to 
counterfactual statements. 
Counterfactuals are important methodological and epistemic tools to infer the 
existence of causal relations. They help to “rule out possibilities that are at first 
promising, or could be thought to be the cause” (Machamer, 2004, p. 31). Saying that 
                                                 
8
 More information is needed in order to conclude that these neurons are the real 
causes of cue integration. This is due to the fact that counterfactuals are informative 
but not sufficient to establish the truth of the related causal claims. What we could 
say, instead, is that neural causes can be explanatory useful even if neurons fire with 
high variability. Neural causes can be real and genuine causes of human behaviour 







“had X not occurred, Y wouldn’t have occurred either” is important because it 
informs us about the existence of a relation between X and Y, but the nature of this 
relation is not expressed via counterfactual claims. There is a “conceptual distinction 
between causation and invariance-under-intervention: there is an intrinsic feature of a 
relationship in virtue of which it is causal, an extrinsic symptom of which is its 
invariance under interventions” (Psillos, 2004, p. 302). 
Thinking in terms of counterfactuals is then important to design and run 
experiments, to develop and modify hypotheses and, ultimately, to discover causal 




If we reconsider our initial question, by relying on counterfactuals alone, we 
cannot judge whether we are dealing with a genuine explanation or with a useful 
redescription of a cognitive behaviour. My suggestion, which I will only briefly 
consider in the next section and explore more thoroughly in the rest of the thesis, is 
that in order to understand why folk-psychological explanations have a certain 
degree of success and whether mental states can cause cognitive behaviour we need 
to abandon the level of folk psychology and descend to the level of mechanisms. It is 
the existence of certain underlying physical scattered chains of causal influences that 




1.5 – Mechanisms 
 
There is no consensus in the literature concerning what a mechanism really is.
10
 I 
here consider a mechanism to be a set of components whose interactions regularly 
bring an explanandum phenomenon about. 
                                                 
9
 See section 1.5 for more details on this. 
10
 The definition of mechanism I will work with is influenced by Stuart Glennan (e.g. 






What is peculiar of a mechanism and becomes necessary to justify the 
goodness of an explanation is the fact that its components are identified both 
functionally (i.e. with reference to the function they play in producing the cognitive 
behaviour) and structurally (i.e. with reference to certain brain components, their 
location, shape, size, connections, and so on). This, I argue, consists in identifying 
what Andy Clark (2001) calls the “real and grounded” causes. 
In what follows, I start providing some reasons for why the identification of 
mechanisms can complement the predictive power of an explanation, thus 
establishing its adequacy. Consider the following quote: 
“When I claim that some event causes another event, say that my turning 
the key causes my car to start, I do not believe this simply because I have 
routinely observed that turning the key is followed by the engine starting.  
I believe this because I believe that there is a mechanism that connects 
key-turning to engine-starting.  I believe that the key closes a switch 
which causes the battery to turn the starter motor and so forth.  
Furthermore, this is not a "secret connexion".  I can look under the hood 
and see how the mechanism works.” (Glennan, 1996, p. 50) 
Mechanisms are composed of real parts that can be empirically discovered. I am 
therefore justified in saying “if X hadn’t occurred, Y wouldn’t have occurred either” 
if I can point to a mechanism that regularly connects X and Y. 
 There are various explanatory pay-offs related to the identification of 
mechanisms underlying cognitive abilities. A mechanism can: 
i. Explain why a certain counterfactual holds  
ii. Provide further evidence that a system is indeed operating a certain process 
(i.e. it can distinguish mere descriptions from genuine explanations) 
iii. Shed new light on cognitive phenomena 
With respect to (i), Woodward claims that the truth-conditions of counterfactuals 






possible worlds (see Lewis, 1973) or via actual or hypothetical experiments. This, as 
Psillos (e.g. 2004) notes, leaves open the question concerning the truth-conditions of 
counterfactual statements. 
 Psillos explores two possible options. The first option, which Woodward does 
not endorse, consists in collapsing the truth-conditions of counterfactuals on the 
evidence-conditions. The consequence of this move would, however, make 
counterfactuals lose their counterfactuality: they would become similar to future 
predictions and/or evidences in support of relevant laws. Consider Ohm’s law 
(Psillos, 2004, p. 296) according to which the voltage E of a current is equal to the 
product of its intensity I times the resistance R of the wire. Take the following 
counterfactual: 
(C) If the resistance were set to R=r at time t, and the voltage were set to E=e 
at t, then the intensity I would be i=e/r at t 
It t is a future time, then (C) provides an actual conditional, that is, a prediction. If t 
is, instead, a past time, then, given the existence of good evidence for Ohm’s law, 
(C) provides evidence for the law. 
 The second option is to provide a story about what these truth-conditions are 
and how they are related to evidence-conditions. Psillos’ main critique of Woodward 
is that this story is not present in Woodward’s account. This is where mechanisms 
can enter the picture. As Glennan (e.g. 1996) argues, it is the presence of a 
mechanism (e.g. thermostat) that explains why a certain counterfactual holds (e.g. if 
the temperature had risen, the furnace would have turned off) and not vice versa. In 
other words, the presence of a mechanism linking cause and effect is sufficient to 
support the truth of certain counterfactual statements: 
“If, for instance, we want to show that smoking causes cancer, the best 
way to do so would be to discover the mechanism by which tar, nicotine, 
etc. interact with the body to produce cancerous cells. We might provide 






smoking and cancer, but so long as we do not understand the mechanism 
in question, we can still wonder whether or not the correlation indicates 
that smoking causes cancer.” (Glennan, 1996, p. 66) 
When an explanation of a system’s capacity must be provided, it is the behaviour of 
the system that is presented first of all, and not how the behaviour varies or how it 
would have changed under different conditions. Although it is readily agreed that, 
when one presents an explanation, one is also committed to a set of counterfactual 
claims concerning what would have happened if the cause had been different, this is 
not the same as saying that explanations just consist in exhibiting patterns of 
counterfactual dependencies. Counterfactual statements play an important role in 
searching for explanations of cognitive capacities insofar as they help to uncover 
their mechanisms through experimentations. Not only mechanisms are discovered 
via experiments, “the rise of mechanical philosophy was closely associated with the 
rise of experimental science. The observable phenomena of the natural world are to 
be explained in terms of hidden mechanisms, and these mechanisms are to be 
inferred using well controlled experiments” (Craver & Darden, 2005, p. 236). 
 Given that folk-psychological explanations do not aim at providing 
mechanisms, the existence of certain counterfactual statements is insufficient to 
validate the truth of their related causal claims and the goodness of their causal 
explanations. 
With respect to (ii), let me briefly introduce an example offered by Gualtiero 
Piccinini and Carl Craver (2011). They discuss Fodor’s position with respect to the 
explanatory primacy of functional descriptions: 
“If I speak about a device as a “camshaft”, I am implicitly identifying it 
by reference to its physical structure, and so I am committed to the view 
that it exhibits a characteristic and specifiable decomposition into 






identifying it by reference to its function and I therefore undertake no 
such commitment.” (Fodor, 1968, p. 113) 
The description of the valve lifter is a functional description: the valve lifter is a 
component of an engine that lifts the valve. Given that, from a structural point of 
view, there can be many different valve lifters (i.e. multiple realisations of the valve 
lifter), the description of the camshaft and the description of the valve lifter are, 
according to Fodor, independent from each other. The same argument applies to the 
generalisations and laws that we find in psychology: these generalisations are not 
reducible and cannot be captured by those of the lower implementational level. 
To argue in favour of a deep relationship between functions and structures, 
Piccinini and Craver claim that: 
“[…] the “valve lifter” job description puts three mechanistic constraints 
on explanation: first, there must be valves (a type of structural 
component) to be lifted; second, lifting (a type of structurally 
individuated capacity) must be exerted on the valves; and third, there 
must be valve lifters (another type of component) to do the lifting. For 
something to be a valve lifter in the relevant respect, it must be able to 
exert an appropriate physical force on a component with certain 
structural characteristics in the relevant direction. This is not to say that 
only camshafts can act as valve lifters. Multiple realizability stands. But 
it is to say that all valve lifters suitable to be used in an internal 
combustion engine share certain structural properties with camshafts.” 
(Piccinini & Craver, 2011, pp. 301–302) 
Why should an explanation of a cognitive behaviour identify the internal 
components, their structural properties, their functional capacities and their 
organisation responsible for a given phenomenon? The answer I put forward here is 
that the identification of components’ structural features offers further evidence that 






to complement the predictive power of an explanation and to demarcate adequate 
from inadequate explanations of cognitive behaviour. As Piccinini and Craver clearly 
point out: 
“[…] if a sub-capacity is a genuinely explanatory part of the whole 
capacity as opposed to an arbitrary partition (a mere piece or temporal 
slice), it must be exhibited by specific components or specific 
configurations of components. In the systems with which psychologists 
and neuroscientists are concerned, the sub-capacities are not 
ontologically primitive; they belong to structures and their 
configurations. The systems have the capacities they have in virtue of 
their components and organization.” (ibid., p. 293). 
With respect to (iii), components identified both functionally and structurally appear 
to shed new light on known phenomena. If we hypothesise, for instance, that certain 
neurons, characterised spatially and temporally, interact in ways that bring about 
behaviours that are commonly considered of different types (e.g. motor action and 
motor imagery), we can test what happens at the neural level in correspondence with 
both behaviours. If the neural mechanisms that we believe are responsible for motor 
action are also responsible for motor imagery, then we can say that the two 
behaviours are related because they are governed by neural components that share 
important structural, morphological and organisational features. This prediction and 
the resulting validation would also result in a reconceptualisation of our 
commonsense thought according to which motor action and motor imagery are two 
distinct phenomena. 
At this lower-level of analysis, we could then have an explanation such that, 
when the firing is of the type A1 rather than A2, we should expect the reaching 
behaviour B1 rather than B2. We could then test our prediction by observing the overt 






certain features of neurons, such as their firing rates, their relations with other 
neurons and with the resulting behaviour). 
Understanding which framework is more suitable to uncover mechanisms is 
the goal of the current project. The putative framework needs to offer explanations 
that are both predictive and mechanistic. Achieving this goal requires understanding 
the relationships between explanations formulated at more or less detailed levels of 
analysis. This, in turn, yields the inevitable problem of clarifying the relationships 
between different theoretical notions (i.e. functional and structural/neural), between 
theories formulated on the basis of different theoretical notions and, more in general, 
between different disciplines of studies. In chapter 4 I will analyse a version of this 
problem by making reference to the relationship between personal and subpersonal 
styles of explanations. I will argue that a co-evolutionary approach (e.g. Churchland, 
1986) that favours the integration of information coming from different levels of 
analysis is required to adequately tackle these problems. 
Before concluding this chapter, in the next section I will discuss why good 




1.6 – Predictability 
 
Some people (e.g. Woodward, 2003; Craver, 2007) claim that generalisations in the 
special sciences (e.g. cognitive science, neuroscience and biology) admit exceptions 
and that the existence of exceptions doesn’t affect their explanatory purchase. This 
thesis undermines the idea, which is central in the deductive-nomological model of 
explanation, according to which the explanans of a good explanation has to predict 
the explanandum. 
 In what follows, I argue in favour of the ability to predict as a necessary, 






 Various areas of research in cognitive science aim at offering explanations of 
cognitive capacities in the form of generalisations that can be empirically tested. 
Given that these explanations are offered in the form of generalisations, it is 
plausible to expect that they might not hold for specific organisms, that is, that there 
could be a number of factors — related to the environment or to the features of the 
specific organism under consideration — that might cause the failure of these 
regularities. If we want to explain the behaviour of a specific organism, then it seems 
that we have to admit that the regularity that we are considering is not exception-
free. 
 It is possible to criticise this conclusion in at least two ways. One way would 
be to say that it is at least theoretically possible to reformulate the generalisation in a 
way that it becomes exception-free. We could, for instance, list a number of 
conditions that have to be present for the generalisation to hold. Another way to 
avoid the conclusion that regularities admit exceptions would be to add to the 
generalisation a ceteris paribus clause (i.e. “in normal circumstances”). 
 Despite the difficulties of both strategies
11
, some believe that it is not even 
necessary to avoid exceptions. Woodward argues that a generalisation that admits 
exceptions can still be explanatory. By accepting this position, we then need to 
abandon the idea that a generalisation has to allow the prediction of the 
corresponding explanandum behaviour. 
 Craver strongly supports this thesis with respect to mechanistic explanations in 
biology. He claims: 
“[…] explaining a phenomenon need not require showing that it was to 
be expected. […] In neuroscience (and, in fact, also in physics, 
chemistry, and almost everywhere) improbable things happen, and when 
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adopted in various areas of scientific research (see Earman et al., 2002), yields 
vacuous and non-empirically testable claims: the content of “ceteris paribus, all Fs 






they do, mechanisms can explain them as well […].” (Craver, 2007, p. 
39) 
It is important to stress that the thesis according to which the ability to predict is not 
a necessary feature of a good explanation is distinct from the thesis according to 
which the ability to predict is not a sufficient criterion for a good explanation. As I 
have described in section 1.3, a derivation from premises to conclusions can satisfy 
the criteria of the deductive-nomological model of explanation and yet not yield an 
adequate explanation because it cites only nomologically sufficient but not causally 
relevant conditions with respect to the explanandum phenomenon. The claim I am 
examining here is different: the ability to predict is not even a necessary desideratum 
of good explanations. Both Woodward and Craver affirm that a good explanation 
doesn’t have to offer reasons to expect the explanandum phenomenon. 
 Consider the behaviour of place cells (O’Keefe & Conway, 1978) discussed 
by Edoardo Datteri and Federico Laudisa (2012). In searching for the possible 
mechanisms underlying spatial memory in rats, in 1970s investigators found that 
certain cells in the area CA1 of the hippocampus of rats fire whenever the animal 
moves through a particular location in space. The generalisation is, in this case, the 
following: 
(G) Each place cell fires only if the rat is located at a particular spatial position 
This generalisation is considered explanatory to the extent that it identifies the 
features that generate the relevant behaviour. Given that the generalisation (G) is 
considered explanatory, (G) is used by investigators to predict the behaviour of place 
cells and to test the predictions on the basis of experimental results. If there are 
discrepancies between predictions and data, investigators are in a position to 
reconsider the adequacy of the generalisation that motivated those predictions. 
Denying that generalisations should have predictive power means, somehow, that 
generalisations are not even explanatory. 






desideratum of a good explanation concerns the empirical control of the hypothesis. 
In Datteri and Laudisa’s own words: 
“This generalization [G] gives rise to a prima facie testability issue that 
has frequently been discussed in the philosophical literature (Earman et 
al., 2002). Suppose we are able to monitor the activity of a rat place cell, 
pc, while the animal is running in its environment. We are free to make 
predictions about the rat based on [G]: for example, we can predict that 
the next time pc fires, the rat will be in the vicinity of position <x,y> 
(where <x,y> is the centre of the receptive field). However, given the 
assumption that [G] is conditional to the absence of several perturbing 
factors, and if we have no idea of what these perturbing factors are, such 
a prediction is not much worth betting on: the behaviour of pc in “real-
world” settings could well be perturbed by some unknown factor, and the 
prediction is likely to fail.” (Datteri & Laudisa, 2012, p. 603) 
Affirming that an explanation can admit exceptions and that it doesn’t have to be 
predictive, then, generates testability problems that depend on the conventional 
methodology to compare predictions with experimental results. When should 
prediction failures count against the hypothesised generalisation? If we follow 
Craver and Woodward and, more in general, if we believe that adequate explanations 
of behaviour don’t need to be predictive, we don’t have a straightforward answer to 
this question. Discrepancies between predictions and data might be due to the fact 
that the generalisation itself is incorrect or they might depend on the presence of 
some unknown perturbing condition in the experimental setting. 
 Let us reconsider for a moment Woodward’s criteria for identifying good 
explanations. According to Woodward, explaining is a matter of showing patterns of 
counterfactual dependencies; a good explanation is able to answer what-if-things-
had-been-different questions and a causal relation is an invariant relation.
12
 This 
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means that the ability to predict is central in Woodward’s manipulationist model of 
explanation. However, he explicitly criticises the idea that predictability is a 
necessary feature of good explanations and affirms that explanatory generalisations 
can admit exceptions. He discusses two examples to argue in favour of this idea. The 
first example concerns the relationship between untreated syphilis and paresis. Given 
that only 25% of people with syphilis get paresis, the existence of untreated syphilis 
doesn’t allow us to predict the development of paresis. Nevertheless, Woodward 
argues that the following is a good explanation of why Jones has paresis:  
Jones’ paresis is caused by his untreated syphilis 
The second example concerns a subject hitting the edge of a table with her knee, thus 
turning over an ink-bottle whose content ruins the carpet. The following claim is 
considered an adequate explanation of the fact that the ink-bottle turned over: 
Knocking over the table with the knee caused the ink-bottle to turn over and 
ruin the carpet 
In both examples, the premises of the explanations (i.e. Jones’ untreated syphilis and 
knocking over the table) don’t provide the basis to predict the conclusions (i.e. 
Jones’s paresis and ink-bottle turned over) in the absence of other circumstances.  
Nevertheless, according to Woodward, both explanations are adequate explanations, 
hence good explanations don’t have to predict the explanandum phenomenon. 
 This claim seems to be in contrast with Woodward’s account according to 
which a good explanation should answer what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions. By answering these questions, an adequate explanation provides ways to 
control and intervene on the explanandum phenomenon. If the correct explanation of 
Jones’ paresis is his untreated syphilis, then one should be in a position to answer the 
following question: if Jones had had (or hadn’t had) latent syphilis, would have he 
developed paresis? It doesn’t seem that the above explanation can provide an answer 
to this question. At the same time, were the explanation to be adequate, one should 






paresis). The above explanation, however, doesn’t provide us with adequate 
strategies of control and intervention. In particular, the explanation doesn’t allow us 
to prevent other people with untreated syphilis to develop paresis. Nevertheless, 
being able to control a phenomenon by knowing the conditions under which it is to 
be expected is an important pay-off of good explanations: adequate explanations 
should allow us to know that, under certain conditions, a phenomenon is to be 
expected. Knowing this, one can work out ways to modify the conditions so that the 
phenomenon doesn’t come about. For all these reasons, it is difficult to see how the 
claims above can actually figure as good explanations with respect to Woodward’s 
model of explanation. 
 Along the same lines, Craver argues that a good explanation should identify a 
mechanism, which is composed of parts that causally interact to bring the 
explanandum phenomenon about. Craver’s notion of causality is borrowed from 
Woodward’s account: a casual relation is an invariant relation under intervention. 
The description of a mechanism, then, allows us to answer what-if-things-had-been-
different questions. 
 According to Craver, in order to explain “[…] one needs to know how the 
phenomenon changes under a variety of interventions into the parts and how the 
parts change when one intervenes to change the phenomenon” (Craver, 2007, p. 
160). It is therefore difficult to justify Craver’s claim that “explaining a phenomenon 
need not require showing that it was to be expected”. On the contrary, he seems to be 
saying that a good explanation identifies the conditions — the parts and their 
activities — under which a certain phenomenon is to be expected. If these conditions 
are known, we can intervene on them to change the explanandum phenomenon. 
 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the ability to predict is central to both 
Woodward’s and Craver’s accounts. More generally, the necessity to predict is 
required to study behaviours and phenomena. Denying the necessary role of 
predictions generates, as I have just shown, important testability problems, which, in 






1.7 – Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I began to tackle the question concerning the necessary desiderata of 
good explanations of cognitive behaviour. I suggested that the ability to predict and 
the ability to identify mechanisms are two necessary desiderata of good explanations 
in cognitive science.  
I argued that the folk-psychological framework is ill-suited to generate good 
explanations because it favours predictive power at the expense of mechanisms. I 
claimed, contrary to Woodward, that counterfactuals statements are insufficient to 
validate the truth of causal claims and the goodness of causal explanations: 
counterfactuals are important epistemic tools insofar as they can help to uncover 
mechanisms. 
I argued that the truth or falsity of folk-psychological causal claims cannot be 
justified by remaining at the level of folk psychology, but that it can be evaluated by 
descending to the level of mechanisms. I then briefly addressed the explanatory pay-
offs of mechanistic and predictive explanations that go beyond their ability to 





















2.1 – Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the ability to predict and to identify mechanisms 
as two necessary desiderata of good explanations in cognitive science and I argued 
that the folk-psychological framework cannot provide such explanations mostly 
because it favours predictive power at the expense of identification of mechanisms. 
In this chapter I will examine the so-called anti-representational framework. This 
framework aims at explaining cognitive behaviour without invoking the notion of 
representation. 
 In what follows, I will analyse two anti-representational accounts: Dynamical 
Systems Theory and Behavioural Systems Theory. I will show that the anti-
representational framework is ill-suited to properly explain cognitive behaviour and I 
will claim that: (i) the identification of localised mechanisms is necessary to 
complement the predictive power of Dynamical Systems Theory’s formal 









2.2 – Dynamical Systems Theory 
 
According to Dynamical Systems Theory (DST), explanations of cognitive 
behaviour don’t require the appeal to the notion of representation. Abandoning the 
notion of representation is seen as a first necessary step to radically change the way 
in which cognitive scientists think and study how the brain carries out cognitive 
tasks. 
 Dynamicists (e.g. van Gelder, 1995; Chemero, 2000) put forward various 
reasons why we should reject “sophisticated internal representations” (van Gelder, 
1995, p. 346) and embrace a radically new framework of explanation. Their basic 
complaint is that physical systems can engage in many or all of the various cognitive 
tasks for which cognitivists have postulated internal representations without 
employing internal representations. 
A prototypical example of a system performing a cognitive task, according to 
dynamicists, is the Watt’s centrifugal governor for the steam engine (ibid.). Watt 
designed the governor to solve the problem of maintaining constant speed for the 
flywheel of a steam engine. The governor consists of a vertical spindle attached to a 
flywheel that rotates with a speed proportional to the speed of the flywheel. Two 
arms with metal balls on their ends are attached to the spindle and are free to move 
with a force that is proportional to that of the speed of the governor. Thanks to a 
mechanical device, the angle of the arms changes the opening of a valve, thus 
controlling the amount of steam driving the flywheel. If the flywheel turns too fast, 
the arms will rise and the valve will partially close. This closure will then reduce the 
amount of steam available to turn the flywheel, thereby slowing the flywheel down. 
If, instead, the flywheel turns too slowly, the arms will drop, thus causing the valve 
to open. This opening will make more steam available, hence it will allow the speed 
of the flywheel to increase. 
Advocates of DST typically employ the Watt governor example to show that 






central claim is that the Watt governor can solve problems for which people might be 
tempted to posit a representational solution (e.g. we might be tempted to interpret the 
present and desired speed of the flywheel and/or the opening and closing of the valve 
in representational terms) without processing any representation. van Gelder offers 
various arguments to show why we should resist this temptation. 
The first argument consists in noticing that the existence of causal relationships 
between certain parts of the governor (e.g. the causal connections between the arm 
angle and the engine speed) is not sufficient to conclude that the former is a 
representation of the latter (e.g. that the arm angle represents the engine speed). 
The second argument has to do with the explanatory pay-offs that a 
representational story, if needed, should provide. van Gelder argues that treating the 
governor as a device that manipulates representations doesn’t provide any specific 
explanatory pay-off. 
The third argument concerns the notion of representation itself. Advocates of 
DST claim that the notion of representation is not rich enough to account for the 
highly complex dynamics that exist between the arm angle and the engine speed. 
Here the idea is that the governor and its environment (the steam engine) are so 
closely linked that considering one of them as representing the other wouldn’t give 
an adequate explanatory purchase with respect to the behaviour of the system in 
question. 
Port and van Gelder extend the above arguments to all kinds of cognitive tasks. 
They argue that cognitive behaviour can be adequately explained in purely DST non-
representational terms because explaining a cognitive behaviour is a matter of 
identifying its relevant parameters and their coupled dynamics in the course of the 
physical system’s evolution over time: 
“The cognitive system is not a discrete sequential manipulator of static 
representational structures; rather, it is a structure of mutually and 
simultaneously influencing changes. The cognitive system does not 






commands; rather, it continuously coevolves with them. [...] To see that 
there is a dynamical approach is to see a new way of conceptually 
reorganizing cognitive science as it is currently practiced.” (Port & van 
Gelder, 1995, p. 24) 
Cognitive systems can, therefore, be adequately explained, according to DST, by 
means of mathematical descriptions in terms of feedback loops. These formal 
descriptions can predict how cognitive behaviours unfold over time. 
To better understand the explanatory pay-offs of DST, let me consider its main 
features and goals in more detail. 
 
2.2.1 – Mathematical descriptions 
 
A mathematical description of a dynamical system, which is called system’s state, is 
a formal description that consists in a n-dimensional mathematical space, whose 
dimensions correspond to the state variables of the system. These state variables are 
measured quantities that supervene on the behaviour of the system’s lower 
constituents and that do not correspond to any particular part of the system. State 
variables are often called lumped parameters, that is, parameters that are equal or 
proportional to some average value of the corresponding distributed ones. The 
mathematics employed typically specifies a dynamical law that determines how the 
values of the state variables evolve through time. 
 According to a dynamical systems analysis, cognition can be explained as a 
multi-dimensional space of all possible thoughts and behaviours, which is traversed 
by a path of thinking, where certain environmental and internal pressures, which are 
captured by mathematical equations, influence the path that a subject follows in the 
space.  
 The set of all trajectories is called the flow and its features are the objects of 
study of DST. To help determine the shape of the flow, DST relies on a number of 






space where all the trajectories that pass close to it get sucked into it), the notion of 
“basin of attraction” (i.e. the area of influence of an attractor), and “bifurcations” (i.e. 
points in the system’s state where a small change in the state values can modify the 
flow). 
 Thanks to this mathematical apparatus, which doesn’t posit any role for 
representations, DST is said to adequately explain all phenomena that unfold over 
time, cognitive phenomena included. 
 Consider the case of coordinated finger movements. The dynamical HKB 
model (Kelso, 1995) — named after its originators (Haken, Kelso and Bunz, 1985) 
— has become a paradigmatic example of a successful application of DST tools. The 
HKB model is based on the observation that, when asked to oscillate with the same 
frequency both index fingers back and forth, people produce only two basic patterns. 
One pattern consists in both fingers moving to the left or to the right at the same 
time. This pattern is called “in-phase” motion. In the second pattern, one finger 
moves to the left and the other finger moves to the right. This is called “anti-phase” 
motion. 
The HKB model characterises the temporal evolution of one purely 
behavioural variable (i.e. the relative phase of the fingers) as a function of another 
purely behavioural variable or control parameter (i.e. the fingers’ oscillation 
frequency). Both variables do not correspond to any internal state that represents the 
frequency of the movements or the state of the fingers’ coordination with respect to 
one another. Interestingly, if people in anti-phase motion are asked to increase the 
frequency of oscillation, they will spontaneously switch to the in-phase mode at a 
certain frequency of movement (the so-called “critical region”). If, instead, people 
start with in-phase motion, they won’t exhibit such switch. In other words, the in-
phase motion will remain stable through and beyond the critical region. In the 
language of dynamics, there are two stable attractors at low frequencies and a 







The features of the HKB model can be captured using the mathematics of 
Dynamical Systems Theory.  The model describes how one collective variable (i.e. 
relative phase) varies depending on the control parameter (i.e. frequency of 
oscillation). The variable  in the model is an abstract mathematical magnitude that 
corresponds to the oscillation phase, which is instead a concrete behavioural 
quantity. The coordination law can be expressed as: 
 = −sin − 2ksin2 
The parameter k in the model corresponds to the inverse of the oscillation frequency 
in the experiment, such that an increase in frequency corresponds to a decrease in k.  
 It is important to note two features of HKB model. First, the model accounts 
for the data without positing any kind of “inner switching mechanism”; rather, the 
switch results from the self-organising evolution of the system. Second, the model 
makes novel predictions that were unknown at the time the model was developed. 
The model can, for instance, predict the consequences of selective interference by 
applying an electrical pulse to the subject’s hand so as to disrupt the normal 
coordination of movements. 
 Interestingly, the HKB model works because there is a correspondence 
between the quantitative properties of an abstract variable and the quantitative 
properties of its concrete counterpart. This is to say that the concrete system 
instantiates the mathematical system. 
 
2.2.2 – Unification 
 
The importance that dynamicists attribute to mathematical descriptions doesn’t 
depend only on the fact that formal descriptions are useful tools for explaining 
behaviour that unfolds over time, but also on their ability to shed light on the real 
nature of dynamical processes, as it has already happened in other sciences, primary 






phenomena under a common generalisation. The dynamical equations of the HKB 
model, for instance, can be used to describe similar coordination patterns 
implemented across physically disparate systems.
13
 As Chemero claims: 
“HKB model is an example of a general strategy for describing 
constraints on behavior. First, observe patterns of macroscopic behavior; 
then seek collective variables (like relative phase) and control parameters 
(like rate) that govern the behavior; finally, search for the simplest 
mathematical function that accounts for the behavior. Because, HKB 
argue, complex systems (like the one involving the muscles, portions of 
the central nervous system, ears, and metronome in the finger-wagging 
task) have a tendency to behave like much simpler systems, one will 
often be able to model these systems in terms of extremely simple 
functions, with only few easily observable parameters, which reflect the 
dynamic behavior.” (Chemero, 2001, p. 141) 
Dynamicists believe that the use of mathematics is necessary not only to unify 
disparate phenomena, but also to naturalise cognition (e.g. Chemero, 2000; Swenson 
& Turvey, 1991; Turvey & Carello, 1981): if we can understand cognition by using 
the same method and mathematical apparatus that we already use in other sciences, 
we will be in a position to offer a proper naturalised account of cognitive behaviour. 
 
2.2.3 – Dynamics 
 
The use of mathematical equations for explaining cognitive phenomena also brings 
to the foreground the importance of real-time dynamics: cognition is active and 
cognitive processes are influenced by time and by changes in the environment. 
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 Coordination patterns that can be modelled with HKB are: certain aspects of motor 
skill learning, interpersonal coordination, speech perception and visual perception 






 The primary role attributed to real-time dynamics is an important novelty of 
the DST approach that puts it immediately in contrast with other theoretical 
frameworks. The natural competitor is the Classical Computational Theory of Mind 
that considers cognitive tasks as the result of processes operating on discrete symbols 
in atemporal manner.
14
 According to DST, adequate explanations of cognitive 
behaviour need to consider cognition in its complexity, as strongly dependent on 
time and system-environment interactions. This is the so-called strong coupling 
thesis that leads up to anti-representationalism: cognitive agents are embedded in an 
environment with which they strongly interact. This means that the states of a system 
that are responsible for its cognitive activity are dynamically coupled with external 
environmental states and features, with the consequence that any change in the 
former brings about, simultaneously, changes in the latter. At the same time, the 
affected states of the environment influence the change in the states of the system. 
These influences are sometimes called closed-loop control processes. 
 Given these close couplings and influences between the system and its 
environment, only DST tools, and not representational or computational tools, are 
considered adequate to explain cognition. 
 To sum up, according to DST advocates: 
 Mathematical descriptions are: 
o The most suitable tools for analysing cognition and for predicting 
cognitive behaviour unfolding over time 
o Sufficient for explanations, hence there is no need to state the 
existence of internal representations 
o Successful strategies for understanding dynamical systems in other 
sciences, so they might offer a good methodology to arrive at a 
naturalised account of cognition 
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 Cognition needs to be considered in its complexity, as a phenomenon that 




2.3 – Critical discussion 
 
2.3.1 – The explanatory inadequacy of formal mathematical methods 
 
A DST description of a cognitive process is a formal mathematical description whose 
main building blocks are the system’s variables. These variables constitute the state 
space of the system and are called lumped parameters because they do not 
correspond to any particular constituent of the system.  
 Given that it would be impossible to consider all the variables involved in the 
generation of even a very small reflex, the choice of which variable should be 
included in the formal mathematical model is crucial to correctly model the 
explanandum phenomenon. 
 Within a DST model, this important choice is made independently from the 
substrate that realises the explanandum cognitive process. Indeed, as I have claimed 
above, implementational details are not seen as necessary for good explanations. 
 In this section, I defend the claim according to which predictability is the main 
goal of dynamical systems explanations. In Port and van Gelder’s own words: a 
dynamical model “yields not only precise descriptions […] but also predictions 
which can be used to evaluate the model” (Port & van Gelder, 1995, p. 15), and for a 
dynamical model to be predictively adequate, it doesn’t necessary have to include 
implementation-dependent variables. Let me elaborate on this point.  
 In his 1998 paper, van Gelder considers various possible objections to DST. 
One of these objections concerns the distinction between description and 
explanation: can DST provide genuine explanations of behaviour? The thought 






connects them, and any line can be approximately described by some equation or 
another. The risk for DST is that of “curve fitting”, that is, connecting the data, 
formulating an equation that describes the connecting line, and then seeing the result 
as the explanation of the phenomenon that generated the data. van Gelder himself 
admits that: 
“A poor dynamical account may amount to little more than ad hoc ‘curve 
fitting’, and would indeed count as mere description.” (van Gelder, 1998, 
p. 625) 
According to van Gelder, the fact that some dynamical accounts are poor doesn’t 
depend on them being dynamical. Indeed, van Gelder notes that genuine 
explanations similar to the dynamical ones are found in many other sciences. In 
addition to this, DST explanations are not mere descriptions because they can 
formulate novel predictions and support counterfactuals (see Clark, 1997). Consider 
the following quotes: 
“Dynamical modelling […] involves finding […] a mathematical rule, 
such that the phenomena of interest unfold in exactly the way described 
by the rule.” (Port & van Gelder, 1995, p. 14) 
“[…] taking some novel phenomena and showing that it is the behavior 
of a dynamical system is always a significant scientific achievement.” 
(ibid., p. 11) 
“Such models specify how change in state variables at any instant 
depends on the current values of those variables themselves and other 
parameters. Solutions to the governing equations tell you the state that 
the system will be in at any point in time, as long as the starting state and 
the amount of elapsed time are known.” (ibid., p. 19) 
According to DST, then, cognitive phenomena are explained by citing the laws (e.g. 






The central role of predictions in DST explanations and the lack of logical distinction 
between an explanation of a given state and its prediction make DST explanations a 
case of deductive-nomological explanations.  
In line with the claims I made in the previous chapter, predictive success, in 
this case the predictive success of dynamical models, is not sufficient to provide 
good explanations of cognitive phenomena. While dynamicists believe that we can 
dispense from decomposition and localisation (Bechtel, 1998) and still obtain an 
adequate explanation of a cognitive capacity, I argue that information concerning the 
nature and the role of the internal physical components responsible for a certain 
behaviour are necessary to explain it. In particular, the identification of the 
responsible mechanism offers strategies of control and testability that allow us to 
distinguish a mere description from a proper explanation. This, in turn, requires a 
deep analysis of the material substrate that brings about the cognitive process.  
A mechanistic approach is not only necessary to distinguish predictive 
descriptions from genuine explanations, but it is also needed to avoid problems 
related to certain dynamical claims. Consider the following quote: 
“[…] the relationship at the heart of the nature hypothesis [i.e. the 
hypothesis that tells us what cognitive agents are by specifying the 
relation they bear to dynamical systems] is not identity but instantiation. 
Cognitive agents are not themselves systems (sets of variables), but, 
rather, objects whose properties can form systems. Cognitive agents 
instantiate numerous systems at any given time. According to the nature 
hypothesis, the systems responsible for cognitive performance are 
dynamical. […] Another noteworthy fact about these models is that the 
variables they posit are not low level (e.g. neural firing rates), but, rather, 
macroscopic quantities at roughly the level of the cognitive performance 






A cognitive system is, then, a real dynamical system when it changes over time and 
when it instantiates a mathematical dynamical system that correctly describes some 
aspects of its change:  
“[…] for every kind of cognitive performance exhibited by a natural 
cognitive agent, there is some quantitative system instantiated by the 
agent at the highest relevant level of causal organization, so that 
performances of that kind are behaviors of that system: in addition, 
causal organization can and should be understood by producing 
dynamical models, using the theoretical resources of dynamics, and 
adopting a broadly dynamical perspective.” (ibid., p. 622) 
How should we interpret the claim that “all cognitive systems are dynamical 
systems”? Marco Giunti (1995) suggests that we could read the claim as saying that 
all dynamical systems are real dynamical systems, that is, systems that change over 
time. Such interpretation, however, would yield a trivial thesis given that any 
concrete object can be said to change over time, in some sense. We could instead 
interpret the claim as saying that all dynamical systems (e.g. mathematical dynamical 
systems) are real dynamical systems, in which case the thesis will be an absurd: a 
cognitive system, which is a real object, cannot be identical to a mathematical 
dynamical system, which is, instead, an abstract formal structure. A third reading, 
Giunti says, could make more sense. It would interpret the claim as “all cognitive 
systems instantiate dynamical systems”, which means that the study of mathematical 
dynamical systems can help us to understand something about cognitive systems. 
The specific sense of “instantiation” becomes clear in van Gelder’s own words: 
“The scientist furnishes an abstract dynamical system to serve as a model 
by specifying abstract variables and governing equations. Simple models 
can be fully understood by means of purely mathematical techniques. 
More commonly, however, scientists enlist the aid of digital computers to 






behavior). The simulation results are compared to experimental data from 
the target. To the extent that the correspondence is close, the target 
system is taken to be similar in structure to the abstract dynamical 
model.” (van Gelder, 1998, p. 620) 
A mathematical dynamical model, then, allows to simulate certain aspects of the 
behaviour of a cognitive system by first implementing the model and then assigning 
to the model a task similar to the one assigned to the cognitive system. In carrying 
out the task, the simulated model goes through a changing process. It is then this 
process that counts as a description of the real cognitive process given that it is 
similar to the cognitive process in some relevant respect. This makes sense for 
dynamicists who are interested in how things change in the first place and have little 
interest in those states that are the medium of change (ibid., p. 621). However, as 
Giunti notes (1995), the instantiation relation insures, at most, a certain similarity 
between the changes that the model aims at describing and what counts as a 
description of them. Accordingly, DST explanations depend on models that are 
instantiated in real systems in a weak sense: the instantiation/simulation relation 
insures only similarity between a certain cognitive process and the corresponding 
simulating process. Setting up correspondences on the basis of predictions between 
numerical sequences contained in the model and those of the real system’s data is not 
sufficient to successfully explain the data. Rather, mathematical variables need to be 
identified in the physical substrate of the system for us to say that they have real 
counterparts in the system’s performance. To do this, we need to study the material 
substrate that implements the cognitive process. 
A further reason why DST advocates treat mathematical formal models as 
adequate explanations of cognitive behaviour has to do with the fact that these 
models have already been proven explanatorily successful in other branches of 
science. I have claimed above that an important goal of DST is that of unifying 
phenomena under a same description and that the achievement of this goal is 






an important pay-off of dynamical modelling is to reveal the existence of widespread 
patterns (e.g. the core equation of the HKB can be used to describe similar 
coordination patterns in other physical systems) and, at the same time, deny that the 
mere fact that dynamical descriptions apply to various physical systems bears on 
whether they explain the phenomena in question or not: 
“If we want to know why humans exhibit the phenomenon described in 
the HKB model, it is merely suggestive to note that a similar pattern is 
observed in a variety of other systems. Given the pattern alone we have 
no better idea than we had as to how it is that humans (or any other 
system for that matter) behave in compliance with the model. If anything, 
then, the broad scope of certain dynamical models merely indicates that 
many other similar phenomena require explanations as well, and perhaps 
these explanations will be similar.” (Kaplan & Bechtel, 2011, p. 441) 
A naturalistic account of cognition, I will argue, doesn’t necessarily have to dispense 
with notions that, prima facie, don’t belong to the natural world (e.g. the notion of 
representation). As I start arguing in the rest of the chapter and more in detail 
throughout the thesis, there are cases where appealing to representation is inevitable 
to make cognitive behaviour intelligible. 
 
2.3.2 – Rethinking the format of representations 
 
According to DST, a cognitive behaviour can be properly explained in terms of 
lumped parameters and differential equations without the need to posit 
representations. In particular, the abandonment of the notion of representation is 
intended to facilitate the study of complex phenomena that unfold over time.  
 In this section I argue that a complex behaviour that unfolds over time can be 
explained in representational terms too. This undermines the DST claim that the 
abandonment of representations is necessary to account for dynamics in the study of 






representational approaches share the idea that timing and dynamics are essential in 
cognition.  
 Consider connectionist approaches. They constitute an important category that 
anti-representationalists fail to adequately address: they are deeply representational 
although they do not employ the traditional classicist notion of representation 
according to which representations are “quasi-linguistic” structures whose contents 
are strings of symbols operated on by a read/write/copy architecture (Churchland, 
1989; Clark & Toribo, 1994). Rather, connectionists consider internal representations 
to be vectors of activations in neural networks, whose processes are vectors’ 
transformations in high dimensional state spaces. As Andy Clark and Josefa Toribo 
clearly show (1994), the main disagreement between classicists (e.g. Smolensky, 
1988; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) and connectionists lies in the identified format of 
internal representations rather than in the existence of representations in the first 
place. 
 Connectionist representations are less transparent and sequentially manipulable 
than classicist representations. While quasi-linguistics forms of representation 
operated upon sequential processes seem inadequate to account for dynamics and 
couplings (i.e. Clark, 1993), the same cannot be said for connectionist forms of 
representation. Indeed, there are “kinds of fast, efficient coupling often achieved by 
connectionists neural network style solutions […]; solutions which are nonetheless 
recognised as falling into a more generally representationalist camp” (Clark & 
Toribo, 1994, p. 412). Paul Churchland, for instance, treats connectionist networks as 
representational systems embodying knowledge structures in the form of prototypes. 
Prototypes are points or small volumes that can be depicted in abstract state spaces of 
possible activation vectors and that can be given a dynamical description in terms of 
“attractors”. 
Rather than attacking the notion of representation as such, then, the DST seems 
to criticise a specific type of explicit and linguistic-form representation. If this is the 






sophisticated forms of representation to perform their tasks successfully. In the next 
chapter (see also chapters 6 and 7) I will examine examples where this more 
plausible reading of representation, together with its explanatory pay-offs, becomes 
clearer. At present, the current discussion suffices to say that embracing a dynamical 
perspective doesn’t force us to give up on representationalism; rather, it opens up the 
possibility to rethink and enrich the notion of representation, in particular with 
respect to its format and its role in the cognitive economy. 
DST also forces us to examine which tasks do indeed employ representations 
and which don’t: not all behaviours need explanations that posit representations. The 
behaviour of the Watt Governor, for instance, can be explained by employing a 
purely causal story about its workings. Nevertheless: 
“The success of a non-representational analysis of a device like the Watt 
governor […] fails to argue for a more generic anti-representationalism. 
For since the dimensions of the relevant state space were 
straightforwardly physical (available without significant computational 
effort from the ambient environmental input), the result is effectively 
trivial. By contrast, as soon as we are dealing with state spaces whose 
dimensions are more abstract, and hence cover a superficially very 
disparate range of patterns of physical stimulation (as in e.g., responding 
to an item as “valuable”, or even detecting the presence of a given 
phoneme (see Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989)), the dynamical system 
story becomes a representational one (too). Thus, unless you believe that 
human cognition somehow operates without recording gross sensory 
inputs so as to draw out the more abstract features to which we 
selectively respond, you will already be committed to a story in which 
the states spaces themselves are properly seen in representational terms.” 






In the last section of the chapter I will introduce examples from the so-called 
“representation-hungry” problem domain to show how the behavioural examples that 
DST considers might not require a representational gloss, while others do. 
 To summarise what I have claimed so far, my arguments against the 
explanatory goodness of DST explanations are the followings: 
 Formal mathematical models are useful for making predictions about the 
unfolding of a system’s behaviour over time, but insufficient to explain it. I 
claimed that a genuine explanation of cognitive behaviour requires the 
identification of its responsible mechanism too. This, in turn, requires a 
deeper analysis of the implementational substrate that realises the cognitive 
behaviour 
 Formal mathematical methods can be employed to unify disparate physical 
phenomena under common generalisations, but they are not sufficient to 
explain the phenomenon in question 
 DST instantiation relationships between formal models and physical systems 
are based on models’ predictive powers alone, hence they are insufficient to 
explain the real processes responsible for behaviour 
 Naturalising cognition doesn’t require the abandonment of the notion of 
representation; rather, complex cognitive phenomena can be adequately 




2.4 – Behavioural Systems Approach 
 
Fred Keijzer (e.g. 1998, 2005) takes a different route to show that cognition and 







 He argues that cognition needs to be reconnected to the world, and that, to do 
this, a necessary first step consists in rejecting the idea that cognitive systems employ 
representations as stands-in for things in the environment. Indeed, a major tenet of 
anti-representational accounts is the claim that many cognitive processes are closely 
and intrinsically dependent on external ones and on the dynamical interplay between 
internal processes and bodily and environmental characteristics. Work in robotics 
(e.g. Brooks, 1991) is often used to explicate this claim. Robots function properly 
when there is a specific control structure, a specific embodiment and a specific 
environment. The internal control structure itself is not sufficient to make sense of 
the workings of the robot; rather, the body and the environment are essentials to 
generate intelligent behaviour.  
Within Keijzer’s Behavioural Systems approach, a behavioural system is 
understood as a neural, bodily and environmental interaction system. In contrast to 
behaviourism that points out only the functional regularities of behaviour
15
, 
Behavioural Systems explanations of cognitive phenomena also require the 
identification of internal (structural) mechanisms. In particular, from a Behavioural 
Systems perspective, a good structural characterisation (i.e. a structural-anatomical 
description of the physical behaviour itself) is necessary to uncover the mechanisms 
underlying cognitive behaviour: 
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 “In psychology, the behaviorist solution of behavioral description can be described 
as function without structure. Structure has been shifted out as irrelevant for operant 
behavior. For example, changes in the feeding behavior in insects and rats can be 
functionally equivalent while the structural properties of the behaviors are hugely 
different. […] Such functional aspects remain the dominant way of characterizing 
behavior. Movements tend to be treated as ‘motor behavior’, another functional form 
of behavior. In contrast, there is little elaboration of the idea that movements—or 
rather sensorimotor couplings in the embodied view—ought to be taken as the 
general and basic structural components of behavior’s functional regularities.” 







“[…] functionality emerges from the system, and is not a basic feature. A 
structural characterisation stresses (neural, bodily and environmental) 
subsystems and the generation of behavior.” (Keijzer, 2005, p. 132) 
Consider an insect’s wing beating behaviour. According to Keijzer, insect wing 
beating is a cognitive behaviour that can be explained by appealing to on-line and 
off-line components: it is controlled by both on-line external feedback from the 
wing’s beating movements and by off-line internal oscillators that set a basic rhythm 
independently from such feedback. The on-line components are crucial to the 
insect’s behavioural success and correspond to the couplings between the insect and 
its environment; the off-line components refer, instead, to certain processes internal 
to the insect that are simultaneous with the on-line ones. 
 The centrality of the on-line components and the importance attributed to the 
dynamics of the system are the main building blocks of the Behavioural Systems 
approach, as clarified in the following quote: 
“Cognition to a large extent depends on, or, some would hold, even 
consists of perception-action loops that build organism and environment 
together in a continuous reciprocal interaction.” (ibid., p. 124)  
Cognitive processes depend on external factors and on the dynamics governing the 
complex interactions between the system and its environment so deeply that, 
according to Keijzer, we can say that cognition consists of perception-action loops 
and dynamics.  
 Here again, we recognise the peculiarity of this approach with respect to the 
Classical Computational Theory of Mind: the Behavioural Systems approach 
attributes a central role to bi-directional, circular, loopy structures of sensorimotor 
and perception-action couplings in the explanation of cognitive behaviour. The 
cognitive behaviour itself is not seen as the result of an internal process, but as an 
intermediate step in an ongoing series of perception-action loops. There is therefore 








 The wing-beating behaviour can then be explained as a 
joint set of adaptations (i.e. the insect wing beating gets modified according to the 
external circumstances) and dynamics (i.e. the behaviour of the insect unfolds in time 
and consists of a series of events that occur over time). 
 Since the notion of internal states applies widely — Keijzer speaks of 
“universal presence of neural and other regulatory factors that modulate all ongoing 
behavioural processes” (ibid., p. 139) — on-line and off-line processes characterise 
any low-level as well as high-level cognitive behaviour. Consider the following 
quote: 
“Given these considerations it makes no sense to cast perception-action 
coupling as on-line and cognitive processing as off-line […]. And, it 
would be a case of representational overstretch if the traditional notion of 
representation is applied to all kinds of internal states required to account 
for different aspects of the whole spectrum of behaviour, from bacterial 
behaviour to the most complex cognitive tasks.” (ibid.) 
The behaviour is cognitive simply because: (i) its outcome is adaptive; (ii) it results 
from the dynamic interplay between the organism and the environment. 
 Showing that cognition results from processes and components which are not 
“special” compared to any other natural process is an important goal for Keijzer and, 
more in general, for anti-representational approaches. Achieving this goal would 
imply that there exists a framework to study and explain cognition as a purely natural 
phenomenon. Keijzer is confident that such a naturalistic account of cognition is 
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 It is interesting to note here, as I will clarify later on in the chapter, that the role of 
these off-line processes operating on internal non-representational states is different 
from other roles typically attributed to off-line processes in the representational 
literature. The latter usually characterises as off-line those processes that stand-in for 
something that is outside in the environment or for something that is currently 
absent. This more common usage of the notion of off-line processes is clearly related 
to a representational function of such processes. For more details on this second 






possible and that the rejection of the notion of representation is a necessary step 
towards it. Internal states do not stand-in for aspects of the environment. They are 
essentially enabling and regulatory components of cognitive processes: 
“Rejecting or criticizing the use of representations is then taken to imply 
a view that solely relies on the immediately present environment for 
guiding perception-action couplings. However, within a behavioural 
systems approach one can, and must, acknowledge the need to 
incorporate internal states as relevant factors in the off-line guidance of 
perception-action couplings. […] Acknowledging internal states does not 
require a commitment to a representational interpretation of these 
internal states. […] At first sight, one may tend to equate the 
behaviourally relevant internal states of a cognitive system with 
something like intentional states or cognitive representations.” (Keijzer, 
2005, pp. 138–139) 
How can a Behavioural Systems approach deal with classic cognitive topics, such as 
playing chess (ibid.)? Keijzer’s answer consists in showing that rejecting 
representations doesn’t imply valuing only the on-line components of cognitive 





 2.5 – Criticisms of Behavioural System Approach 
 
To sum up, Keijzer uses the following arguments to argue against representations: 
i. A cognitive behaviour consists of on-line and off-line processes (i.e. neural 






ii. Explanatory power is achieved once it is possible to highlight the universal 
features that cognitive processes, and consequently cognitive systems, share 
with other natural processes and natural systems 
iii. Cognition depends to a large extent on perception-action loops, which are 
interpreted as on-line components 
Let me consider each of these points individually.  
The idea that cognitive behaviours depend on both on-line and off-line 
processes (i) is widespread even among representationalists, who usually argue that 
cognitive systems need to rely on internal processes to support and complement on-
line processes. This is particularly evident when the explanandum phenomenon 
doesn’t depend closely or directly on available environmental states (e.g. imagery, 
memory, planning or reasoning). In these cases, priority is given to internal features 
rather than to perception-action loops: advocates of representationalism say that 
systems can behave cognitively even in the presence of reduced or absent relevant 
information from the environment because they employ internal representations. An 
account that cited only on-line and off-line processes over regulatory states wouldn’t 
be sufficiently explanatory. The role played by off-line components and processes in 
representational accounts is different from the role they play in a Behavioral Systems 
account: off-line components are not only used by the system to regulate on-line 
dynamics, but function as surrogates for certain on-line features. Consider Rick 
Grush’s account of mental imagery (2004). Mental imagery is a cognitive behaviour 
whose explanation requires considerable attention to its off-line components and 
processes. How could this behaviour be explained within Keijzer’s account? Could 
we say that it is the result of perception-action loops? Could we treat its internal 
states as purely regulatory neural states? A representational story seems to be more 
explanatory here: the agent can imagine an event without performing any overt 
behaviour because the underlying process, which is not a perception-action loop in 
Keijzer’s sense, is based on the internal manipulation of states that function as 






1995). As I will briefly argue in the last section of the chapter and more in the next 
chapter, behaviours that require off-line representational components are more 
common than we might imagine at first. 
Following the same kind of reasoning and considering now point (ii), I believe 
that in order to identify what is typical of cognitive behaviour we cannot only 
highlight features that are common among all physical systems interacting with the 
environment. If we want to explain decision-making processes, for instance, we want 
an explanation that doesn’t only show what is in common between a decision process 
and, for example, a motor process; rather, we want an explanation that can show how 
a system can perform decision processes in the first place and what distinguish these 
processes from others. In other words, we do not have a good explanation of a 
cognitive phenomenon when we show how it is similar to other physical phenomena, 
but when we can identify its responsible mechanism — see my criticism of DST in 
2.3.1. 
Let me now consider point (iii) and the idea that cognition depends to a large 
extent on perception-action loops.  
 This is another claim that I think misses the mark, as almost every 
representationalist would agree with it. Indeed, many advocates of 
representationalism (e.g. Bechtel, 1998; Clark, 1997; Grush, 2003) understand 
perception and action as cognitive. Extending the cognitive domain so as to include 
also lower-level behaviours is surely an important pay-off of anti-representational 
and dynamical approaches, as I argued above with respect to DST, but not a claim 
that can be used to argue against representationalism in general. Indeed, Keijzer 
himself recognises that the importance of loopy structures is not confined only to 
anti-representational accounts of cognitive abilities, but widely adopted in cognitive 
science (Keijzer, 2005, p. 134). On the one hand, focusing on dynamics and loops 
does not force us to reject the notion of representation as explanatorily useful and, on 
the other hand, the importance attributed to perceptual and motor processes and to 






according to which every behaviour is representational. Considering again the wing-
beating behaviour discussed above, saying that it depends on perception-action loops 
and on insect-environment dynamics doesn’t force us to conclude that it also results 
from processes operating on internal representations. Showing that certain 
behaviours, which result from dynamics and perception-action loops, can be 
explained in non-representational terms is not sufficient to claim that every cognitive 




2.6 – Representation-hungry problems 
 
One substantial trouble affecting DST and Behavioural System approach is that the 
kinds of problem-domain invoked are just not sufficiently “representation-hungry” 
(Clark & Toribo, 1994, p. 418). Rather, they are, without exception, domains where 
environmental stimuli can be used in place of internal representations.  It is therefore 
unfair to use these cases to illustrate a more general anti-representational claim. 
Clark and Toribo name a “representation-hungry” problem domain any domain 
where one or both of the following conditions apply: 
 The problem involves reasoning about things or states of affairs that are not 
directly present, non-existent or counterfactuals 
 The problem needs the system to be sensitive to environmental parameters 
that are complex or ambiguous 
The ability to track the distal or the non-existent, for instance, requires, prima facie, 
the use of some inner resource that can be employed to allow appropriate 
behavioural coordination without the constant guide of inputs from the environment. 
Domains where this ability is required are less rare than we might expect.  Reasoning 
about absent environmental features or counterfactual scenarios is central in many 






of pursued preys and to engage in counterfactual reasoning when selecting how to 
grasp food. 
 Behavioural success in animals, including humans, often depends also on the 
ability to compress or dilate input space. In some cases, animals need to interpret 
inputs that are quite similar as deeply different and inputs that are quite different on 
their immediate coding as deeply similar. This suggests that animals are able to 
isolate only that information contained in the inputs that is relevant to their 
coordination with the current environment. The internal states developed to serve this 
end are, according to Clark and Toribo, just internal representations whose contents 
concern the states of affairs thus isolated. 
 Even basic visual abilities (e.g. object recognition) may require the use of 
similar strategies, as recent neuroscientific research has shown. The ability to 
recognise the object from any one of a number of distances, angles, settings, and so 
on is best explained by supposing that the system first transforms the input into a 
canonical representation frame and only then matches this transformed product to its 
stored knowledge to carry out the identification task. 
 All these cases are, interestingly, more widespread than we might have 
originally supposed. Given that they all require the employment of representations, it 





2.7 – Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I analysed the anti-representational framework by examining two anti-
representational accounts: Dynamical Systems Theory and Behavioural Systems 
approach. I then offered various reasons why the anti-representational framework 






 According to the authors I considered, a good explanation of cognitive 
behaviour is a naturalistic explanation that shows the place of cognition in the natural 
world. I argued that, despite being an important pay-off of anti-representational 
explanations, this goal does not free us from the need to give an analysis of the 
mechanisms underlying cognitive behaviour. In particular, I showed that 
predictability and unification are not sufficient criteria for good explanations, and I 
argued that they need to be complemented with the identification of mechanisms. 
Such additional component allows to distinguish descriptions from explanations and 
to identify a clearer bridge between models and modelled systems. 
 In addition to this, I claimed that a naturalistic account of cognitive behaviour 
doesn’t need to reject the notion of representation. Rather, such notion appears to be 
inevitable to explain a wide range of cognitive phenomena that belong to the so-
called “representation-hungry” domain and that do not result from direct couplings 


























Chapter 3 - William Ramsey and the Partial 




3.1 – Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined two anti-representational proposals and their 
arguments against the usefulness of the notion of mental representation in explaining 
cognition. In the current chapter I will discuss a different attack on the notion of 
representation put forward by William Ramsey (2007). 
 According to Ramsey, a genuine representational account explains the 
cognitive success of a system in terms of internal representations and operations over 
them. For a state to be a representation, he says, it needs to satisfy certain desiderata. 
The result of his analysis is a partial eliminativist thesis according to which only the 
Classical Computational Theory of Cognition (CCTC), but not the newer accounts 
(i.e. connectionism and cognitive neuroscience), is genuinely representational. The 
structure of the chapter is as follows. 
 I will first define what Ramsey calls the job description challenge that sets the 
standards that a theory needs to meet to be representational. According to Ramsey, 
the notion of representation employed in the CCTC can meet this challenge, while 






neuroscience cannot. Receptor states are reliable causal relays rather than 
representations. 
 I will resist Ramsey’s partial eliminativist thesis by drawing on various 
arguments. I will first claim that the central distinction that Ramsey correctly 
highlights between theories of representation and theories of content does not apply 
in the case of the CCTC. In particular, I will show that the CCTC is representational 
because it explains the cognitive success of a system in terms of internal models that 
the system can employ to draw inferences about the world (i.e. it is model-based), 
and not because it adopts an isomorphism-based theory of content. In addition to 
this, I will argue that the isomorphism-based theory of content is inadequate. 
 I will then claim that connectionist and cognitive neuroscientific explanations 
are genuinely representational because they often explain the success of a cognitive 
system in terms of the exploitation of an internal model, whose representational 




3.2 – The job description challenge 
 
The first step in Ramsey’s argument consists in identifying a list of minimal criteria 
for something to be a representation; the second step involves the use of this list as a 
benchmark to judge whether cognitive theories are justified in talking about 
representation. Ramsey argues that if a theory employs a notion of representation 
that doesn’t match these criteria, then that theory is not representational. 
Connectionist and cognitive neuroscientific accounts are not representational because 
they employ a notion of representation — the so-called receptor notion of 
representation — that doesn’t meet these criteria and that doesn’t yield any 
explanatory benefits over and above that of a reliable causal relay. 
Folk psychology provides the list of minimal criteria for something to be a 






framework of explanation characterises human cognition in terms of propositional 
attitudes (e.g. beliefs, desires and intentions, whose content can typically be 
expressed in propositions) and their causal relations.  
Within folk psychology, the notion of representation is defined not only in 
terms of its content, but also in terms of the functional role it plays within the 
system: for a state to be a representation, the state should have content and it should 
use that content in a way that is consistent with deductive principles. Accordingly, 
Ramsey identifies the following minimal criteria for something to be a genuine 
representation: 
1. A representation has non-derived intentional content 
2. A representation plays a causal role 
To these two features, Ramsey adds a third one: 
3. The causal role that a representation plays is dependent on its intentional 
content 
Ramsey’s main thesis is that only a theory that invokes representations whose 
features match these minimal criteria can be considered representational in a genuine 
sense. This is called the job description challenge. 
 A theory can meet this challenge when it offers reasons for why certain internal 
elements are genuine internal stands-in for external features. This means that a 
theory that only accounts for how certain internal states gain their content or a theory 
that only accounts for how internal states function as stands-in is not a genuinely 
representational theory.
17
 Consider a compass. Ramsey claims that a compass is a 
non-mental representational object because the position of its needle informs 
cognitive agents about directions (i.e. the position stands-in for possible directions). 
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 Nevertheless, Ramsey seems to believe that a theory that can show how certain 
internal states function as representations is more likely to be genuinely 
representational than a theory that can only provide a story about how internal states 






The position of the needle entails facts about the world because it is nomically 
dependent on magnetic north (i.e. it acquires its content through a certain nomic 
dependency). To explain why a compass functions as a representational device, 
Ramsey argues, we need both stories. Simply knowing how the needle acquires its 
content wouldn’t suffice: a person might understand the needle’s nomic dependency 
on magnetic north without knowing how the compass actually functions as a 
representational object. At the same time, merely knowing that the needle’s position 





3.3 – The Classical Computational Theory of Cognition 
 
Ramsey believes that there is only one theory in cognitive science that meets the job 
description challenge, that is, a theory that can offer not only a theory of content but 
a genuine full-blown theory of representation. This is the Classical Computational 
Theory of Cognition (CCTC). In what follows, I will examine how the CCTC is 
committed to representations. 
 
3.3.1 – IO-representations 
 
The first kind of CCTC representational commitment depends on the compositional 
nature of computations. 
 A computational task is generally understood as a sum of smaller 
computational sub-tasks, each one characterised by its own inputs, operations and 
outputs. Consider a computational process that transforms numbers into products 
(multiplication). Ramsey says that: 
“Although we say various mechanical devices do multiplication, the 






speaking, no physical system could ever do. Numbers and products are 
abstract entities, and physical systems can’t perform operations on 
abstract entities.” (Ramsey, 2007, p. 68) 
Given that numbers and products are abstract entities, they can be used by a system 
only if they are treated as representations of numbers and products: a system can 
multiply numbers only if it has something internal that stands-in for those numbers. 
To make sense of this computational process we then need to posit the existence of 
representations of numbers and representations of products, respectively in terms of 
inputs and outputs. A cognitive theory that wants to explain how multiplication 
happens in the brain should therefore account for how the brain can transform 
representational inputs into representational outputs. 
Consider another example. If we want to explain how a cognitive system 
recognises faces, we need to treat the inputs to the system not as actual faces, but as 
“some sort of visual or perhaps tactile representation presented by the sensory 
system. The outputs are also representations – perhaps something like the recognition 
‘That’s so-and-so’, or perhaps a representation of the person’s name” (ibid., p. 69). 
Generally speaking, Ramsey believes that cognitive theories should aim at 
explaining cognitive processes not in terms of physiological changes between events, 
but in terms of how certain events, which represent for instance faces, get 
transformed to allow the system to perform successfully in its task. 
Within the CCTC, the brain is understood as an information processor: we are 
“justified in treating a cognitive system’s inputs and outputs as representations 
because, given what we know about cognitive systems, we are justified in 
characterizing many of their operations as having certain types of starts and finishes; 
namely starts and finishes that stand for other things” (ibid., p. 70).  
 In addition to the assignment of representational status to inputs and outputs of 
the overall process, the CCTC also considers the inputs and outputs of its sub-






“If there is an inner sub-system that is an adder, then its inputs must be 
representations of numbers and its outputs representations of sums. If 
these internal structures are not serving as representations in this way, 
then the sort of task-decompositional analysis provided by the CCTC 
doesn’t work.” (ibid., p. 72) 
Within the CCTC, Ramsey notes, treating sub-computations as representational is 
necessary to explain why cognitive systems can do multiplication, recognise faces, 
and so on. As these representations are internal to the system and characterise the 
inputs and outputs of sub-computations, Ramsey calls them IO-representations. He 
then points out that their content is essential for the causal role they play in the 
cognitive system: they need to be about the relevant computational arguments or 
values to allow the sub-computations to do their job in the overall computational 
process. Although these representations “don’t accord with our commonsense 
understanding of mental representations, they nevertheless play a functional role that 
is intuitively representational in nature. Their role is intuitively representational 
because we recognise that the systems doing addition, or comparing chess moves, 
treat their inputs and outputs as symbols standing in for things like numbers or chess 
game scenarios. […] the CCTC invokes a notion of internal representation that […] 
is actually built into the fabric of its explanatory framework and thereby does 
essential explanatory work” (ibid., p. 74). 
 
3.3.2 – S-representations 
 
The second CCTC representational commitment is via S-representations or 
Structural-representations. These representations are the components of internal 
models that cognitive systems employ to successfully perform in cognitive tasks. 
 Ramsey calls these components “structural” representations because they 
stand-in for structural features of the target domain by mirroring or by being 






between specific internal states and specific aspects of the target domain. Rather, it is 
the overall internal model that is isomorphic to the states of affairs and that, as a 
whole, represents. On this point Ramsey argues that: 
“A map illustrates this kind of representation. The individual features on 
a map stand for parts of the landscape not by resembling the things they 
stand for, but by participating in a model that has a broader structural 
symmetry with the environment the map describes. […] some sort of 
structural or organisational isomorphism between two systems can give 
rise to a type of representational relation, whereby one system can be 
exploited to draw conclusions about the other system.” (ibid., p. 78) 
A map represents certain structural features of the landscape that a cognitive system 
can use to draw inferences about the world (e.g. finding out the distance between two 
places). When I visit a city for the first time and I need to get from the station to the 
hotel, I usually read the map of the city to find out the distance between the station 
and the hotel and the best direction to take. The map helps me to get to my hotel 
successfully because it appropriately resembles (i.e. represents) the most crucial 
structural features of the city, thus allowing me to draw conclusions about the target 
system (i.e. the city and the location of the hotel). 
 Ramsey argues that, in the same way in which a cognitive system can use the 
map of a city to draw inferences about the city, a cognitive system can perform 
successfully by relying on an internal model of her environment. Isomorphism 
applies both to concrete external models, such as the map, and to internal models. 
 Internal models are important features of CCTC style explanations because 
they allow a kind of surrogative model-based reasoning: a cognitive system can 
successfully draw inferences about the structure of the world by reasoning about the 
structure of her internal model of the world. If I am in my hometown and I need to 
buy some bread, I can successfully satisfy my goal by relying on an internal map, 







Consider Bob, a cognitive agent who is trying to discover whether and how members 
of a numerous family are related. He knows the family, but finds it difficult to 
remember all their kinship relations.  
 One way in which Bob could succeed in the task is by drawing the family tree 
on a paper and then connecting the different names with lines. This strategy would 
allow him to draw inferences about the various kinship relations on the basis of a 
concrete and visible diagram of the whole family, whose elements would represent 
the family’s members and relations. 
 Bob could also succeed in the task by employing a different strategy: rather 
than drawing a diagram, he could form “if-then” propositions. These propositions 
would stand-in for the relevant elements of the family tree and their connections (e.g. 
“if X is Y’s sister, then X is Y’s daughter aunt”) and they would allow Bob to find 
out all the various kinship relations. In this case, we would explain Bob’s success in 
terms of the exploitation of an internal model of the family, whose components and 
relations mirrored, or were isomorphic to, those of the family. These components 
would be genuinely representational because they would stand-in for the elements of 
the target domain.  
 According to Ramsey, in the same way in which we do not doubt the 
representational status of names and connecting lines in the diagram, we should not 
doubt the representational status of the elements of Bob’s internal model given that 
their content is essential for the causal role they play in the cognitive processing (e.g. 
they need to stand-in for the relevant faces and relations of the target domain). At 
this point, Ramsey believes we could ask two questions. 
 We could ask whether Bob succeeds because he relies on an internal model and 
because he knows the meaning of its elements. Ramsey affirms that the answer to 
this question would be negative: Bob performs appropriately because he can follow 
the structure of the symbols and operate on them in a purely mechanical way. There 






representations. A syntactic story about how the symbols get compared and about 
which rules get applied on them would be sufficiently explanatory.  
 We could instead wonder why those specific symbols and their use make Bob 
perform successfully. Ramsey says that a syntactic story here would not provide a 
sufficiently explanatory answer. Rather, we need to understand the symbols as 
representational elements that stand-in for features of the diagram, and the operations 
among them as instantiating a sort of surrogative reasoning. 
 Bob’s success in the task can then be explained in a syntactic and purely 
mechanical way if we want to understand how the process works, and in a 
representational way if we want to understand why Bob manages to perform 
successfully by exploiting those processes. In Ramsey’s own words: 
“[…] we can’t fully understand how mindless-Bob performs the 
operation of figuring out how two people are related unless we 
understand his operations as involving the implementation of a model. 
And to understand his operations as an implementation of a model, we 
need to look at the elements of these operations – in particular the marks 
on the page – as representations of people and kinship relations.” (ibid., 
p. 85) 
Ramsey’s point here is that Bob’s internal model is representational although Bob 
doesn’t understand the meaning of the symbols (i.e. that the letters stand for family’s 
members and that their connections stand for their relations). Having the model in 
place, Bob can succeed in his cognitive task by mechanically following certain rules. 
He claims, though, that it is necessary that the content of representation gets fixed by 
isomorphism: representations need to stand-in for something else for the model to 
work, and they can be stands-in for external features if they share structural 
similarities with them. 
 Accordingly, a notion of representation can be explanatory useful even in a 






that is not committed to any kind of implementational characterisation of the states 
and processes that traffic in representations. Implementational details, Ramsey says, 
might be important to actually construct a machine able to perform computational 
processes, but not to understand the sense in which a cognitive process is 
computational. 
 
3.3.3 – CCTC and the job description challenge 
 
Ramsey argues that the CCTC is committed to representations and that the notion of 
representation it employs meets the job description challenge; hence the CCTC 
vindicates our folk-psychological understanding of representation. Let me briefly 
summarise the arguments he addresses to show this. 
 As described above, Ramsey points out two ways in which the CCTC is 
committed to representations. 
 The first commitment is via IO-representations: 
 They derive from the compositional nature of computational processes, which 
are typically considered in terms of their sub-parts, each one understood as a 
sub-computation 
 The content of IO-representations is essential for the causal role they play in 
the computational processing because they need to stand-in for the relevant 
computational arguments or values 
IO-representations are then part of the CCTC explanatory framework although they 
are not similar to our folk conception of representation. 
 The second representational commitment is via S-representations: 
 A cognitive system performs successfully in a cognitive task by relying on an 
internal model of its target domain, whose components are isomorphic 






 By exploiting an internal model, an agent can perform a sort of model-based 
surrogative reasoning  
 A cognitive agent performs appropriately by exploiting the structure of the 
internal models’ components in a purely mechanical way. Nevertheless, in 
order to explain why those specific components and the operations upon them 
enable the agent to perform successfully, we need to understand the 
components as representations of elements of the target domain, and the 
operations as instantiations of surrogative reasoning 
Once more, because CCTC explanations are model-based, the notion of S-
representation is a natural element of this theoretical framework. 
 We can now ask whether the CCTC vindicates our folk-psychological notion 
of representation. If this were the case, then the CCTC would not be committed to 
representations in general, but to representations whose features match the minimal 
criteria (i.e. for something to be a representation it should have non-derived 
intentional content and it should play a causal role similar to that of beliefs, desires 
and intentions in folk psychology). 
Ramsey claims that IO- and S-representations do share many features of our 
folk notion of representation: they both have the kind of intentionality that we 
attribute to thoughts and the discreteness that folk psychology assigns to beliefs and 
desires. Consider Sherlock Holmes’ reasoning process employed to find out how a 
victim died (Fodor, 1987). Holmes uses a folk-psychological reconstruction of his 
thoughts, observations and beliefs. His reasoning process has an argument-form, 
with premises that yield certain conclusions. Ramsey claims that, since the CCTC is 
good at explaining these kinds of arguments in computational terms by relying on 
IO-representations, the CCTC can be seen as a scientific framework that can 
vindicate folk psychology. 
 This would be possible also on a different reading of the process, this time 
involving S-representations: Holmes finds out how the victim died by exploiting 






yield to the victim’s demise. Here the solution is found by mentally reconstructing 
the setting of the crime, its relevant events and their connections. Accordingly, 
Ramsey says, folk-psychological explanations can be cashed out in terms of models 
and surrogative reasoning and “If this is correct, then folk notions of mental 
representations may well be very close to the notion of S-representation proposed by 
the CCTC. […] While it is hard to see how beliefs could turn out to be mere 
syntactic states with an unspecified representational role (as suggested by the 
Standard Interpretation), it does seem they could turn out to be representational 





3.4 – The receptor notion of representation 
 
Ramsey’s central claim is that the CCTC is the only genuine representational theory 
and that the newer accounts (i.e. connectionism and cognitive neuroscience) do not 
employ any genuine notion of representation: their so-called receptor notion can be 
considered simply in terms of reliable causal relay. 
In what follows, I will first characterise the receptor notion and I will then 
consider two separate objections to it. 
 
3.4.1 – Nomic dependency 
 
Connectionism and cognitive neuroscience apply the notion of representation to 
states that reliably get activated and co-vary with some external features of the 
environment. 
 Accordingly, a state X (internal) is called a receptor representation for Y 
(external) if the occurrence of X is nomically dependent on the occurrence of Y. 






represent features of the environment when they reliably fire in correspondence to 
them. This is for instance the case of the so-called “edge cells”, that is, neurons in the 
visual area of the brain that fire whenever agents see edges in the environment. 
Claiming that some cells reliably fire in response to certain external stimuli is like 
saying that their activities are nomically dependent on those external stimuli. 
 Nomic dependency relations are often equated to representational relations in 
the newer accounts. Ramsey’s first critique to the receptor notion lies exactly in this 
equation: something can be nomically dependent on something else, he claims, 
without carrying information about it. A cell can fire reliably and co-vary in 
accordance with certain features of the world without being, at the same time, a 
representation of those features of the world. Assigning a representational status to 
this kind of internal states should be avoided because explanatory useless. 
Ramsey’s first step in attacking the reception-style notion consists in criticising 
Fred Dretske’s naturalistic account of content (1988) as a theory of representation. 
This move is motivated by the fact that many defenders of the receptor notion of 
representation agree, at least to a certain degree, with Dretske on what should count 
as a genuine representational state. 
 Dretske aimed at offering a purely causal account of what it is for a state to be 
a representation. His account, however, seemed to leave no room for 
misrepresentation or falsehood: if X represents Y whenever X reliably co-varies with 
Y, then it becomes difficult to imagine cases where this nomic dependency does not 
hold. 
 To handle this problem, Dretske introduced a teleological component to his 
account (e.g. Millikan, 1984): an internal state X is a genuine representation of Y not 
only when it is nomically dependent on Y, but also when it becomes incorporated 
into the system’s processing because of this nomic dependency. States that, for 
instance, are employed as causes of motor outputs because they indicate, or stand-in 
for, certain external conditions are genuinely representational states. Here, the 






into a system’s functional architecture. Misrepresentation can then be explained in 
the following way: a state misrepresents when it gets recruited in a system for 
playing a functional role that is different from the one it has been selected for either 
through learning or natural selection. Coming back to Ramsey’s example, if the 
needle reacted to something different from the magnetic north, the compass would 
misrepresent, that is, it would respond to something different than what it was 
recruited for.  
 The teleological character of representation is for Dretske and his followers not 
only important for dealing with the problem of misrepresentation, but also for 
explaining why a certain representation with certain content gets incorporated into a 
system’s processing. 
 To summarise, Dretske believes that an internal component X is a 
representation of Y if: 
 X is nomically dependent on or reliably co-varies with Y 
 X becomes part of the system’s processing because it is nomically dependent 
on Y 
Ramsey criticizes Dretske’s account on different grounds. 
The first critique is against Dretske’s claim that the teleological component is 
sufficiently explanatory for cases of misrepresentation. Ramsey observes that 
misrepresentation can’t be equated with malfunctioning: a device or a state can play 
a role different from the one it was supposed or designed to play without being a 
representation. A television, for instance, can malfunction and its malfunctioning can 
be explained in non-representational terms; the same can be said for many biological 
processes. We therefore don’t have an account of misrepresentation by appealing to 
teleology alone. Rather, we first have to assume that the state is a representation in 
order for it to misrepresent, that is, we first need to know in virtue of what that state 
is representing instead of doing something else. Once we know that we are dealing 






and how it has a different and false content in other occasions. Dretske, however, 
“limits what a state represents by appealing to what it ought to represents, leaving the 
first question about whether the state in question represents at all untouched” (ibid., 
p. 132). 
A second problem concerns the relationship between “being nomic dependent 
on” and “carrying information about” something. Advocates of the receptor notion 
believe that a state carries information about something when it is nomically 
dependent on it. But if being an indicator that carries information means for a state to 
be a reliable responder, then every time we talk about information carrying we could 
talk about nomic relations between states. Indeed, Ramsey claims that these relations 
would be such that they could be used by the system to learn about the current states 
of affairs. If, for instance, we want shade on our back porch at a certain time in the 
afternoon, we might think of planting a tree at a certain distance from our porch 
because we know that its shadows will fall exactly where and when we want. In this 
case, Ramsey affirms, we would exploit the nomic relation that exists between the 
tree, its shadows and the sun to assign to the tree the job of shading our back porch. 
It would, however, seem inappropriate to interpret the shadows as representations of 
the position of the sun in the sky or of the hour of the day because the information 
that the shadows carry is not relevant to the job they perform: we plant the tree in 
that position to shade our porch and not to learn about the position of the sun or the 
hour of the day. We therefore need some additional reasons to conclude that 
something is employed because of the information that is carried by a certain nomic 
relation rather than just because it is functional to our purpose. According to 
Ramsey, one problem with the receptor notion is not that it is explanatory irrelevant 
in itself, but that the information that results from its law-like relation with external 
events is explanatory irrelevant. 
For all the above reasons, Ramsey claims that for a state X to be nomically 
dependent on a state Y it does not mean that X carries information about Y. It 






“A structure can be employed qua nomic-dependent or qua reliable-
respondent without being employed qua information-carrier or qua 
representation.” (ibid., p. 138) 
The receptor notion of representation is, therefore, explanatory useless because it 
doesn’t provide any additional explanatory pay-off over and above that of reliable 
causal relay. 
 
3.4.2 – Distributed representational format 
 
Ramsey’s second major objection to the receptor notion concerns the causal role that 
a state should play to count as a representation. 
 Ramsey claims that having a discrete format is necessary for a state to play the 
causal role typically attributed to a propositional attitude. One of the problems in the 
newer accounts is that their representations don’t have such a discrete format. The 
clearest examples can be found in connectionist modelling studies. 
Although it employs the notion of computation, connectionism is often 
considered an alternative to the CCTC because it explains computational processes 
in terms of distributed rather than localised operations over networks of nodes and 
connections. Connectionist research has been introduced to better understand how 
our brains carry out cognitive tasks and, to this end, neural networks have been 
designed to resemble some aspects of our cerebral neurons and cortical activations. 
Connectionist networks consist of layers of nodes similar to cerebral neurons. These 
nodes play different roles and have different values within the overall network. Their 
values are defined in terms of their “weights”: a high weighted connection between 
nodes has more value than a smaller weighted connection. Neural activations are also 
characterised on the basis of “thresholds”: if the connection’s weight between two 
nodes, A and B, is above a certain threshold, then the activation passes from A to B, 






network’s economy because it is through their modulation and adjustment that the 
network learns how to perform a task.  
 An important feature of connectionist networks is that the information that 
passes and gets transformed is not identifiable in any specific node; rather, 
information is distributed across nodes’ activations. This means that the semantics of 
the network depends on relations of similarities and differences among activation 
patterns through time. If two networks get activated in similar ways, then they 
encode similar information, and if a same network gets activated in a similar way at 
time t1 and t2, then the network encodes similar information at both times. 
 Since neural networks compute over information that is encoded in a 
distributed way, computational processes in connectionism can’t be defined in terms 
of their inner sub-computations. 
 Importantly, the reason why researchers moved away from the CCTC was to 
suggest more neurally-constrained explanations of cognitive capacities. CCTC 
explanations, for instance, are said not to account for the plasticity shown by neural 
networks. While in artificial neural networks the overall networks can carry out 
cognitive tasks with only few output problems even in cases of malfunctioning or 
loss of individual nodes, in the CCTC the disruption of only one symbol has a much 
more widespread effect on the overall functioning of the system. However, since 
cognitive systems typically manage to perform cognitive tasks even when their 
underlying processes are somehow disrupted, connectionist explanations have been 
considered more appropriate for modelling and explaining real cognitive behaviour. 
The constraints that the implementation level imposes on connectionist explanations 
are stringent. A first constraint is dictated by the nature of the brain itself: a very 
complex net of neurons, connections and activations that vary through time under 
many different internal and external conditions. To test biologically plausible 
hypotheses about how the brain manages to carry out complex computational tasks, a 
first necessary condition is to treat neurons and their connections as the main 










 Distributed formats, however, prevent connectionism from meeting the job 
description challenge: connectionist representations are not causal in the same way in 
which propositional attitudes are causal in folk psychology.  
For cognitive neuroscience, the situation is even more complicated. Although 
there is no consensus over the format of neural representations (e.g. single cells’ 
activations, grouping of cells, and so on), most neuroscientists and cognitive 
neuroscientists believe that representations in the brain do not have a discrete format. 
 Before discussing Ramsey’s critiques concerning the receptor notion of 
representation, let me briefly summarise them: 
 A receptor representation is an internal state X that co-varies or that is 
nomically dependent on an external state Y 
 Nomic relations should not be equated to representational relations: 
something can be nomically dependent on something else without carrying 
information about it 
 A state can be an indicator of another state by depending nomically on it. But, 
if being an indicator that carries information means for a state to be a reliable 
responder, then every time we talk about information carrying we could talk 
about nomic relations between states 
 The receptor notion of representation has a distributed format, hence it cannot 
play the causal role attributed to representation in folk psychology 
 Theories that employ the receptor notion do not meet the job description 
challenge. This means that the representational talk should be avoided and 
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 There is clearly much more to say about connectionism, but for the current 








that the notion of representation should be substituted with the notion of 
reliable causal relay 
In the next section I will examine whether we are justified in concluding, as Ramsey 
does, that connectionist accounts are not representational. I will argue that some of 
Ramsey’s reasons in favour of CCTC representationalism can be also applied to 
connectionism and cognitive neuroscience. In the last section of the chapter I will 
then claim that, while a distinction between a theory of content and a theory of 
representation is essential, we do not have enough reasons to embrace Ramsey’s 




3.5 – Internal models and representational commitment 
 
Ramsey defends the CCTC as a genuine theory of representation on the basis of two 
main reasons: CCTC’s commitment to IO-representation and CCTC’s commitment 
to internal models and S-representations. 
The first commitment has to do with the compositional nature of CCTC 
explanations: complex computations are explained in terms of simpler sub-
computations and, given that each computational process is characterised by non-
mental representational inputs and outputs, inner sub-computations need to be 
characterised in terms of their inner mental inputs and outputs. These inner 
computational symbols have to stand-in for external features of the environment.  
The second commitment is via S-representations. Ramsey shows that the 
CCTC explains the success of agents in cognitive tasks by positing the presence of 
internal models, whose elements (S-representations) and causal connections can be 
exploited to implement surrogative reasoning. This form of reasoning enables 
systems to draw inferences about the world. However, for these internal models to 






features of the target domain and need to acquire their content by being isomorphic 
to them. By employing S-representations (and also IO-representations), the CCTC 
can be considered a genuine theory of representation. 
 There are two points that I want to raise here. The first point is that S-
representations are not peculiar of the CCTC only. Representations are elements of 
internal models and are isomorphic to elements of the world even in some 
connectionist networks. The second consideration is that a theory can employ S-
representations without embracing the isomorphism theory of content. 
 
3.5.1 – S-representations in connectionism 
 
A commitment to S-representations is not unique to CCTC-style explanations. 
Connectionism, for instance, employs them too. I consider here only two examples 
that help clarify this point. 
Paul Churchland (1998) studied two identical feed-forward networks trained on 
the same corpus of 100 photos of each of the 100 members of 4 extended and 
multigenerational families. The networks were trained so that they could distinguish 
any input photo as a member of one of the 4 families. After the training period, the 
two networks were able to generalise successfully to any new example of the 4 
families with a degree of accuracy higher than 90%. Churchland explained the 
behaviour of these two networks in the following way. The networks became able to 
distinguish each new example as belonging to a specific family because the 
activation-space of each network became partitioned in a way that, for each of the 25 
faces of the first family, there was a specific number of points that tended to be 
assembled in a given sub-volume within the overall space. This process is often 
called clustering. The same cluster, this time in different sub-volumes of the 
activation space, characterised the faces of the other 3 families. The clustered and 
recognisable points of the two networks characteristic of a specific family were 






family members identified the standard causal response to a typical face that 
belonged, for instance, to family 1. This means that the activation pattern that was 
said to represent a given member as belonging to a specific family was nomically 
dependent on (or reliably co-varied with) the member it stood-in for. The notion of 
representation employed here clearly was the receptor notion. 
 In discussing the results of the study, Churchland pointed out that the two 
networks managed to successfully solve the problem although they relied on 
different coding strategies. The reason for this is that there were similarities in the 
relative positions of the points (nodes) in the two networks that stood-in for a 
specific family. What explained how the two networks succeeded in the cognitive 
task was then some kind of structural feature: the two networks used the degree of 
similarity or of difference recognised among faces of members of different families 
to associate a new face to the appropriate family. Indeed, the hidden spaces of the 
networks got partitioned through training so as to reflect, in a systematic way, the 
structure of the environment: systematic distance measures stood-in for important 
family relations. 
Following Ramsey’s definition of S-representation (i.e. internal states that 
acquire their content by being isomorphic to their target domain), connectionist 
explanations can rely on S-representations, hence they can be genuinely 
representational. 
I would like to consider a second example that has been recently offered by 
Oron Shagrir (2012). Shagrir claims that oculomotor control can be explained by 
referring to S-representations, internal models and recurrent neural networks: the 
brain controls the eyes by implementing an internal model in the form of a recurrent 
neural network with multistable states, one for each eye position. This means that the 
brain controls the oculomotor system by employing a short-term memory of the 
current eye position, which is understood in terms of a recurrent neural network with 
multiple states (S1, S2,…, Sn), each representing an eye position (E1, E2,…, En). The 






position E2, there is a transition from state S1 to state S2 in memory. Certain 
computational processes operating on the input representing the eye position make 
these dynamics possible. In particular, for every eye position, there is a 
corresponding stable pattern of activation in memory. No single cell in memory, or 
state in the network, represents; rather, it is the collective activation of states that 
represents a specific eye position: whenever a new stimulus arrives, it perturbs the 
memory network, thus moving it from the stable pattern of current activated points to 
a new one. This new stable position represents the current eye position. Interestingly, 
the distance between two stable patterns of activations in the memory network 
mirrors that between the two corresponding eye positions. Shagrir claims that the 
memory functions as a kind of internal map that the system can go and “look up” for 
solving problems. Accordingly, the explanation of how the oculomotor system 
controls the eyes refers to the fact that it internally implements and uses a model of 
the dynamics and positions of the eyes. 
In this case it seems that we can conclude that the explanation of how the 
memory network controls the eyes is genuinely representational: the network 
performs successfully by employing an internal model, whose elements stand-in for 
those of the target domain (i.e. the eye positions) and whose connections stand-in for 
those of the target domain (i.e. the distance between two eye positions). It then 
follows that these internal representations can be said to be isomorphic to the 
elements of the target domain. All this is possible, though, in a non-CCTC 
framework that employs distributed representations. 
 
3.5.2 – The inadequacy of isomorphism-based theory of content 
 
The second consideration concerns isomorphism as a theory of content. As Mark 
Sprevak (2011) has pointed out, one can embrace S-representations without 







 While a representational relation is an asymmetrical relation (i.e. a state can 
represent another state of affair without that latter representing the former), an 
isomorphic relation is a symmetrical relation (i.e. a similarity in structure between 
two objects or two states is symmetrical — if the word “dog” is isomorphic to the 
word “god”, then the word “god” is also isomorphic to the word “dog”). An internal 
state can then represent an external feature without being isomorphic to it. 
Isomorphism brings indeterminacy in content: the words “dog” and “god” are 
isomorphic although they identify very different states of affairs.  
If we say that a state is a representation when it is a component of an internal 
model that the system uses to draw inferences about the world, then we are making a 
claim about the role that the state plays in the overall cognitive economy of the 
system. It is a separate question that concerning how the state gains the content it 
has. The arguments Ramsey addresses in favour of S-representations should then be 
separated from those used to argue for an isomorphism-based theory of content. 
Once we separate the two arguments, we are in a position to recognise that many 
connectionist and cognitive neuroscientific explanations of cognitive performances 
do employ S-representations, without necessarily embracing also the isomorphism-
based theory of content. Consider once more the edge cells example discussed above. 
In explaining the success of cognitive systems in recognising (i.e. drawing inferences 
about) edges between light and darkness in their visual field, researchers typically 
interpret the activity of certain cells in the visual cortex as representing distal edges. 
By interpreting the activity of these cells in this way, they can account for how a 
cognitive system manages to perform successfully: these cells represent distal edges 
and they are part of a wider internal model that the system can “look up” for its 
environmental success. 
A theory can then be representational without embracing isomorphism. As 
Ramsey correctly points out, it is important to show that a theory is actually 
committed to representations. Ramsey’s critique of Dretske’s account of 






theory of representation: we first need to say why a state is a representation in order 
to say that it has a certain content and that it can misrepresent. A state can therefore 
be labelled as a representation rather than as a reliable causal relay if it plays an 
explanatory role in explaining successful behaviour. In this specific case, if a theory 
employs representations to talk about the components of an internal model that the 
cognitive system uses to perform successfully in the environment (i.e. if a theory is 
committed to S-representations without the isomorphism story), then that theory is 
representational. 
A less ambiguous term than S-representation, which immediately suggests the 
idea of structural isomorphism, could be of help here. I therefore suggest we could 
talk about M-representations or Model-representations to identify those states of 
internal models that a system can employ to draw inferences about the world. Saying 
that a theory is committed to M-representations means that the theory can explain a 
cognitive ability in terms of the exploitation of an internal model. The states of this 
internal model are representations, no matter how they acquire their content.  
 Accordingly, every theory that posits models as surrogates of (aspects of) the 
world in reasoning is a representational theory. Connectionism is then committed to 
genuine representations. If we consider again Churchland’s example, the networks 
are able to perform the task because, through training, they form an internal model of 
their target domain. In the same way in which Bob’s success in the task cannot be 
explained only by relying on a syntactic story about the assembly and use of internal 
symbols, we wouldn’t be able to explain the success of the two networks without 
seeing their clustering processes as representational. 
Claiming that a theory of content is not sufficient to offer a full-blown theory 
of representation is then not enough to argue in favour of representational 
eliminativism in the newer accounts.  
The reasons for this conclusion are twofold. First, Ramsey himself does not 
deny the receptor notion as a theory of content, or the explanatory relevance of 






something a representation. Second, a receptor state can count as a representation 
because of its explanatory role in explaining the success of agents in drawing 




3.6 – Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I discussed William Ramsey’s recent attack to the explanatory 
usefulness of the notion of representation in connectionism and cognitive 
neuroscience and I argued for its inadequacy. 
 I examined Ramsey’s defence of the representational status of CCTC 
explanations (via IO-representations and S-representations) and his partial 
eliminativist thesis towards the receptor notion of representation employed in the 
newer accounts. I then resisted Ramsey’s partial eliminativist thesis by showing that: 
 Connectionism and cognitive neuroscience often employ S-representations 
because they both typically explain the success of cognitive systems in terms 
of: 
o Structural isomorphism between the internal structure of the system 
that gets activated and the target domain 
o Internal models that the system uses to draw inference and reason 
about the world 
 A theory can employ the notion of S-representation without embracing the 
isomorphism-based theory of content 
 The isomorphism-based theory of content is inadequate because isomorphism 
is a symmetrical relation that entails great indeterminacy in content 
 If a theory is committed to representations when it employs internal models 






representational. The newer accounts are, therefore, genuinely 
representational 
 Even if the receptor notion only offers a theory of content, there are still good 
reasons to consider these internal states as representations 
To conclude, I want to stress that, although it is difficult to come up with necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a state to be a representation, its is often possible to 
identify cases where a representational talk is applicable and cases where 
explanations of behaviour cannot avoid appealing to such a notion without losing 
important explanatory power. I argued that the newer accounts fall into this category 























4.1 – Introduction 
 
In this chapter I analyse the explanatory aims, methodologies and vocabularies of 
personal and subpersonal explanations of mental phenomena. 
 In the first part of the chapter I discuss personal-level explanations and the 
autonomy theorists’ position with respect to it. In the rest of the chapter I address and 
critically discuss two purely subpersonal accounts: Churchland’s eliminativism and 
Bickle’s reductionism. 
 I examine these accounts and show that none of them succeeds in providing 
appropriate explanations of mental phenomena: purely personal-level and purely 




4.2 – The distinction 
 
We believe that we normally can and do explain other people’s behaviour in 
appropriate ways. If I see my friend Sara applying for a job and I want to know why 






desires: Sara is applying for a job because she desires a job and believes that by 
applying for it she can get it. And if I see my flat-mate wearing a thick coat and a 
warm scarf and I want to explain why, I can easily say that she is wearing warm 
clothes because she believes that it is cold outside and she desires to be warm. 
 In explaining people’s behaviour we also often, correctly, assume that their 
behaviour is not simply triggered by environmental conditions. Whether it is really 
cold outside or not, if I see my flat-mate wearing a thick coat, I explain her behaviour 
by saying that she believes that outside it is cold and that she desires to be warm. I 
then manage to explain her behaviour by making reference to her mental states, and, 
in particular, to her belief and desire. 
 The content of a mental state doesn’t simply depend on how the world is 
(whether it is cold or not outside), but also on how the agent takes the world to be 
(outside it is cold). For this reason, mental states are called intentional: they are about 
something. 
 Another important feature of mental states is that they are not physical objects. 
If they were, they would mirror the real states of affairs out in the world and we 
know that sometimes they don’t: my flat-mate can believe that outside it is cold, but, 
in fact, it is not. What characterises the nature of a mental state is that its content can 
be expressed with a proposition: she believes that outside it is cold. We explain 
behaviour by making reference to mental states with propositional content and the 
same propositional content can be linked to different mental states. The propositional 
content “that outside it is cold” can, for instance, be paired with a belief (believe that 
outside it is cold), with a hope (hope that outside it is cold), with a desire (desire that 
outside it is cold) or with any other mental state. The resulting pair of mental state 
and propositional content gives rise to the so-called propositional attitude. 
 To properly explain people’s behaviour we also make reference to the 
connections between mental attitudes. In particular, we can explain behaviour 
because we know that propositional attitudes are often rationally related to give rise 






each other in accordance with principles of rationality (e.g. propositional attitudes 
should be consistent and they should follow the rules of logic or probability theory). 
 The fact that everyday explanations of people’s behaviour make reference to 
rational principles introduces a normative dimension into the picture. We can explain 
behaviour because we compare them with how an agent, with that combination of 
propositional attitudes, ought to have acted: 
“[We] explain intelligent behaviour by interpreting it as the behaviour of 
rational agents. The principles of rationality regulating the interpretation 
of rational agents are normative principles rather than descriptive 
generalizations (principles that describe how people ought to behave, as 
opposed to description of how they generally do behave).” (Bermudez, 
2005, pp. 42–43) 
Given the central role of normativity in our everyday explanations of people’s 
behaviour, propositional attitudes are often called reasons for actions. 
 We commonly rely on this kind of explanations in our life and this seems to 
suggest that we often can properly explain other people’s behaviour in an intuitive, 
easy and unscientific way. To explain why my flat-mate is wearing a warm scarf I 
don’t need technical instruments or knowledge of her internal wirings. 
 Explanations that, instead, make reference to people’s brains, their internal 
wirings and the mechanical descriptions that can be given of them, are commonly 
called subpersonal explanations. 
Daniel Dennett (1969) coins the terms “personal” and “subpersonal” to clarify 
the distinction between “the explanatory level of people and their sensations and 
activities” and “the subpersonal-level of brains and events in the nervous system” 
(ibid., p. 93). 
 While the personal level makes reference to whole persons qua rational agents 
(e.g. Hornsby, 2000), the subpersonal level makes reference to parts of persons, their 






personal level) to a lower level of explanation consists in decomposing persons into 
parts, mainly brain parts, and in identifying how the organised operations of these 
parts can bring about personal phenomena. Explanations at this lower level are 
descriptive rather than normative because they identify the explanandum’s causal 
history or the “sequences of events that can be subsumed under general causal law” 
(ibid., p. 38). Personal and subpersonal explanations appeal then to different 
vocabularies, to different sets of norms and to different principles. 
 Dennett introduced this distinction to clarify the explanatory domains of 
different disciplines. The practice, however, has shown that this distinction has 
created more confusion than clarity. 
 There are various reasons for this. The main reason, I believe, has to do with 
the difficulty in integrating, comparing and contrasting knowledge coming from 
different explanations of the same explanandum phenomenon. Jose Luis Bermudez 
refers to this problem as the interface problem (Bermudez, 2005), that is, the 
problem of how folk psychology, the main type of personal-level explanation, 
interfaces with scientific psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience. 
 According to Bermudez, personal-level explanations are horizontal 
explanations that aim at explaining a particular state or event in terms of distinct and 
often temporally antecedent states and events. He says: 
“Suppose we ask why the window broke when it did. An horizontal 
explanation of the window’s breaking might cite the baseball hitting it, 
together with a generalization about windows tending to break when hit 
by baseballs travelling at appropriate speeds.” (ibid., p. 32) 
These kinds of explanations are not suitable to answer other kinds of questions. What 
if I want to know why the window broke when the baseball hit it? How can we know 
why certain generalisations hold? According to Bermudez, vertical explanations are 






be broadly characterised as explaining the grounds of horizontal explanations” (ibid., 
p. 33). 
 In the rest of the chapter I will analyse three different answers to the interface 
problem. As I will show, they are all answers that, in different ways, consider the 
interface problem as a non-problem. On the contrary, I will argue that both the 
personal level and the subpersonal level are required to adequately explain cognitive 
phenomena. 
 I will begin by examining the arguments used to vindicate the explanatory 




4.3 – The autonomy of the mental 
 
Advocates of the autonomy of the mental (e.g. Hornsby, 2000; McDowell, 1994; 
Davidson, 1963) hold that explanations of mental phenomena become intelligible 
and can be explained only in the context of our human life (McDowell, 1994, p. 
204). They want to show that “what is explained at the personal level cannot be 
explained over and again at a lower level” (Hornsby, 2000, p. 8) because “when we 
abandon the personal level in a very real sense we abandon the subject matter of 
[persons’ mental states] as well” (Dennett, 1969, p. 38). 
Jennifer Hornsby (2000) argues that we need to focus on mental states if we 
want to explain the behaviour of a person qua rational agent. A different approach 
would simply put the person out of the picture: 
“[…] there is no prospect of finding a person intelligible in terms of 
physical goings on inside her. If one speaks impersonally, one is barred 
from the sort of normative account that might show a person’s doing 
something to be understandable. [At the same time] there remains a 






and capacities that we take for granted when we see mental causation at 
work. These are capacities to move one’s arm when one wants to, to 
understand another’s words and say some of one’s own, to see and hear, 
to recognize faces and expressions […]. How can we do such things? 
What properties are there of our brains and nervous systems in virtue of 
which […] we can do them? […] Sub-personal psychology has plenty of 
tasks in its own. It addresses ‘How’- questions which proceed from 
empirical ignorance […].” (ibid., pp. 8–9) 
Subpersonal explanations are, therefore, important, but they can provide adequate 
answers only to “how” questions. The personal level is the only level that deals with 
“why” questions. 
 Among the reasons why, according to Hornsby, the personal level should be 
kept distinct from the subpersonal level we find: 
 Lower-level explanations don’t target people’s behaviour 
 Subpersonal-level explanations can answer how-questions, while personal-
level explanations concern why-questions 
 A normative account is needed to make a person’s behaviour intelligible and 
this account is found only at the personal level 
John McDowell (e.g. 1994) argues along the same lines by comparing the personal-
subpersonal distinction to the constitutive-enabling distinction. 
 He discusses the personal-level phenomenon of visual experience. Subpersonal 
explanations of visual experience, he says, make reference to a series of information 
processes that take place in a subject’s visual system. They tell us, for instance, that 
arrays of intensities and wavelengths are computed by the visual system to yield a 
sort of image of a part of the environment. Personal explanations, instead, are 
concerned with what defines the nature of a visual experience as an encounter with 






explanation of visual experience and still maintains that the role of the visual system 
(i.e. a subpart of a person) is not to inform the person of something.  
 To make the point clearer, McDowell comments on a famous paper entitled 
“What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s brain” (Lettvin et al., 1959). He claims that 
“in the metaphor, our parts talk to one another; they do not, at least in general, talk to 
us” (McDowell, 1994, p. 195). In the frog’s case, the frog’s visual system doesn’t tell 
the frog anything beyond the fact that there is a bug-like object in a certain position. 
The role of the frog’s visual system is not to process information, but to react to 
moving objects in the environment: 
“One sub-froggy part of a frog transmits information to another: the 
frog’s eye talks to the frog’s brain, not to the frog.  […] What tells the 
frog things is the environment, making things of itself apparent to the 
frog. […] What the frog’s eye does for the frog is to put it in touch with 
moving specks in its spatial environment.” (ibid., pp. 197–198) 
According to McDowell, then, visual processes enable a certain kind of encounter 
with moving objects by putting the frog in contact with its environment. What the 
visual system doesn’t do, instead, is shed light on what is constitutive of visual 
experience. In other words, subpersonal explanations can only account for the factors 
that enable personal-level phenomena to come about, but they cannot offer 
constitutive explanations for them. 
 How exactly should we understand the difference between constitutive and 
enabling conditions? 
 
4.3.1 – Enabling and constitutive conditions 
 
If we look, for instance, at the way in which Hornsby and McDowell treat the 
distinction, it seems as if the constitutive nature of a certain mental phenomenon can 
be uncovered solely at the level of folk psychology. Nevertheless, there are cases 






contribution to our understanding of the constitutive nature of certain personal-level 
phenomena. 
Consider the case of elementary learning developed by Eric Kandel and 
colleagues (e.g. Hawkins & Kandel, 1984) and discussed by Gold and Stoljar (1999) 
as an example of purely neuroscientific subpersonal explanation. This theory aims at 
explaining two kinds of learning — simple learning and associative learning — by 
making reference to properties of neurons and, in particular, to changes in synaptic 
strength due to the production of neurotransmitters in sensory neurons. We can 
understand these forms of learning as personal-level phenomena because they 
characterise the behaviour of whole organisms and not of sub-parts of them. 
 The theory employs a basic model that can be adapted to explain a number of 
different forms of learning, from habituation to sensitisation and classical 
conditioning. Habituation and sensitisation are two forms of simple learning. 
Habituation is a form of learning through which an animal gradually ignores a 
stimulus when it doesn’t bring reward or harm, while sensitisation is a form of 
learning that develops when an animal starts experiencing a harmless stimulus as 
noxious after the stimulus has been associated with an aversive one. Kandel and 
colleagues studied these forms of learning in a simple organism, the marine snail 
Aplysia californica. 
 They found that the Aplysia’s innate gill-withdrawal reflex, which followed a 
neutral tactile stimulus to the tail, could be habituated by reducing the quantity of 
neurotransmitter released by siphon sensory neurons on the motor neurons. 
 In the case of sensitisation, instead, they discovered that the responsible 
process involved an enhancing change of the neurotransmitter released by the 
sensory neuron on their target cells. Here, while a mild stimulus to the tail produced 
a mild gill-withdrawal reflex, a shock to the tail activated facilitator interneurons that 
synapse near the synapse formed by the siphon sensory neurons on the motor 
neurons. The role and the activity of these interneurons was that of making the 






time the siphon sensory neuron was mildly stimulated, more neurotransmitter was 
produced and released on motor neurons and a stronger gill-withdrawal reflex 
occurred. This process, which is called presynaptic facilitation, consisted in making 
the siphon sensory neurons more active via the activity of facilitator interneurons. 
 Kandel and colleagues found that the process of classical conditioning was 
quite similar to that of sensitisation. In classical conditioning, an unconditioned 
stimulus (US) and a conditioned stimulus (CS) became paired such that the response 
that would normally follow US occurred even in the presence of CS alone. They 
tested Aplysia’s behaviour during repeated experiments where they presented a 
shock at the tail (US) and a mild tactile stimulus at the tail (CS). These two stimuli 
were contiguous in time, that is, they occurred one after the other within a precise 
temporal interval. While in the first experiments Aplysia’s gill-withdrawal reflex 
occurred only after the presentation of US, Kandel et al. found that, after repeated 
experiments, the CS caused the same reflex. The ability of the CS to cause the gill-
withdrawal reflex seemed to depend on a process of presynaptic facilitation due to 
the neural pathway activated by the US: as a result of the activation of facilitator 
interneurons, the activity generated by US caused a greater facilitation of the sensory 
neurons responding to CS. 
 These results provided empirical evidence that the processes underlying 
sensitisation and classical conditioning were similar. Both depended on a process of 
presynaptic facilitation that, in the case of sensitisation, consisted in the greater 
production of neurotransmitter by siphon sensory neurons, while, in the case of 
classical conditioning, depended on the temporal pairings of US and CS, which, in 
turn, enhanced the presynapses of siphon sensory neurons.
19
 
 Why are these studies important to show the role that subpersonal explanations 
play in the conceptualisation of personal phenomena? 
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 For a more detailed discussion on the types of learning in Aplysia, see Gold & 






 Once we analyse carefully these experimental results, we recognise that the 
information gathered about the internal processes responsible for the various kinds of 
learning under consideration show that these types of learning are not as different in 
nature as previously supposed. In particular, the analysis of neurons, neural pathways 
and connections in the animal highlighted that classical conditioning is rather close 
in nature to one of the two kinds of learning usually considered simple learning: 
sensitisation. Here, certain subpersonal information offered evidence for a change in 
the constitutive nature of these personal-level categories, a result that wouldn’t have 
been possible by observing the behaviour of the animal from a merely “outside 
perspective”.  
 Cases like this one shouldn’t be surprising to those who, differently from the 
autonomy theorists, believe that:  
“It is this sort of contribution that philosophers and neuroscientists expect 
neuroscience to offer in the future: a contribution to the way we think 
about the basic phenomena of the mind.” (Gold & Stoljar, 1999, p. 826) 
Tyler Burge in his Origins of Objectivity (2010) offers some additional compelling 
reasons for why we shouldn’t think that constitutive information could only derive 
from personal-level explanations. 
 What is the nature of perception? Which are the constitutive conditions 
necessarily for a subject to perceive the world (i.e. to attribute physical features to 
specific physical particulars)? These are some of the questions Burge tackles in his 
book. However, differently from McDowell, Burge believes that scientific 
psychology can and does shed light on these questions: 
“Philosophy can help sharpen distinctions (such as that between 
perception and sensory discrimination, or between different conceptions 
of representation) that in scientific work are not as sharp as they might 






that enrich philosophical understanding and places limits on tenable 
philosophical positions.” (ibid., p. 26) 
Burge distinguishes perception from mere sensory registration or sensory 
discrimination. In particular, he argues, perception is a form of objectified 
representation, that is, it is the capacity of a system to represent mind-independent 
features of the environment in a more or less accurate way: 
“Objective representation need not be derived, rationalised, validated by 
the individual. The most elementary forms of empirical objectivity are 
the products of conditions that the individual has no perspective on. 
Subindividual conditions are unconscious, automatic, relatively modular 
aspects of perceptual systems and belief forming system. Environmental 
conditions are twofold. They are the actual properties and relations in the 
environment that the individual interacts with and discriminates. And 
they are the patterns of causal relations between the environment and the 
individual’s perceptual and cognitive capacities […].” (Burge, 2010, p. 
24) 
Sensory states are those states that register or encode information from the 
environment to contribute to an organism’s fitness. A sensory state is, for instance, a 
state that encodes the information that in the environment there is a predator. This 
encoded information, then, initiates a process that affects the responses of the animal 
in such a way that they contribute to its fitness. When these states make their 
contribution, “it is not the accuracy per se that makes the contribution. The 
tendencies of the state to produce efficient responses to needs or, more precisely, 
tendencies to produce evolutionary fitness — not the veridical aspects of the state —
make the contribution” (Burge, 2010, p. 302). 
 Organisms like bacteria and amoebae, for instance, discriminate particulars in 
the environment, such as light and heat. These discriminations, then, initiate a 






 A perceptual state is, instead, a representational state that can be veridical or 
non-veridical: 
“[…] a perceptual state is the type of state that it is partly by virtue of 
being a state that purports to pick out various particulars in a scene and to 
attribute to those purported particulars such attributes as being cube-
shaped, being green, being in certain directions and at certain distances. 
If there are particulars causing the perceptual state in the right way and 
those particulars have the attributes that are attributed, the perceptual 
state is veridical.” (ibid., p. 308) 
Perceptual accuracy doesn’t necessarily or constitutively enhance biological success; 
rather, it is a constitutive part of representational success. Perception is therefore a 
type of veridical representation. To define veridical representations, subpersonal 
information from the sciences becomes necessary:  
“Where there is perception, there is sensory information registration. 
That is, where there is perception, there is functional, causally based, 
usually high, statistical correlation, between a type of state impacted by 
surface stimulation (and that encodes surface stimulation), on one hand, 
and a type of stimulation, on the other. Sensory information registration 
per se is not a type of perception […]. Perception is a sensory capacity 
for objectified representation.” (ibid., p. 317) 
Burge offers the notion of objectified representation as a solution to the 
underdetermination problem: how can we explain the fact that an organism often 
represents the environment veridically given the fact that the encoded sensory 
information underdetermines environmental conditions? 
“To arrive at a representational state that privileges as representatum one 
of many possible environmental antecedents of the registration of 
sensory inputs, the system must have default settings, or a default range 






According to Burge, formation laws, which describe the law-like regularities of the 
environment, help to overcome the underdetermination problem by transforming 
pure sensory states into representational states, whose contents are, at least, highly 
veridical. Burge describes the case of convergence as an example of transformation 
of sensory information in the visual system. 
 Convergence is one way the visual system determines the distance (i.e. the 
location) of an object in the environment. The lines of sight of the two eyes fixated 
on an object form an angle that is dependent on the distance between the subject and 
the object. A closer object corresponds to a wider angle, while a more distant object 
corresponds to a narrower angle. The fixation point and the middle point between the 
two eyes form a third angle and others can be identified using certain geometrical 
principles (see ibid., pp. 348–349). Burge claims that: 
“Experiments have shown that visual systems rely on proximal 
information regarding [these] angles, together with the distance between 
the eyes to determine the distance and location of distal causes of 
proximal information.” (ibid.) 
Accordingly, a system can form representational states of an object in the 
environment because it can apply such principles. A perceptual representation then 
results from the conjunction of sensory information and geometrical principles and a 
constitutive explanation of perceptual experience needs to account for both. These 
two elements, when taken together, yield a form of objectified representation, which 
is what makes a state a perceptual state rather than something else. Note, however, 
that sensory information is clearly not a personal-level component and that formation 
laws are provided by scientific psychology. 
 If there are at least some cases where we need subpersonal information to 
explain what constitutes a personal-level phenomenon, then what about the 






“Perceptions and perceptual states that are attributed to an individual are 
always also attributable to the individual’s perceptual system, a 
subsystem of an individual. Any visual perceptual state of an animal, for 
example, is also a state of the animal’s visual system. Many processes 
that occur in perceptual systems, however, are not attributable to 
individuals. Transformations of sensory information into perceptions and 
transformations among perceptions are almost never attributable to the 
individual. The individual does not make them occur; they are not 
conscious or accessible to consciousness, they are not exercises of 
individual’s central capabilities. But, necessarily and constitutively, 
individuals perceive. […] Individuals perceive as a result of perceptual 
states’ being formed in their perceptual systems. Perceptual states are 
realizations of individuals’ capacities.” (Burge, 2010, p. 369) 
The constitutive relation between perception and individual depends then on the fact 
that perceptual states constitutively figure in individual functions, that is, in fulfilling 
individual’s needs and goals.  
 As I have shown, the distinction between personal and subpersonal 
explanations is not straightforward: subpersonal information can, and sometimes 
does, shed light on the nature of certain personal phenomena by saying something 
about what makes a certain personal-level state what it really is. 
 
4.3.2 – The ideal of rationality 
 
I will focus now on a second reason that is generally appealed to in order to argue for 
the autonomy of the personal-level of explanation with regard to the subpersonal-
level of explanation: people’s behaviour can be made intelligible once they are 







Donald Davidson (1980) argues that personal explanations depend on what he 
calls the ideal of rationality, that is, explaining people’s behaviour consists in 
making behaviour intelligible in light of the rational principles that govern them: 
“When we ask why someone acted as he did, we want to be provided 
with an interpretation. […] When we learn his reason, we have an 
interpretation, a new description of what he did which fits into a familiar 
picture. The picture certainly includes some of the agent’s beliefs and 
attitudes.” (Davidson, 1963, p. 691) 
Along the same lines, Jennifer Hornsby claims that it is “a normative account that 
might show a person’s doing something to be understandable” (Hornsby, 2000, p. 8). 
 Autonomists argue that a personal-level explanation of a behaviour is a 
normative explanation that cites the agent’s reason (i.e. belief or attitude) for acting. 
Only a normative interpretation makes a person’s behaviour intelligible in a way that 
“the redescription […] places the action in a wider social, economic, linguistic, or 
evaluative context” (Davidson, 1963, p. 691). 
 An action gets explained when it is placed within a wider pattern and we 
should accept the idea that personal-level phenomena cannot be further explained by 
going deeper than the level of persons. The fact that persons are rational agents is a 
sufficient reason to keep the personal-level and the subpersonal-level of explanation 
separate and independent from each other. 
 Let me try to uncover the nature and the role of these principles of rationality a 
bit more. 
 Principles of rationality regulate the explanation of agents’ behaviour and, for 
this reason, they are normative rather than descriptive. This means that these 







 A natural question might arise: do we explain a behaviour when we show that 
it is, or it is approximate to be, as rational as it ought to be? Consider the following 
quote: 
“[…] a person can have a reason for an action and perform the action, 
and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation 
between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that an agent 
performed the action because he had the reason.” (ibid., p. 691) 
Accordingly, an action is properly explained once the reason why a subject acted is 
identified; this reason really explains the action and it doesn’t simply justify it. 
Nevertheless, when we redescribe an action we are not always in a position to do so 
because “what emerges, in the ex post facto atmosphere of explanation and 
justification, as the reason frequently was, to the agent at the time of action, one 
consideration among many, a reason” (ibid., p. 697). 
 Normative explanations then run the risk of being nothing more than 
hermeneutic strategies in the sense that they explain intelligent behaviours by 
interpreting them as behaviours of rational agents (Bermudez, 2005, p. 42). 
 Rational interpretations, however, might not be good explanations. Imagine I 
see my friend Anna walking towards the department on a Saturday morning. I know 
that she is working on a chapter and that she has a close deadline. I then explain her 
behaviour by saying that she desires to finish the chapter and that she believes that it 
is easier for her to work in the office rather than at home. As a matter of fact, though, 
she simply passes by the department and walks straight ahead. My rational 
interpretation of Anna’s behaviour is then not a good explanation of her behaviour 
although it makes it rational, appropriate and intelligible given what I know of what 
she wants (i.e. she desperately wants to finish her chapter) and of what she believes 
(i.e. she complained many times about how noisy her flat was during weekends). 
Indeed, an interpretation is a rational reconstruction of a behaviour that maximises its 






always noisy during weekends, she ought to work in the office on Saturday morning. 
There are plenty of situations where we have a rational interpretation of someone’s 
behaviour (or even of our own behaviour) that is not an explanation of it. Consider 
psychological and psychoanalytical literatures. These literatures are full of examples 
of people who believe they act for a certain reason, but that, actually, are moved by 
beliefs and desires that are consciously inaccessible to them. Some psychological 
studies (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, 1978), for instance, show that we often 
construct stories that seem to make sense to us, and that sometimes we come up with 
reasons for our actions that, even if plausible, are demonstrably false. These cases are 
called confabulations (Hirstein, 2005): when we rationalise an action, we don’t state 
the reasons that actually lead the agent to act in a certain way. A rational ex post 
facto description can be offered to make a subject’s action intelligible even when we 
are ignorant about the course of events that led the subject to act in that way. 
 We are then left with a worry as to whether we should consider rational 
redescriptions to be genuine explanations rather than mere strategies to make 
behaviour intelligible. How can we justify personal and normative explanations? Is 
our only option for explaining behaviour that of asking people about their real 
reasons? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then a new problem arises since 
it has been long recognised that introspection is an unreliable method to establish the 
truth or falsity of explanatory claims (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
 How can we then be sure that our rational redescription is an actual explanation 
of a certain behaviour?  
“[…] we can show […] that an action is rational if the acting subject can 
come up with a narrative that reconstructs how a given piece of 
behaviour fits into the agent’s overall world view and character. What 
decides whether an action is based on reasons or not, then, is not whether 
these putative reasons have been always already in place, albeit 
subconsciously, but whether the behaviour in question can plausibly be 






intentions, goals and values. […] It conflates the distinction between post 
hoc reasoning and confabulation, and makes episodes of explicit reason-
giving which are accurate indistinguishable from cases in which subjects 
merely come up with a “coherent fiction.” (Snow, 2006, p. 559) 
If we remain at the personal level we run the risk of not being able to distinguish 
proper explanations from pseudo-explanations of cognitive behaviour. Personal-level 
explanations need to be supplemented by information from lower-level of analysis, 
both to uncover what is constitutive of personal phenomena, and to explain, rather 
than redescribe, cognitive behaviour. 
 Before turning to purely subpersonal-level explanations, let me summarise the 
arguments I endorsed to claim that purely personal-level explanations are not good 
explanations of mental phenomena: 
 Subpersonal information can, and sometimes does, provide answers to 
constitutive why-questions about the nature of certain personal-level 
phenomena:  
o Kandel’s studies on learning have shown that the nature of 
sensitisation and classical learning are more similar than expected 
o Burge’s explanation of human perceptual experience needs to account 
for the capacity of objectified representation, which is understood as a 
conjunction of formation laws (defined by scientific psychology) and 
sensory data 
 Purely normative explanations run the risk of being nothing more than 
hermeneutic strategies 
o They can make people’s behaviour intelligible by placing it into a 
wider social, linguistic or evaluative context. Making people’s 
behaviour intelligible, however, doesn’t always mean explaining it, 






 Personal-level normative explanations can turn out to be pseudo-explanations 




4.4 – Subpersonal explanations 
 
In contrast to personal-level explanations, which are typically couched in the 
vocabulary of folk psychology, subpersonal-level explanations come in various 
forms. Subpersonal explanations can be expressed in the vocabulary of cognitive 
psychology, in terms of brain components and their activities, or in terms of 
biological and chemical functions. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I analyse two subpersonal views with regard 
to mental phenomena: eliminativism and reductionism. I first consider Paul 
Churchland’s eliminativism and then John Bickle’s reductionism. I address the 
arguments for the goodness of explanations of mental phenomena couched purely in 
subpersonal neuroscientific terms, and I discuss whether these arguments are 
justified or not.  
 
4.4.1 – Churchland’s eliminativism 
 
“Our vocabulary of propositional attitudes should be viewed as a 
simplification of the underlying multidimensional-reality, a conceptual 
framework whose predictive and explanatory utility indicates not its 
accuracy, but the extent to which it abstracts away from and compresses 
the underlying complexity.” (Churchland, 1981, p. 129) 
Churchland’s famous paper “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional 
Attitudes” is a manifesto for those who take an eliminativist stance towards folk 






 The paper sets up a naturalistic methodological position: a person interested in 
understanding mental phenomena needs to recognise that the mind is a physical 
object and that a proper explanation of mental phenomena should place them within 
the natural realm.  
 Given this methodology, Churchland’s first and main critique of the goodness 
of folk-psychological explanations is that folk psychology doesn’t pick out anything 
real. Since mental states are not physical states, they are empty notions and, because 
folk psychology is based on mental states, folk psychology is false. This, in a 
nutshell, is Churchland’s eliminativist argument. 
 Churchland’s metaphysical position is materialism: mental states, like beliefs 
and desires, are non-physical entities. Only physical entities really exist in the natural 
world, hence we should eliminate the folk notions from the vocabulary we adopt to 
explain mental phenomena. There is nothing more to the understanding of the mind 
than understanding the brain. 
 The starting point in this debate consists in treating folk psychology as a 
theory. If folk psychology is a theory, then “it is at least an abstract possibility that its 
principles are radically false and its ontology is an illusion” (ibid., p. 72). 
 According to Churchland, however, for folk psychology this is not an abstract, 
but a very concrete possibility. Folk psychology is unable to explain many different 
cognitive phenomena, such as mental illnesses, creative imagination, individual 
intelligence differences, sleep, the ability to perform motor actions, memory, 
perceptual illusions and also learning. Failures in accounting for these phenomena 
show that folk psychology cannot explain all of mental life. 
 According to Churchland, the status of folk psychology should be reconsidered 
not only in light of its explanatory failures, but also in light of its stagnancy: folk 
psychology “is no part of [the] growing synthesis” (ibid., p. 75) because it hasn’t 
progressed since the ancient Greek times and, in contrast to other sciences such as 






intentional concepts haven’t evolved since. Considering these and other features, folk 
psychology is an appealing candidate for elimination. 
 There are two immediate objections to this position, which Churchland 
considers in turn. 
 A first objection draws on the normativity of personal-level folk-psychological 
explanations: folk psychology is a normative theory and not an empirical theory. 
According to autonomy theorists, beliefs, desires and other mental states do not 
cause cognitive behaviour; rather, they are the reasons for them. Only empirical 
causal theories can be falsified by empirical data. Folk psychology is not an 
empirical theory, hence it cannot be empirically falsified. 
Churchland’s counter-argument consists in showing that the normative 
dimension of folk psychology should be understood from a naturalistic perspective. 
He argues that the existence of certain regularities among propositional attitudes 
doesn’t show that there is something normative about these regularities. In the same 
way in which we don’t attribute a normative character to the gas law’s regularities, 
we shouldn’t give a normative gloss to the folk-psychological ones. Indeed:  
“[…] logical relations between propositions are as much an objective 
matter of abstract fact as are arithmetical relations between numbers. […] 
A normative dimension enters only because we happen to value most of 
the patterns ascribed by FP.” (ibid., p. 82) 
The second line of critique that Churchland considers has to do with the abstract 
character of folk psychology.  
 Functionalists, like Fodor, claim that folk psychology should be understood as 
an abstract theory that doesn’t need to be informed by the nature of the brain. 
According to this view, folk psychology refers to states that are internal and that are 
characterised by what they do, by their reciprocal relations and by how they are 
connected to the inputs and the outputs of a given cognitive process. Given that each 






that a functional characterisation plays an important role in explaining people’s 
behaviour even if it doesn’t mirror the structure and functioning of individual brains. 
 Churchland’s reply to this objection stresses the dependence of functional 
characterisations on implementational details. He argues that, if we highlight the 
functional role of mental states as a way of claiming that explanations of mental 
phenomena are independent from knowledge of the brain, then we are on the wrong 
track because this would amount to say that functional categories could never be 
false, which would be absurd. On the contrary, Churchland strongly believes that a 
good theory has to leave room for the possibility that the categories it identifies 
might be wrong. The explanatory failures of folk psychology make it a real 
possibility or at least provide reasons for remaining skeptical about its truth. 
 Churchland compares the folk-psychological functional concepts with the 
concepts employed in the past by alchemy. According to Churchland, in the same 
way in which alchemy was replaced by modern chemistry, folk psychology will be 
replaced by modern neuroscience: 
“[…] the correct account of cognition, whether functionalist or 
naturalistic, will bear about as much resemblance to [folk psychology] as 
modern chemistry bears to four-spirit alchemy.” (ibid., p. 82) 
To sum up, Churchland argues that: 
 Mental states are empty notions that do not belong to the natural world 
 Folk psychology can’t explain many cognitive phenomena, so it is not so 
predictive as we normally think it is 
 Folk psychology is stagnant and unproductive, and these are not features of 
good theories 
In the next section I will claim that Churchland’s arguments don’t justify the 







4.4.1.1 – Why not eliminativism? 
 
Churchland claims that folk-psychological concepts fail to refer. Given that mental 
states are the main components of the theory of folk psychology and that they are not 
real, folk psychology is false. Neuroscience, instead, identifies real entities and 
processes in the brain, hence it will provide proper explanations of mental 
phenomena. 
 As others have already noted (e.g. Gold & Stoljar, 1999), without a clear 
empirical confirmation for this claim, eliminativism risks remaining only an 
interesting but hypothetical position. Indeed, there are cases where folk psychology 
does not only play an important heuristic role in driving further research into the 
nature of cognitive phenomena (i.e. having a clear behavioural description of a 
cognitive behaviour is important to look for the possible neural mechanisms 
underlying it), but also a constitutive role in their explanations. 
 Consider the example of learning that I have discussed above with respect to 
the distinction between constitutive and enabling conditions. The first thing to notice 
is that Kandel’s low-level theory did not develop in a vacuum. Rather, the theory 
makes use of some psychological works, and, in particular, it draws on the 
psychological model of classical conditioning (e.g. Rescorla, 1968). In addition to 
this, the example shows, on the one hand, that certain findings at the lower-levels can 
shed light on important aspects of the explanandum phenomena that might have gone 
unnoticed at the personal-level of analysis, and, on the other hand, that certain 
personal-level notions figure in explanations of cognitive phenomena. Let me 
elaborate on this last point. 
From one perspective, we could say that Kandel and Schwartz (e.g. 1982) offer 
a purely neurobiologial explanation of classical conditioning in Aplysia according to 
which conditioning is a process where the contiguity between the conditioned 






former to the latter. This characterisation, however, doesn’t seem to properly explain 
the data.  
 In Rescorla’s first experimental setting (1968), a rat was exposed to a tone 
during a 2 minute interval (CS) and to an electric shock (US) at a later time within 
the same interval. In the second experimental setting, the electric shock occurred 
when the tone was presented. The results showed that only the rat that participated in 
the second experiment learned the association between the tone and the shock.  
 Interestingly, these results couldn’t be explained by making reference to the 
notion of contiguity as the accepted view of classical conditioning suggested (i.e. two 
stimuli occurred within a certain temporal interval — 2 minutes) because the CS and 
the US satisfied the contiguity requirement in both experiments. Given that 
conditioning happened only in the second case, something more was needed to make 
sense of these results. 
 Rescorla claimed that the extra-ingredient in the second experiment was 
information: conditioning learning could be explained by making reference to CS 
and US, but also to the notion of information, that is, by saying that the tone was 
providing information about the coming of the shock: 
“[…] in order to explain this effect […] one needs to appeal to a notion 
of information that is richer than the notion of low-level mechanical 
process in which the control over a response is passed from one stimulus 
to another.” (Gold & Stoljar, 1999, p. 824) 
Indeed, learning is a process where the difference between the actual state of the 
world and the organism’s representation of that state is reduced, which is a way to 
say that the organism learns when it can reduce its surprise. 
 It is hard to see how the concept of synaptic plasticity can capture the 
conceptual complexity of the notions of information and surprise. These are 
personal-level notions that characterise the behaviour of the whole organism: it is the 






mechanisms. Certain personal-level notions, then, remain present even in lower-level 
theories: 
“No matter how much we know about the causal intricacies at the 
molecular level, there is always this further question to be asked, namely, 
what are the causal mechanisms for, what is it that these mechanisms 
[…] are supposed to accomplish?” (de Jong & Schouten, 2005, p. 480) 
Can Churchland’s eliminativist claims convince us that folk-psychological personal-
level notions and explanations should be eliminated? My answer has been negative 
and here are the reasons I provided: 
1. Folk psychology is useful in driving further research and in setting up 
experiments to understand the nature of mental phenomena 
2. Certain personal-level concepts can be part of successful explanations of 
cognitive phenomena (e.g. the notion of information and not the lower-level 
notion of contiguity is required to explain conditioning learning) 
In the next section I will consider John Bickle’s subpersonal account. He argues that 
folk psychology cannot explain mental phenomena because it plays a purely heuristic 
role. His aim is to show that the causal role of high-level folk-psychological 
explanations of a range of mental phenomena is dropped once lower-level 
explanations of the same phenomena are found. 
 
4.4.2 – Bickle’s reductionism 
 
John Bickle (e.g. 2003, 2006, 2007) argues in favour of reductionism within the 
philosophy of mind. His main claim is that psychological concepts and kinds should 
be reduced to molecular-biological mechanisms and pathways, and he is confident 
that the reduction of mind to molecules is forthcoming in contemporary 
neuroscience. He admits that philosophers have been unable to notice these 






relationship between higher-level and lower-level explanations and too little on 
advances in molecular and cellular neuroscience. In particular, Bickle says, 
philosophers haven’t analysed the neuroscientific experimental practices that “bridge 
molecular pathway levels directly; and this practices are common to all recent 
empirical successes” (Bickle, 2006, p. 414). 
 He argues that lower-level explanations can explain mental phenomena in 
terms of their observable manifestations and their dependencies on molecular 
modifications and interventions. Certain molecular interventions, he claims, clearly 
show that behaviours and behavioural changes can be properly accounted in terms of 
changes in molecular activity in the brain. In particular, we are justified in 
concluding that certain molecular mechanisms are the mechanisms of, for instance, 
memory consolidation when we can:  
“[…] intervene causally at increasingly “lower” levels of biological 
organization in animal models and then to track the specific effects of 
these interventions on behaviour in widely accepted protocols for the 
cognitive phenomenon under investigation.” (Bickle, 2007, p. 230)  
Within Bickle’s account, “one only claims a successful explanation, a successful 
search for a cellular or molecular mechanism, or a successful reduction, of a 
psychological kind when one successfully intervenes at the lower level and then 
measures statistically-significant behavioural difference” (Bickle, 2006, p. 420). 
 If the interventionist strategy works by producing the expected behavioural 
change, then, according to Bickle, we can confidently say that we have explained the 
behavioural data directly, with no need to make use of intermediate levels (e.g. 
cognitive neuroscience, information processing, and so on). 
 Direct explanations are distinguishable features of Bickle’s reductionism with 
regard to the more classical interlevel reductionism: interlevels are simply not 
necessarily to reduce the mental phenomena to the molecular level. The role of 






their heuristic function — once the appropriate higher-level tool, theoretical 
assumptions, and experimental results have identified candidate cellular or molecular 
mechanisms scientifically — they give way to the strategy of ‘intervening 
cellularly/molecularly and tracking behaviourally’” (ibid., p. 428). 
 Bickle’s reductionism differs also from other possible readings of “reduction” 
in that it doesn’t require, or assume, that it is possible to explain cognitive 
phenomena in terms of lower-level laws or generalisations. He argues that in cellular 
and molecular neuroscience there are very few explanations that appeal to laws or 
generalisations: molecular biologists know how specific molecules interact in 
specific contexts, but they don’t provide explanatory generalisations for these 
processes. 
 In brief, Bickle’s reductionist arguments can be summarised in the following 
way: 
 Philosophers have underestimated the importance of experiments in 
molecular neuroscience because they were too focused on understanding the 
nature of interlevel relations 
 Molecular and cellular neuroscience show that behaviours and behavioural 
changes can be explained in terms of molecular activities: once we have 
operationalised a behaviour, we can intervene on certain molecular variables 
we believe are responsible for the behaviour and then measure the effects 
 Molecular neuroscience shows that behaviours can be explained directly with 
no need to rely on intermediate levels of analysis 
A close look at neuroscientific findings, however, seems to suggest that the direct 
link between psychology and molecular neuroscience that Bickle addresses is not so 
obvious. 
 A direct molecular explanation of a mental phenomenon depends, in Bickle’s 
account, on how researchers operationalise it. However, practice in science shows 






thus yielding different explanations of the underlying molecular mechanisms 
responsible for it. These differences seem to undermine Bickle’s claim that 
contemporary neuroscience has already provided examples of reduction. 
 In what follows I will analyse the consequences of Bickle’s reductionism by 
drawing heavily on Jacqueline Sullivan’s descriptions of the multiplicity of 





4.4.2.1 – Do we really have reductionist explanations? 
 
To understand the consequences of Bickle’s position, Sullivan discusses one of 
Bickle’s case studies: social recognition memory in mice and, in particular, the role 
that a specific protein (CREB) plays in it. Social recognition memory is generally 
operationalised in terms of the ability to recognise another individual after an initial 
interaction with it. 
 Bickle considers the experiments run by Kogan et al. (2000) as examples of 
reduction. Kogan and colleagues intervened on CREB to have mutant mice that were 
deficient in two isoforms of CREB and that had a reduced amount of CREB in their 
brains. They trained a group of mutants with a group of normal mice using a 
modified behavioural protocol associated with a previously developed learning 
paradigm. In their experiments, a normal mouse was placed in a cage with a mutant 
adult or with a normal adult already habituated to the cage for 15 minutes for a first 
interaction of 2 minutes. The experiments were then followed by 24 hours delay. 
After this period, the adult mouse was observed while socially investigating the new 
mouse. The types of behaviour that were considered cases of social investigations 
included: direct contact with the new mouse while inspecting any part of the body, 
sniffing of the mouth, of the ears, of the tail, of the ano-genital area and close 






 Kogan and colleagues found that, differently from normal mice, the mutants 
examined the new mouse in the same way even after the 24 hours intervals. They 
interpreted these results as signs of the inability of the mutant mice to encode in 
long-term memory the information necessary for the recognition task. These failures 
were associated to the CREB mutation. 
 Examples like this one show that it is possible to track behavioural changes by 
intervening on molecular variables; Bickle calls this methodology reduction-in-
practice. 
 Despite the appeal of Bickle’s proposal, there are at least two problems with 
his interpretation of Kogan’s studies. A first problem is related to the claim that these 
studies are examples of reduction-in-practice of social recognition memory; a second 
problem has to do with the more general reductive claim he endorses. 
Concerning the first problem and in contrast to what Bickle claims, 
neuroscientific experiments of the same phenomenon (e.g. social recognition 
memory) are quite diverse. This diversity makes experimental results difficult to 
compare and integrate:  
“Reduction-in-practice is something that occurs in an individual 
experimental laboratory when an investigator operationalizes a 
psychological function […] by developing a protocol that specifies how 
to produce that function […] and detect when it occurs, by reference to 
observable changes in behaviour […].” (Sullivan, 2009, p. 517) 
The experimental protocols can vary in relation to the duration of the exposure of the 
mutant mouse to the new mouse, in the interval duration or in the behavioural 
features that are supposed to mark the acquired capacity of social recognition. In 
most of the cases, different molecular mechanisms can be used to directly explain the 
behavioural data of that particular experiment, in that particular laboratory, obtained 
by following a specific experimental protocol. Relatedly, it is still an open question 






“assume that the operationalizations […] are actually indicative of the function of 
interest” (ibid., p. 518). 
 The second concern is about Bickle’s more general reductionist claims. Bickle 
takes the ability of molecular neuroscience to directly explain certain cognitive 
phenomena as a sign of its ability to explain all cognitive phenomena. This follows 
from his general claim that higher-level explanations and notions have only a 
heuristic role in the discovery of the proper molecular explanations. Nevertheless, 
given the difficulty that the reductionist methodology already shows in relation to a 
single phenomenon and the fact that “at best what Bickle has achieved by appeal to 
experiments in molecular and cellular cognition is a case for many local “within-lab” 
reductions” (ibid., p. 519), the conclusion that the future of neuroscience will provide 
reductions for all cognitive phenomena in non-humans and in humans is 
unwarranted. 
 While Bickle believes that direct explanations can be offered by looking at 
practice in science, and in particular in molecular neuroscience, I have discussed 
some drawbacks of his account. Once we recognise that, on the one hand, it is not 
easy to describe the relation between a certain mental phenomenon and its 
underlying molecular mechanism, and that, on the other hand, lower-levels 
explanations do often bear the stamp of the higher-level ones (see for instance 
Kandel’s study above), we are forced to admit that higher-level notions and theories 
are not superfluous or purely heuristic as Bickle (and Churchland) wants to make us 
believe.  
 To sum up, a reductionist account doesn’t succeed in undermining the 
importance of personal-level concepts and explanations because: 
 Reduction of mind to molecules is not forthcoming in neuroscience and the 
reduction-in-practice example of social recognition memory that Bickle 






o The way in which scientists operationalise an ability varies and, as a 
consequence, different molecular mechanisms can be discovered for 
the same capacity 
 Even once we have a reduction of a mental phenomenon at the molecular 





4.5 – Conclusion 
 
Three different answers to the interface problem have been examined in this chapter. 
 Autonomist theorists provide a first answer by claiming that personal-level 
explanations are autonomous from subpersonal-level explanations. They argue that 
the two types of explanation aim at accounting for different phenomena: personal-
level explanations answer constitutive why-questions, while subpersonal 
explanations answer enabling how-questions. I claimed that their arguments don’t 
succeed for two main reasons: (i) subpersonal information can, and sometimes does, 
provide answers to constitutive questions; (ii) a normative explanation of a 
phenomenon runs the risk of being purely hermeneutic, but not explanatory. 
 I then analysed the materialistic approach according to which folk psychology 
is a false theory and its concepts are empty concepts that should be replaced by 
neuroscientific ones. I argued against this proposal by claiming that certain personal-
level concepts can figure in successful explanations of mental phenomena and that 
folk psychology is not false but needs to be enhanced. 
 The third and last position that I have considered is a reductionist position 
according to which mind should be reduced to molecules and neuroscience is already 
providing examples of reduction-in-practice. I claimed that neuroscientific practice is 






reductions of single mental phenomena. As a consequence, the claim that all mental 
phenomena will get reduced to molecular mechanisms is unwarranted. 
 The analysis of the distinction between personal- and subpersonal-levels of 
explanation that I have just offered suggests that both levels are needed to adequately 






















5.1 – Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, I argued that adequate explanations of why systems perform 
cognitive behaviour require the employment of the notion of representation. I also 
claimed that normative personal-level explanations can make behaviours intelligible 
but cannot provide good explanations of them and I suggested that an identification 
of the subpersonal mechanisms underlying cognitive capacities is necessary to justify 
the validity of personal-level claims. 
 In this chapter, I will consider a different take on personal-level folk-
psychological explanations by engaging with Jose Luis Bermudez’s account of 
rationality (2000, 2003, 2009). 
 I will first highlight the differences between his notion of rationality and that of 
autonomy theorists and I will then examine his arguments in favour of three different 
levels of rationality. I will argue that the two criteria for rational behaviour that 
Bermudez identifies (i.e. the behaviour results from a range of alternatives and the 
behaviour matches some normative standards) are inadequate to understand the 






behaviour are possible only once external behavioural criteria are complemented 
with internal mechanistic ones. Details about how information is encoded and 
manipulated inside the brain, I will claim, are essential to confirm or disconfirm our 
hypotheses about the role and nature of reasoning processes and, ultimately, to 
evaluate our hypotheses about how rationality is naturally possible. Throughout the 
chapter, I will also distinguish between “objective” and “subjective” utility, between 
adaptive and individual goals, and between instrumental components (and selection 




5.2 – Personal-level explanations 
 
Before engaging with Bermudez’s account of rationality and rational behaviours, let 
me briefly recall the main features of personal-level normative explanations.
20
 
 According to folk psychology in general and to the so-called autonomy theory 
in particular, an agent’s behaviour is explained once its responsible mental states are 
identified. These states, which are characterised by their propositional content, are 
related via rationalising connections. An agent whose behaviour can be explained in 
this way is a rational agent. 
 While propositional attitudes are seen as the reasons motivating agents’ action, 
rational constraints allow to cut down the number of possible variations associated to 
an agent’s psychological profile (i.e. the combination of the agent’s beliefs and 
desires — Bermudez, 2009) and her consequent action. In particular, a behaviour is 
considered rational when it maximises a certain utility with respect to an agent’s goal 
and current environment. A personal-level folk-psychological explanation of a 
behaviour a typically takes the following form: if an agent s desires p and knows that 
by doing a she will get p, then s will, ceteris paribus, do a. 
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 For a folk psychologist, rationality is linked to the ability to entertain a 
conscious inferential process by constructing an argument from premises (beliefs and 
desires) to conclusions (behaviour). Recently, however, there have been some 
interesting suggestions to reconsider the argument-form attributed to these processes. 
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (2011) claim that the term “inference”, as it is 
normally used in psychology, refers to processes where new mental states are 
generated from previously held mental states. When inference is understood in these 
terms, the production of new beliefs on the basis of previous beliefs, the production 
of expectations on the basis of perception and the elaboration of plans on the basis of 
beliefs and desires become all cases of inference. If inference doesn’t necessarily 
need to be associated with a deliberate and conscious process and with the 
consequent ability to construct a valid argument, then it can be seen as a building 
block of not only conceptual thinking, but also of perceptual and motor processes.
21
  
 As I will show throughout the chapter, Bermudez (2003) addresses a similar 
claim. Although he stresses the importance of normative rational explanations, he 
believes that a behaviour can be internally and externally rational even if it does not 
result from a conscious inferential process. According to him, rationality can be 





5.3 – Bermudez on rationality 
 
Rationality is usually considered a normative notion that defines the way in which an 
agent ought to behave, while reasoning is a descriptive notion that specifies the 
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 The possibility of considering perceptual and motor processes already as instances 
of rationality has important consequences that will be considered later on in the 






process performed by an agent to behave rationally. Rationality and reasoning are 
both notions that belong to the folk-psychological vocabulary. 
 A folk-psychological account of rationality considers a behaviour rational (and 
the agent performing that behaviour a rational agent) if it results from a conscious 
inferential process.  
 Bermudez draws on folk psychology, but claims that a behaviour is rational as 
long as: (i) it results from a range of alternatives; (ii) it matches some normative 
standards. Organisms or agents can engage in inferential tasks even by relying on 
simple rules and heuristics. 
 Bermudez suggests three different levels of rationality. One level is only 
externally rational, while the other two are also internally rational. In his own words: 
“[The] assessments of internal rationality are relative to an agent's 
doxastic and motivational states, taking those states as given, while 
assessments of external rationality include assessments of the doxastic 
states underlying the action. To say that an action is externally rational is 
to say that it is in some sense appropriate to the circumstances in which it 
is performed, where those circumstances include the agent's motivational 
states—with different theories of external rationality interpreting the type 
of appropriateness involved here in different ways. The internal 
rationalizing connection between beliefs, desires, and actions allows the 
attribution of thoughts and desires to be genuinely explanatory. Beliefs 
and desires cause behaviour qua beliefs and desires (that is to say, in 
virtue of their content) because their contents rationally dictate a single 
course of action—or a limited number of possible courses of action. In 
the absence of such a rationalizing connection, there would be no reason 
why a belief-desire pair with those particular contents should cause that 






I quoted this passage at full length because it clarifies the distinction between 
external and internal rationality. It also shows that Bermudez somehow equates 
rationality with appropriateness in behaviour: we can assess if a behaviour of an 
agent is externally rational, he says, by judging whether it is appropriate given the 
current circumstances and the goal of the agent. To judge whether a behaviour is also 
internally rational, instead, we need to focus on the nature of the intermediary 
processes that lead from desire/goal to behaviour. The components of these 
intermediary processes have to be mental states or propositional attitudes, and they 
have to be linked by rationalising connections. These connections are equivalent to 
the rationality constraints I mentioned above: rationalising connections among 
beliefs, desires and goals cut down the number of possible rational courses of action. 
In Bermudez’s account, the rationalising connections don’t simply cut down the 
number of possible rational actions, but they also usually dictate, depending on the 
content of mental states, a single rational action. More generally, an organism can 
behave rationally if it has a space of possible alternative actions available. 
 Following the distinction between internal and external rationality, Bermudez 




5.3.1 – Level 0 rationality 
 
Level 0 rationality characterises those behaviours that, according to Bermudez, do 
not require a psychological explanation. These are all sorts of automatic stimulus-
response behaviours, from reflexes to innate mechanisms, that don’t traffic in 
representations mediating inputs and outputs. 
 Consider the following level 0 rational behaviour. Imagine you are in a given 
context x at time t1. There is a flame next to you and you decide to move your fingers 
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 In Thinking without words, Bermudez considers the possibility that also non-
linguistic creatures can perform rational behaviours. I believe that the same reasons 
he uses to address and justify this possibility can also be applied to humans, 






close to it. As soon as you reach the fire, you immediately move your fingers away. 
According to Bermudez, your behaviour is an instance of level 0 rational behaviour: 
it is automatic, it might have evolved to preserve your species and it doesn’t involve 
any decision process. 
 All members of a same species perform the same level 0 rational behaviour 
given appropriate environmental conditions. For this reason, Bermudez calls these 
behaviours “dispositions”: a level 0 rational behaviour is a disposition of a species as 
a whole, rather than of any individual organism. 
 These dispositions are sort of genetic dispositions and they are called rational 
because, by performing in conformity to them, single organisms can successfully 
perform in their environment. If the organism had acted in conformity to a different 
disposition, its behaviour would have been less rational. 
 The behaviour described above doesn’t result from a deliberate choice: if we 
get close to the fire, we move away very quickly, without considering any other 
possible course of action. Nevertheless, Bermudez affirms that even this simple kind 
of behaviour is an instance of rationality: it is rational because it is adaptive and 
because it is appropriate with respect to the environment and to the goal of the 
organism. 
 Another interesting example is that of foraging behaviour. According to 
Bermudez, foraging behaviour is a level 0 rational behaviour because it is externally 
rational, that is, it allows animals to maximise their search for food. Indeed, a 
specific foraging behaviour can be explained in terms of an optimal foraging theory: 
it is one of a set of possible foraging behaviours and it can be compared with a 




 To summarise, level 0 rationality can be assessed in relation to a behaviour on 
the basis of external criteria of rationality, which means that a behaviour is rational 
because its outcome matches some normative standard. Considerations about the 
                                                 
23






underlying processes are not relevant. In particular, a level 0 rational behaviour is 
rational even if it doesn’t result from any internal operation over representations. 
 
5.3.2 – Level 1 rationality 
 
Level 1 rationality applies to those cases where there is a set of possible behaviours 
available here and now to a specific organism, among which just one is selected, and 
where the selection does not result from a decision process.  
 Consider the case of an animal that is confronting a dangerous animal and that 
has to choose one of two possible behaviours: fight or flee. Bermudez argues that, 
although we wouldn’t say that the animal is engaging in any genuine decision-
making process, “there is a clear sense in which one of the two possible courses of 
action could be more rational than the other” (Bermudez, 2003, p. 121). 
 One of the two behaviours carries a greater advantage for the animal because it 
maximises a certain expected utility with respect to its goal. According to 
Bermudez’s account, if the animal’s behaviour maximises the expected utility, then 
the behaviour is rational. It is rational although it doesn’t result from a decision-
making process.  
 To clarify the difference between selection and decision processes, Bermudez 
draws on the Gibsonian theory of affordances (Gibson, 1979): in a selection process, 
an organism is able to select the most appropriate behaviour by relying on direct 
perception. In the example above, the animal selects fight instead of flee because it 
just “sees” that fighting is the most appropriate course of action. This means that: (i) 
the animal performs rationally by relying on vision alone; (ii) in cases of level 1 
rational behaviour, perception is direct (i.e. the animal not only perceives that 
something is in its environment – a dangerous animal – but also what it can do in 
response to it); (iii) the content of the animal’s perception corresponds to both the 






 Bermudez argues that an organism doesn’t need to represent affordances in any 
complex way because they stand for possibilities of actions that are already part of 
the content of perception itself. The comparison of these simple representations 
doesn’t require any decision-making process, that is, it doesn’t need to follow any 
step-wise procedure. Consider Fodor’s model of practical decision-making (1975); 
this model consists in different steps: 
1- The organism is in a certain situation S 
2- The organism believes that there is a set of possible courses of actions A1, A2, 
A3, …, An available in that situation S 
3- The organism predicts which consequence C would probably follow from 
selecting and performing each of the possible courses of actions (i.e. action 
A1 in S will probably yield consequence C1, and so on) 
4- The consequences are ordered in accordance to their preferences 
5- The organism will choose the action with respect to the probability and 
preference of its consequence in situation S 
An animal that is confronting a dangerous animal does not apply this form of 
decision-making process; rather, it relies only on the content of its direct perceived 
environment and affordances. The animal only “sees” what to do: it does not need to 
consider all the possible courses of actions, calculate the probability of their 
outcomes in a given context, and then perform the action that, according to this 
calculation, is likely to maximise a certain kind of expected utility.  
 Given this characterisation of level 1 behaviour, there is a clear sense in which 
affordances differ from mental states (e.g. beliefs and desires) within Bermudez’s 
account. To highlight such differences, Bermudez calls affordances instrumental 
components.  For an animal to compare the action of fighting with the action of 
fleeing, it only needs “representations of actions” (ibid., p. 123), which are not very 






representations, or affordances, enable the animal to behave rationally by selecting 
the action that maximises the current utility.  
 The range of behaviours is here assessed with respect to a specific organism in 
its ontogeny (i.e. organism’s development) and not phylogeny (i.e. species’ 
evolution), as it was for level 0 rationality, and it is closely dependent on the here 
and now of the organism’s interaction with its perceived environment. 
 Capacities that are typically considered to be non-cognitive and non-rational, 
such as perceptual abilities, are examples of level 1 behaviours. Indeed, Bermudez 
offers an account of rationality that can embrace high-level but also low-level 
processes. Perception is rational, he claims, because it enables the organism to select 
the action that maximises a certain kind of utility. Perception, in particular direct 
perception, is the process through which the animal chooses the “best” and most 
context-appropriate behaviour. 
 Although the range of alternatives is limited to those afforded by the 
environment, this limitation, Bermudez says, does not affect the applicability of the 
notion of rationality; rationality can be applied whenever the behaviour is selected 
within a range of other possible behaviours, no matter how extensive and numerous 
that range is. 
 
5.3.3 – Level 2 rationality 
 
Level 2 rationality is different from the previous two types of rationality in that it 
identifies behaviours that result from genuine decision processes. For a process to be 
a decision process it needs to select a particular course of action on “consequence-
sensitive grounds” (Bermudez, 2003, p. 124). 
 For a behaviour to be selected on consequence-sensitive grounds, it means that 
it is selected for a reason. The reason involved is associated to the probability of the 






and current context, that a specific course of action can, better than others, maximise 
its expected utility. 
 Bermudez calls these reasons instrumental beliefs since they are 
representations of the contingencies that hold between a given action and its 
expected outcome and because they inform the cognitive system about how to 
behave to satisfy its goal in a given context. In this sense “to say that an action is 
being performed on consequence-sensitive grounds implies far more than it’s simply 
being performed because of its consequence” (ibid.). For a behaviour to be assessed 
at level 2 rationality, then, the organism needs to have a goal and instrumental beliefs 
(i.e. reasons to act in a certain way in order to satisfy a goal). 
 Level 2 rationality shares some features of personal-level explanations of 
rational behaviour. It considers an organism rational when it behaves in accordance 
with reasons, which link its beliefs and desires in rational and appropriate ways with 
respect to a given environment. An action is a level 2 rational action when there is a 
match between the action and the organism’s background beliefs. 
 In contrast to the folk-psychological account of rationality, however, Bermudez 
believes that representations of contingencies and their comparison do not 
necessarily have to be thought in terms of classical inferences. 
 Consider tool manufacture and tool-using behaviours. According to Bermudez, 
they are clear examples of level 2 rational behaviours because they depend on 
representations of contingencies between actions and their outcomes. Wild 
chimpanzees make wands for dipping into ants’ nests in one way and wands for 
dipping into termite nests in another way. The tool construction techniques involved 
in these two cases are different both in terms of the materials used and in terms of the 
processes adopted. Moreover, chimpanzees often decide how to construct their tools 
far away and well in advance with respect to where they are actually going to use 
them. This suggests that chimpanzees can predict the future and act in accordance 
with their predictions: tools that will be used to catch ants are different from those 






 Although some people (Gould & Gould, 1998) think that even these 
behaviours are innate, as level 0 rational behaviours, Bermudez believes that they are 
good examples of behaviours that result from thinking processes, in which 
representations of contingencies are used. 
 Accordingly, instrumental beliefs and genuine decision processes enter the 
picture only when an animal can form a belief about the consequences that an action 
is likely to have. In particular, one of these two conditions needs to be met: 
 The organism should not be able to perceive directly the goal of the action 
 The organism should not immediately perceive that a certain action would 
yield the desired result (an animal can directly perceive a goal and still not 
know how to obtain it until it forms an appropriate instrumental belief for it) 
If neither of the above conditions is met, the organism does not need to rely on 
explicit beliefs but only on instrumental components, as it is in the cases of level 1 or 
level 0 rationality. 
 Bermudez maintains that the difference between level 1 and level 2 rational 
behaviours lies in the fact that in the first case instrumental components are the 
contents of perception already, while in the second case the organism has to create 
separate instrumental beliefs. This distinction becomes more evident when 
operational criteria are adopted. 
 
5.3.4 – The explanatory role of operational criteria 
 
Bermudez suggests that we can rely on operational criteria to prove that a behaviour 
is an instance of level 2 and not of level 1 rationality. 
 In operational terms, Bermudez says, a level 2 rational behaviour is typical of 
an organism that can modify its behaviour once contingencies in the environment 
change. If a given contingency between an action and its expected outcome ceases to 
exist, a level 2 rational animal should stop performing on the basis of that 






an animal persists in behaving in a certain way even in the absence of a given 
contingency, then its behaviour belongs to level 1 and not to level 2 domain. 
 An example is the Rescorla and Skucy’s studies on rats (1969). This series of 
studies showed that rats trained to press a lever to get food ceased to press the lever 
if the food started to be delivered in correspondence to different circumstances. Rats 
were able to recognise that there was a contingency between lever-pressing and food 
delivery, and also that, from a certain time, that contingency didn’t hold anymore. 
According to Bermudez, rats performed level 2 rational behaviours. 
 Other examples of level 2 rational behaviours are those concerning actions that 
clearly go beyond the current available affordances. If an animal is able to decide not 
to act on the affordances that are directly available, it means that the animal is 
deciding on the basis of some kind of instrumental belief. This belief is such that the 
animal decides to take a different course of action than the ones afforded because the 
selected action is considered to yield the maximum expected utility with respect to 
its goal. In these cases, the instrumental belief (i.e. the representation of a 
contingency) informs the animal that if it performs a certain action it will probably 
get the maximum expected reward available.  
 Bermudez claims that these minimal operational criteria show when a 
behaviour is rational in terms of level 2 rationality and when it is rational in the sense 




5.4 – Critical discussion 
 
5.4.1 – Level 0 non-rational behaviours 
 







 We are considering an automatic stimulus-response behaviour: given the 
same input, the organism always responds with the same behavioural output 
 Level 0 rational behaviour doesn’t result from the manipulation of 
intermediary internal representations 
 Level 0 rational behaviour is a rational “genetic disposition”: the range of 
possible alternatives does not characterise a single organism, but a species as 
a whole that has adapted to follow rational rather than less rational 
dispositions with respect to the environment 
 Rationality at this level is external rationality as the focus is on behavioural 
outcomes 
 Rationality can be applied to a behaviour when there is a normative standard 
(i.e. the maximisation of some expected utility) against which it can be 
compared 
In what follows I will argue that level 0 rational behaviours are not instances of 
rationality by providing the following reasons: 
i. Level 0 rational behaviours do not require a psychological explanation 
ii. Level 0 rational behaviours maximise an objective kind of utility with respect 
to adaptive goals (i.e. survival and reproduction). This maximisation can be 
accounted for in terms of natural selection and adaptation 
For point (i), I argue that level 0 rational behaviours don’t require psychological 
explanations. As Bermudez himself affirms, psychological explanations are required 
only if behaviours cannot be predicted purely on the basis of sensory inputs: 
“[…] if one can identify a member of a given species and has some 
understanding of the innate releasing mechanisms characteristic of 
members of that species at the appropriate stage of development, then 
one will be able straightforwardly to predict what the creature will do 
when it registers stimuli of the appropriate type. Registering the relevant 






understood, explained, and predicted without any appeal to an 
intermediary between stimulus and response. Similar input-output links 
can be seen in the case of sensorimotor schemas and various types of 
conditioned behaviour. Psychological explanations of behaviour only 
become necessary when no such input-output links can be identified.” 
(Bermudez, 2003, p. 8) 
Since behaviours listed at level 0 rationality are behaviours that can be predicted on 
the basis of sensory inputs alone, they don’t require psychological explanations. If 
we are interested in understanding why we automatically move our fingers away 
from the fire when we get close to it, we don’t need to employ an explanation that 
refers to our belief that if we keep our fingers on the fire they will burn, nor to our 
desire to move away from there. We can “simply” explain our behaviour in terms of 
instincts: we move away our fingers quickly and automatically because our 
movements are guided by our natural instincts. This is a simple example of a hard-
wired behaviour (we know that, by observing another person getting close to the fire, 
that person will move away too) that is not peculiar to an organism, an animal or a 
person. A level 0 behaviour, therefore, doesn’t result from a space of alternatives 
available to the organism in the here and now of its interaction with the environment. 
The possibility of other courses of action can be appreciated only from a 
phylogenetic perspective: by observing the species’ evolution through time, we 
recognise that natural selection has provided the whole species with the foraging 
strategy that is adaptive for its survival in a certain environment. 
 With respect to point (ii), Bermudez argues that these behaviours are instances 
of rationality not only because they result from a range of possible other courses of 
action, but also because they match normative criteria. In particular, he claims, they 
maximise a certain kind of utility (e.g. the energy gained from food). 
 Utility is a quantity that depends on an organism’s goal. This means that 
understanding utility (as the normative criterion necessary to specify the nature of a 






claim that the nature of utility in the case of level 0 behaviour makes it an inadequate 
benchmark to evaluate the rationality of behaviour.  
 Consider the case of an animal performing foraging behaviour. The animal’s 
goal is a typical adaptive goal: surviving. Achieving this adaptive goal requires the 
exploitation of natural tendencies that all living systems have. There is no clear sense 
in which we could understand this goal (and its related utility for the animal) as 
related to a space of alternatives and the performed behaviour as the result of an 
individual choice. Let us call the utility that is related to shared natural goals 
“objective utility”, and the utility that refers to individual specific goals (e.g. arrive at 
University as quickly as possible) “subjective utility”. 
 I argue that the first kind of utility cannot constitute a normative benchmark 
against which the rationality of behaviour should be evaluated: a behaviour that 
maximises an “objective utility” can be explained in terms of adaptation and natural 
selection. The notion of rationality would be explanatory redundant. Indeed, foraging 
behaviours are listed among the classical examples of adaptive behaviours. 
 Addressing the presence of adaptive trait is, instead, insufficient to explain 
behaviours that maximise “subjective utilities”. While natural selection can provide 
coarse-grained explanations of why animals have certain abilities, it can’t explain 
why a specific animal chooses a particular action instead of another in a particular 
context. Natural selection can account for why we have the ability to make decisions, 
but it can’t explain why it is the case that John chooses the shortest path to get to 
University. In other words, the notion of adaptation can explain and distinguish 
behaviours that are adaptive from those that are non-adaptive, but it doesn’t seem 
suitable to explain how a cognitive system behaves in specific circumstances. The 
achievement of individual goals often requires the animal to select a behaviour on 
the basis of an expected utility maximisation that depends both on her goal and on 
her background knowledge: the richer the knowledge and expertise, the wider the 
space of alternatives the subject can choose from. The bottom line is that for a 






or that it is selected among a range of alternatives. It is first of all crucial to 
understand whether the standards are adequate benchmarks for comparison, and 
whether the space of alternatives is ontogenetically or phylogenetically determined. 
Given that external criteria are orthogonal to internal ones, I suggest that we are 
entitled to ask whether an adaptive behaviour is also a rational behaviour when: 
 The goal of an animal is not straightforwardly linked to survival or 
reproduction 
 The behaviour matches some normative standard 
 The utility that gets maximised depends on the animal’s goal and knowledge, 
hence it is subjective and not objective 
 The behaviour is one of a range of other possible behaviours available to the 
organism in a given context 
Drawing on the claims I have just made, my answer to Bermudez’s question: “are 
psychological explanations available all the way down the ladder of rationality, or is 
there a privileged level or levels of rationality below which psychological 
explanations is not possible?” (ibid., p. 128) is twofold. 
 First, I believe that the question already implies that it is possible to have 
rationality even when we are not dealing with behaviours that require a 
psychological explanation. As I have just argued, this assumption is misleading: if a 
behaviour does not require a psychological explanation and if it can be predicted 
solely on the basis of sensory inputs, then that behaviour is not a candidate of 
rational explanation. Rationality can enter the picture only when we are dealing with 
behaviours that cannot be predicted solely on the basis of information about the 
current environment. I have suggested elsewhere that explaining these behaviours 
often requires the employment of internal representations too (see chapters 2 and 3). 
 Second, I have provided arguments in favour of the idea that rationality cannot 
be applied to level 0 automatic, hard-wired, stimulus-response behaviours because 






5.4.2 – Level 1 and level 2 rational behaviours: where is the 
difference? 
 
In contrast to level 0 behaviours, level 1 behaviours do require a psychological 
explanation and the space of alternatives is attributable to specific organisms. Level 
1 behaviours are: 
 Selected among a set of other possible behaviours 
 Closely dependent on the here and now of the organism in interaction with its 
environment 
 The result of selection processes 
 Selected on the basis of direct perception because the content of perception 
already contains information about possible courses of actions (the animal 
perceives affordances) 
In particular: 
 Selection among affordances is not decision among affordances  
 Selection among affordances is rational because it allows the animal to 
behave in a way that maximises a certain expected utility 
A case of level 1 rational behaviour is, as I have previously analysed, that of 
perception: it can’t be predicted from knowledge of sensory inputs alone because it 
results from a (limited) number of alternatives.  
 According to Bermudez, a behaviour is rational when it matches a normative 
standard and results from a range of alternatives, and a behaviour belongs to level 1 
domain when its underlying reasoning process traffics in representations of actions 
or affordances. When an organism perceives a scene, for instance, its perception is 
mediated by internal representations (i.e. internal instrumental components), which 
have a very simple content that already dictates a particular course of action.  
 The nature of the underlying process is central. Bermudez claims that, through 






which action should be performed to maximise the expected utility. Selection 
processes need to be kept distinct from decision processes because only the latter 
require the employment of beliefs. 
 With reference to the case of the animal confronting another animal, Bermudez 
claims that the choice between the two possible behaviours fight or flee “might […] 
be understood at a purely perceptual level. It is perfectly possible, and indeed highly 
likely, that the choice between such action-representations can be made on relatively 
simple and more-or-less noncognitive grounds” (ibid., p. 123). 
 My main concern here is on the nature of the processes underlying level 1 
behaviours. Bermudez claims that they result from selection and not from decision 
processes because they involve quite simple representations and do not necessitate 
the employment of any instrumental beliefs. To address this point, let me first 
summarise the main features of level 2 rational behaviours. 
 The central features of level 2 rational behaviours are the followings: 
 Behaviours that result from genuine decisions 
 Behaviours whose selection is made from a range of possible alternatives 
 Behaviours whose selection is made on reasons that are consequence-
sensitive  
 Reasons are called instrumental beliefs and they are representations of 
contingencies holding between an action and its expected outcome 
 The comparison of representations of contingencies is not inferential, but 
immediate and straightforward 
 These behaviours happen when organisms cannot directly perceive their 
goals in the environment or the courses of action that would yield the desired 
results 
 Operational criteria show that behaviours are level 2 rational behaviours 
when organisms change them with regard to changes in the contingencies 






Bermudez affirms that a genuine decision process does not need to confirm to 
Fodor’s step-wise model; rather, it needs to be made on consequence-sensitive 
grounds: an animal decides to perform an action because it has predicted that that 
action will lead to a greater utility (with respect to its goal and to the other possible 
actions). This means that the selection of an action in cases of genuine decisions 
depends on an organism’s ability to predict the consequences that different courses 
of action will have in a certain environment. 
 Making predictions, forming expectations and deciding in an anticipatory 
manner are peculiar features of organisms performing level 2 rational behaviours. 
Level 1 rational behaviours, on the other hand, do not involve instrumental beliefs 
because organisms immediately perceive how to satisfy their goals. 
 My first critique to the distinction between level 1 and level 2 rational 
behaviours concerns Bermudez’s assumption that affordances are not about 
contingencies between actions and their possible consequences in a given 
environment. Why does Bermudez claim that selection processes operating on 
affordances are made on non-consequence-sensitive grounds? Why can’t the 
distinction between the reasoning processes implicated in level 1 and level 2 rational 
behaviours be understood in terms of degree rather than kind? Indeed, selection 
among affordances seems to depend highly on the likely consequences of the 
different available behaviours. If the selection in a level 1 behaviour is goal-oriented, 
then it is also consequence-sensitive in the sense that the resulting behaviour will be 
the one that is expected to accomplish the goal. I therefore suggest that a level 1 
behaviour results from a selection that is sensitive to the goal of the animal and to the 
match between its expected consequences and the achievement of the goal. This 







 Working within the Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework
24
, Daw and 
colleagues (2005) suggested that there are different neural mechanisms that 
contribute to action selection: model-based and model-free mechanisms. An animal 
working with a model-based approach can rely on its internal knowledge about the 
causal structure of the world to construct predictions on the fly of the long-term 
outcomes of various actions. This strategy, which can be computationally expensive 
in terms of the amount of memory and time required, allows the animal to react to 
changes in the environment in a straightforward way. A model-free strategy, instead, 
enables the animal to adjust to new contingencies only after it has acquired enough 
experience with the new environment. The difference between model-based and 
model-free strategies is similar to Bermudez’s difference between level 1 and level 2 
rational behaviours. 
 Daw and colleagues ran a series of experiments on rats trained to press a lever 
to obtain food. They found that they used different RL strategies in different 
circumstances: when animals were moderately trained on the task, their decisions 
were sensitive to outcome devaluation (i.e. reward value of food was reduced by 
either feeding the rats or by making the food poisoned), while their choice was 
insensitive to changes in contingencies when they were well trained on the task. 
Interestingly, the adoption of one of the two strategies varied on the basis of how 
time-demanding and complex the task was and on how trained the rats were on that 
task. 
 Generalising these empirical results, we can say that if an animal needs to 
choose an action in a time-demanding situation without previous extensive 
experience with that situation, then its selection will be based on instincts. In this 
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 The Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework offers models of optimal and 
approximately-optimal learning of which behaviour achieves a goal in face of 
uncertainty or rewards. In RL, the decision of which action to undertake is based on 
each of the possible available actions’ predicted values, which are defined in terms of 
the amount of reward that each action is expected to bring (see chapter 6 for more 







case the animal’s behaviour is a level 0 non-rational behaviour. If, instead, an animal 
is not trained on the task but has time to select the action, as it is in the case of the 
rats in the example above, then it will be sensitive to changes in the contingencies 
(i.e. it will perform a level 2 (non-habitual) rational behaviour). 
 Other possible scenarios are those where an animal has been extensively 
trained in a given task. Here the complexity of the task is crucial. Daw and 
colleagues showed that if rats were adequately trained on a task where they didn’t 
have a wide range of possible actions to reach their goal (i.e. the task was quite 
simple), they remained insensitive to changes in contingencies until they acquired 
more experience with the new settings. Since they didn’t have a set of adequate 
habitual behaviours to bear on the situation, rats needed further training to learn that 
other responses to the environment were adequate with respect to their goal. If, 
instead, they experienced various possible courses of actions during their training 
period, all of which were adequate with respect to their goal, rats would be sensitive 
to devaluation. 
 Interestingly, level 1 behaviours do not correspond to any of the above 
scenarios: animals perform on the basis of model-based or model-free strategies in 
different circumstances and in relation to their degree of knowledge of those 
circumstances. The processes that are responsible for their behaviours are not 
different in kind; rather, they are different in the amount of time available, in the 
level of complexity and in the richness of the animals’ background knowledge. 
Contingencies between actions and their expected outcomes are in place in all the 
different situations, except when rats have no time to adequately consider the 
situation and no previous experience with the task. If operating on consequence-
sensitive grounds is what is required, in Bermudez’s account, for a behaviour to be a 
level 2 behaviour, then there seems to be no room left for level 1 rational behaviours. 
 Consider the following example. Imagine we plan to go to a park populated by 
many wild animals, some of which are bears. We decide to go with a friend who is 






happens, we shouldn’t be afraid: the bears living in the park are innocuous. We go 
and visit the park when, at a certain point, we turn around and find ourselves face to 
face with a bear. This is a situation where we clearly have little time to plan our next 
move. According to Bermudez, in this situation, we will select the action that, 
compared to others, is expected to maximise the current utility. We will probably 
have two alternative courses of action: confront the bear or run away. If our goal is to 
survive, we might select the running behaviour since it is the one that will maximise 
our expected utility. Our selection here, Bermudez would say, is not influenced by 
our background beliefs (e.g. our friend told us that the bears that live in the park are 
innocuous), but only by fear.  
 Consider now a slightly different scenario. We are in the park and we see a 
bear in the distance. We have some time to decide what to do before the bear gets too 
close to us. We might start thinking that, although we are scared and want to run 
away, our friend told us that these bears are not dangerous.  Instead of selecting 
between the two affordances, we might want to consider the possibility of letting the 
bear getting closer to take a memorable picture. 
 If we now compare the two scenarios, we see that they are similar in terms of 
their contexts, but different in terms of their goals. While in the first scenario the 
bear is too close for us to engage in a process where our background beliefs can 
actually make a difference, in the second scenario we can recall what our friend told 
us (i.e. the bear is not dangerous). In this second scenario, then, we could decide to 
wait and take a picture instead of automatically reacting to the situation by running 
away. Bermudez would explain the first case as involving a behaviour resulting from 
a selection among affordances, which are not consequence-dependent nor need to 
involve beliefs. Only the second case would be for him an instance of selection, 
hence of level 2 behaviour. Nevertheless, if we analyse the two scenarios, we notice 
that the difference between level 1 and level 2 behaviours (i.e. the difference 
between instrumental components, instrumental beliefs and processes operating over 






 In the next section I will address some reasons why Bermudez might have 
misunderstood the distinction between level 1 and level 2 rational behaviours. 
 
5.4.2.1 – The methodological inadequacy of operational criteria 
 
Bermudez believes that the evidence that proves the difference between selection and 
decision processes comes from experimental results. He claims that the analysis of 
experimental data with the use of some minimal operational criteria, as he calls them, 
can distinguish a behaviour that results from genuine decision processes, hence a 
level 2 rational behaviour, from a behaviour resulting from selection processes, 
which is, instead, an instance of level 1 rationality.  
 He affirms that only a behaviour that changes once external conditions are 
different results from decision processes over instrumental beliefs about the 
contingencies between actions and their consequences. On the contrary, a behaviour 
that doesn’t change once external circumstances change is an instance of selection 
processes over instrumental components (but not instrumental beliefs). Interestingly, 
Bermudez claims that organisms operate over internal components in immediate and 
straightforward ways in both cases.  
 The point I want to make in this section is that external criteria are not 
sufficient to explain the nature of rational behaviour. In particular, I claim that 
behavioural criteria can guide the search for explanations of rational behaviour, but 
that additional information concerning the nature of the internal and underlying 
reasoning processes is necessarily to say whether a behaviour is similar or different 
to another one, whether two behaviours are of the same kind or not, and whether they 
are instances of rationality. 
 What operational criteria can show is that there are some differences in 
behavioural outcomes and that these differences might be due to distinct processes: 
one kind of process that operates on simple forms of representations and on a 






that requires the comparison of more complex and numerous representations (i.e. 
decision process). Bermudez claims that the second kind of process happens when 
the goal is not immediately perceivable by the organism or when the organism does 
not immediately know which is the most appropriate action. 
 Nevertheless, we could explain these results without invoking the existence of 
two different underlying reasoning processes, but only a difference in terms of their 
complexity and in terms of the components used. In the same way in which 
Bermudez himself justifies the rational nature of a level 1 behaviour even if the range 
of alternatives is limited and the nature of the representations employed is simple, we 
could hypothesise that the difference between a level 1 and a level 2 behaviour is in 
terms of the number of actions available to an organism and of the complexity of the 
representations involved. Accordingly, they would not involve two distinct kinds of 
processes. As I argued in the previous section, it could be the case that when an agent 
needs to behave in a very fast way in reaction to the environment, her behaviour is 
more dependent on instincts than on background beliefs. If this were the case, then, 
the behaviour would simply be an instance of level 0 rationality: it would result from 
a hard-wired mechanism that natural selection has offered us to cope with the 
environment. 
 
5.4.3 – Only a terminological disagreement? 
 
Someone might think that my point of contention is purely terminological: since 
Bermudez has clarified the notion of rationality he employs in his analysis and since 
he is consistent with his definition, we can agree with his conclusions too. 
I want to resist the idea that my criticisms of Bermudez’s analysis of the notion 
of rationality are purely terminological. 
 First, I believe that to make progress in our understanding of rationality we 
need to agree at least on some minimal criteria for a behaviour to be rational. Having 






general criteria for rational behaviour. We could, for instance, end up listing as 
rational a behaviour for which the notion of adaptation can do the explanatory work 
already. As I claimed in 5.4.1, applying the notion of rationality to hard-wired and 
instinctual behaviours does not offer any explanatory gain over and above that 
provided by evolutionary explanations in terms of adaptive processes. 
 I also believe that a clearer idea of what rationality might amounts to is 
necessary to avoid certain ambiguous conclusions about the nature of cognitive 
behaviour. Consider the conclusions that Bermudez draws from the idea that the 
reasoning processes involved in both level 1 and level 2 rational behaviours are not 
inferential in nature. Starting with this premise, Bermudez concludes that rationality 
does not have to be considered in terms of the ability to constructs arguments or in 
terms of the ability to employ strategies and inferences prescribed by rational 
theories. According to him, a behaviour is optimal because it can be modelled in 
terms of expected utility theory (and it can be compared to standards) even if it 
doesn’t result from its application. The foraging behaviour mentioned above is such 
an example: an animal behaves in a way that maximises the energy gain from food 
not because it has previously and internally calculated which action would have been 
optimal given its goal and the current environment, but because it follows simple 
(and innate) rules and heuristics. An example of a level 1 behaviour that is externally 
rational because it can be modelled according to a theory of expected utility, but 
whose outcome does not result from the application of such a theory, is the case of 
the animal that is confronting a dangerous animal. Here, Bermudez claims, the 
selection of one of the two courses of action, fight or flee, is based on direct 
perception, that is, on a simple heuristic that allows the behaviour to be fast and also 
appropriate. The animal does not calculate utilities. All the relevant information is 
already present in the context of perception. In these cases, appropriateness is 
understood as a matter of an animal straightforwardly acting on a given instrumental 






 From his analysis of the reasoning processes implicated in the different rational 
behaviours, he concludes not only that there are behaviours which are rational and, at 
the same time, non-cognitive or not based on decision processes, but also that we are 
able to apply models and theories to assess the rationality of a behaviour even though 
that behaviour does not result from the application of those models and theories at 
all. Rationality, Bermudez argues, can be achieved even if the behaviour in question 
does not conform to the strategies prescribed by classical rational theories. He then 
goes on to argue that rational calculations are too complex and demanding given 
humans’ cognitive limitations and that experimental data show how, in many 
reasoning situations, human performance deviates from that expected on the basis of 
classical rational theories. Humans, Bermudez (2000) claims, do not follow 
strategies and inferences prescribed by such theories. The reasoning processes used 
in these tasks are not imperfect applications or approximations of techniques 
prescribed by rational theories because they are not their application at all. 
 This claim is in line with the proposal according to which our rationality is 
bounded. Advocates of bounded rationality or of the so-called “ecological standards 
of rationality” (e.g. Gigerenzer et al., 1996, 1999, 2000; Evans & Over, 1996, 1997) 
offer an account of reasoning and rationality in terms of heuristics and biases. In 
contrast to classical rational analysis according to which rational explanations consist 
in the specification of a goal and the environmental and in the subject’s ability to 
derive an optimal solution to achieve that goal in that environment (Anderson, 1990), 
advocates of bounded rationality believe that cognitive systems are limited and 
unable to derive such optimal solutions; rather, they perform in ecologically 
successful ways by relying on fast and frugal heuristics. By stressing the effects of 
natural cognitive limitations on classical theories of rationality and reasoning, they 
argue that concepts of logic, decision-theory and probability do not match naturally 










 Bermudez’s proposal seems to be in line with these ecological accounts. He 
claims that once we pay attention to the nature of the underlying reasoning processes, 
we recognise that behavioural success can be achieved by employing strategies that 
are different from those prescribed by classical rational theories. Which are the data 
Bermudez relies on to draw this conclusion? 
 As I previously discussed, Bermudez argues that rationality is a matter of 
heuristics rather than inferential processes by relying on operational criteria: if the 
animal chooses differently once the circumstances are changed, then the animal can 
recognise and internally represent the presence or absence of specific contingencies 
between actions and their outcomes. Nevertheless, as I have argued above, relying 
only on operational criteria is a too weak strategy to justify the distinction between 
level 1 and level 2 rational behaviours. If my argument there was sound, then, the 
central distinction between affordances and instrumental beliefs and that between 
selection and decision processes can be put into question. 
 I have shown some possible consequences of drawing conclusions about the 
nature of behaviours and about their underlying processes before we actually have 
enough relevant information about them. We might end up claiming that all rational 
behaviours result from strategies that do not have anything in common with those 
prescribed by classical rational theories or that we have explained a behaviour once 
we are able to predict it. It is therefore important to recognise that explanations that 
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 However, consider the distinction between rational calculation and rational 
description (see Chater et al., 2003). In contrast to what advocates of ecological 
rationality argue, it is plausible to claim that classical rational theories do have an 
important explanatory role, but only as normative criteria. This would mean that, 
given that the complexity of optimal calculations would exceed cognitive systems’ 
real capacities, rational theories do not provide information about the computations 
actually carried out by cognitive systems. The real processes that operate in real-life 
reasoning processes only approximate those predicted by rational theories.  
Nevertheless, saying that classical theories can only be approximated does not deny 






derive only from external criteria cannot be considered adequate explanations. By 
adopting them we run the risk of interpreting behaviours in a way that is too 
dependent on our a priori commitments.  
 Accordingly, Bermudez’s three levels of rationality can’t be taken for granted 
and the explanatory power of purely personal-level stories about rationality and 
reasoning can be put into question. As seen in the previous chapter, autonomy 
theorists believe that personal-level folk-psychological explanations are necessary 
and sufficient for explaining and predicting others’ people behaviours as they 
approximate to an ideal of rationality. Their hypothesis is that we can understand and 
predict others’ behaviours to the extent that we can understand the inferential 
relations between their mental states and their actions (e.g. Davidson, 1980). 
According to autonomy theorists, only personal-level explanations can properly 
account for human rationality and we do not need to know much about the particular 
underlying machinery of such capacity. Once again, the evidence here comes from 
external observational criteria. 
 As claimed in chapters 1 and 4, good explanations of rational behaviours can’t 
proceed only at the personal or external observational level. Operational criteria and 
rational expectations are not sufficient for explanation. What makes a process a 
reasoning process can’t be simply derived from behavioural outcome. Rather, we 
need to complement the external perspective with an internal study of the processes 
in question. If there are indeed different components and if these different 
components are actually employed in different processes, then these differences 
should map onto the structure that makes them possible. Only once these differences 
are shown not only at the functional but also at the structural level, we can conclude 
that they actually exist. 
 Mechanisms are, therefore, necessary: a complete explanation of a capacity in 
terms of functional properties requires the identification of structures that possess 
these properties. This means that the distinction between instrumental components, 






distinctions between these representations and distinctions between the ways in 
which they are processed should be found at the level of the brain. At the same time, 
the identified mechanism should constrain the functional analysis of the capacity: the 
representational formats and the operations on them should vary depending on how 
the mechanism handles their distinctions.  
 Accordingly, whether a system implements a certain process instead of another 
one and whether it contains instrumental components or instrumental beliefs is also a 
matter of its structural features. Information about structural components, their 
organisation and their activities have to be found at the subpersonal-level of analysis. 
It is only once we recognise that subpersonal-level states and events are important to 
understand rationality constraints that we start asking about those specific 
mechanisms that underlie the behaviours that we call, from a normative perspective, 
rational. Given that Bermudez’s three levels are characterised by the same rational 
standard — the maximisation of a certain kind of utility — what distinguishes them 
is the way in which “appropriateness” is calculated and achieved. Although 
Bermudez recognises this important distinction, the methodology he adopts is 
inadequate because it remains at a purely functional and behavioural level: he 
identifies internal components on the basis of their functions within the system and 
with respect to certain behaviours. He does not dig deeper into the structural nature 
of these components. Whether affordances and instrumental beliefs are the 
responsible components of different processes and whether they are actually 
processed in different ways can be ultimately proven only once we have information 
about the structural components that implement these supposedly different functions. 
Indeed, we already have some insights about rational processes in humans that do 
seem to follow the strategies prescribed by rational theories, and, in particular, 








5.5 – Conclusion 
 
To summarise, my main concerns with Bermudez’s accounts of rationality are the 
followings: 
 Level 0 rationality does not identify rational but only adaptive behaviours 
 The very distinction between level 1 and level 2 rationality is unclear: 
o Affordances, as well as instrumental beliefs, seem to be consequence-
sensitive 
o Bermudez justifies the distinction between affordances-based 
processes and instrumental beliefs-based processes solely on the basis 
of operational criteria 
 Operational criteria are not methodologically strong enough to establish the 
nature of reasoning processes since they consider only behavioural outcomes 
and how these outcomes are affected by environmental changes  
 Conceiving the nature of reasoning processes that yield rational behaviours in 
terms of fast and frugal heuristics on the basis of operational criteria is 
unwarranted 
 Claiming that in real-life reasoning situations humans do not follow strategies 
and inferences prescribed by rational theories because this is what some 
experimental results show is not enough to conclude that humans do not 
follow these strategies at all 
 A functional analysis of the capacity to perform in context-appropriate ways 
needs to be supplemented and constrained by information about the 
subpersonal states and events responsible for that capacity 
 Personal-level explanations cannot stand on their own. In order to offer an 
adequate explanation of a capacity, a mechanistic story is necessary too.  
For all these reasons, I think that Bermudez’s conclusions are too quick. I showed 
that he doesn’t have enough information to support the idea that human rationality is 






mechanisms are required to genuinely explain why humans (and other animals) are 
often context-appropriate in their responses to the environment.  
 In the next chapter I will examine more closely the explanatory gain that 























6.1 – Introduction 
 
So far I have analysed three different frameworks adopted to explain cognitive 
behaviour: the folk-psychological, the anti-representational and the physiological 
subpersonal frameworks. 
 With respect to folk-psychological explanations, I argued that: (i) their main 
goal consists in making behaviours intelligible rather than in explaining them; (ii) 
they appeal to an unclear notion of cause. 
 Regarding anti-representational explanations, I highlighted that they are more 
suitable to describe how a system’s behaviour changes over time rather than to 
explain how a system performs a certain behaviour in the first place. This results in 
mathematical formalisations of a system’s performance that bear little or no 
biological plausibility. Indeed, such plausibility, I argued, depends on the 
identification of localised mechanisms, which is not the focus of anti-
representational explanations. 
 Concerning physiological subpersonal explanations, I argued that they cannot 






required to explain cognitive phenomena and because neuroscientific practice 
doesn’t provide evidence for the possibility of reductions of mental phenomena to 
molecular phenomena. 
The goal of the current chapter is to examine the neurocomputational 
framework by analysing a family of models — the Bayesian models — that belong 




6.2 – The neurocomputational framework 
 
Neurocomputationalism is a framework of explanation adopted to study human 
behaviour that considers the brain as a processor of information and cognition as a 
result of neural computations: humans perform cognitive tasks because they process 
internal representations in certain ways. 
 Neurocomputational explanations are special kinds of subpersonal explanations 
that try to explain why humans perform cognitively in light of the various ways in 
which the nervous system copes with its environment. This makes the 
neurocomputational methodology different from the standard procedures in 
psychology and cognitive psychology: rather than studying behaviour independently 
of knowledge of the brain
26
, the neurocomputational framework aims at uncovering 
the internal structure of the processes underlying various cognitive performances 
and, in particular, the internal biological components responsible for certain 
behavioural outcomes. Neurocomputationalism tries to achieve these results by 
suggesting mathematical models and by relying on simulations. It first identifies the 
task a subject needs to perform and it then suggests a possible way in which she can 
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 In standard psychology and cognitive psychology, experiments are designed to 
measure and identify only behavioural information (i.e. reaction times, patterns of 
errors, and so on). This information is then used to understand the nature of the 






carry it out. This way is defined in terms of algorithms that, if executed, should yield 
the desired behavioural response. 
 The neurocomputational methodology follows the basic assumption that if a 
system has a certain property, then that property is not a basic fact about the system, 
but depends on the nature and organisation of its components parts (e.g. Glennan, 
2010). This methodology has benefited from the rise of new techniques for the study 
of the brain (e.g. fMRI and PET), which has allowed researchers to envisage a future 
where both functional and structural features (e.g. specific brain areas, neurons, 
populations of neurons, neurotransmitters, synaptic connections, and so on) of 
cognitive processes could be uncovered. The hope is that these (and other) 
techniques will help the identification of possible correspondences between stages of 
information processing responsible for a specific cognitive phenomenon and 
repeatable events at the level of the brain. 
 At present, only tentative bridges between neurocomputational models and 
brain processes have been suggested with respect to quite simple perceptual and 
motor tasks, but researchers expect that more bridges will be discovered in the 
future. 
The novelty of the neurocomputational framework can be better understood 
within the three-level framework laid out by David Marr (1982). Marr’s framework 
specifies the computational task that the system needs to solve together with a class 
of rules or algorithms that can be responsible for the system’s success in the task. It 
also suggests ways to uncover the implementational nature of the cognitive process 
by relating informational stages to biological transactions among neurons and 
population of neurons. As I will show in the current chapter and, especially, in the 
next chapter, the simultaneous focus on computational, algorithmic and 
implementational levels makes the neurocomputational framework apt for co-
evolution. This means that information at different levels can interact and constrain 
each other, eventually leading to modifications of some of the categories that we 






Patricia Churchland (1986), co-evolution is a fruitful framework within which our 
understanding of brain and mind “may need to be revised, and the revisionary 
rationales may come from research at any level” (ibid., p. 746). 
 Neurocomputational explanations make reference to brain components and to 
the transformation of information among neural populations. They suggest possible 
ways in which neural processes might encode, use and transform information in 
terms of neural computations (i.e. transformations of neural spike trains according to 
algorithms). It is by describing how neural components encode information and how 
they interact with other components to transform this information that 
neurocomputational explanations aim at accounting for how cognitive functions and 
behaviours are generated within a cognitive system. 
 In the rest of the chapter I will examine the neurocomputational framework 
mostly by analysing one of its families of models —  Bayesian models —  and their 




6.3 – The Bayesian neurocomputational framework 
 
We access the world through our senses, which are our main sources of information. 
Sensory information, even though vital for successful interactions with the world, is 
often noisy and ambiguous. Not only is sensory information ambiguous, the world 
often presents itself in quite uncertain modes too. The same object seen from 
different perspectives, for instance, will yield different sensory information and the 
same sensory information can be caused by different environmental states. 
 How can we overcome these ambiguities and extract information about the 
state that obtains in the world? How can we select actions appropriate to the current 
circumstances and to our goals on the basis of noisy and uncertain data? 
 The task of the brain might seem impossible at first: it must infer information 






that the brain “knows” is the way in which its own states (e.g. spikes of neurons) 
flow and modify. 
 The Bayesian neurocomputational framework suggests a possible way in which 
this uncertainty can be handled, thus allowing agents to behave successfully in the 
world. The main hypothesis at the heart of Bayesianism is that cognitive agents use 
some rule (or approximate rule) when perceiving the environment, making decisions 
and performing actions. In particular, the claim is that the main goal of our nervous 
system is to infer the cause of its sensory inputs by relying on ambiguous and noisy 
sensory information and internal generative probabilistic models of the relevant 
variables in the environment causing the sensory stimuli. Internal probabilistic 
models are then tuned by learning and experience via the interactions of the agent 
with the environment. 
 The process of making informed guesses about the causes of sensory 
stimulation and updating those guesses based on new evidence is called Bayesian 
inference, and it results from the execution of Bayes’ rule: 
 
P(H|S) = P(S|H)P(H) 
               P(S) 
 
Bayes’ rule indicates a way in which the nervous system can update the (posterior) 
probability [P(H|S)] that a certain hypothesis (H) is true given the sensory data (S). 
Accordingly, Bayesian inference is possible by multiplying the probability of the 
sensory data given the hypothesis (likelihood) with the probability of the hypothesis 
(prior), divided by the probability of the data. 
 Advocates of the Bayesian neurocomputational framework believe that the 
cognitive system combines uncertain information about stimuli with prior 
information in a way that accounts for their uncertainty. This means that the internal 
representations over which Bayesian computations are performed need to encode 






the sensory stimuli modifies the weighting of prediction-error, which, in turn, 
impacts the higher levels of the hierarchy (see 6.5). In other words, generative 
models must include what Jacob Hohwy calls “precision expectations”: context-
based assessments of the reliability and salience of the sensory information itself. 
Precision-expectations allow the system to require precise prediction-error signals on 
some occasions and less precise prediction-error signals on other occasions. In 
Hohwy’s words: 
“Prediction error that is unreliable due to varying levels of noise in the 
states of the world is not a learning signal that will facilitate confident 
veridical revision of generative models or make it likely that selective 
sampling of the world is efficient. Prediction error minimization must 
therefore take variability in prediction error messaging into consideration 
– it needs to assess the precision of the prediction error.” (Hohwy, 2012, 
p. 4) 
According to this framework, our cognitive system can be described as a 
combination of top-down and bottom-up signals. Top-down signals are the prior 
expectations about the state of the world before the system receives sensory 
information [P(H)], while bottom-up signals are the sensory information conditional 
on the priors [P(S|H)].  
 Priors heavily influence what agents perceive and represent by constraining the 
way in which sensory information is processed. Predictions about current 
environmental cues are then selected according to the best model the system has of 
the possible causes. 
Learning is driven by mismatches between bottom-up and top-down signals: if 
there is a mismatch between the prior expectation and the bottom-up sensory signal, 
the prior gets corrected using Bayes’ rule within a cascade of cortical processes 
where the higher levels attempt to predict the input at the lower levels on the basis of 






 The signal of the mismatch is called prediction-error. Changing the priors via 
prediction-errors coincides with changing the predictions about the causes of the 
lower-level activities. 
 To get clear on Bayesianism, and on the neurocomputational framework more 
in general, consider the case of perception. 
 It is now widely accepted that perception takes place along a cascade of many 
processing stages over cortical areas arranged in a hierarchical structure. According 
to the Bayesian neurocomputational framework, neural activations produced by 
sensory inputs from the current visual scene belong to the lowest level of the 
hierarchy. These inputs are processed along a cascade of multi-level stages, where 
each level tries to predict the activity at the level below it via top-down (backward) 
connections. Top-down influences allow the activity at one stage to become input to 
a lower-level stage. As long as top-down signals successfully predict the lower-level 
activity, no update or modification is required. If, instead, the top-down predictions 
don’t match the activity at the lower level, a prediction-error signalling the 
inappropriateness of the prediction with respect to the current activity is generated 
and propagated to the higher levels. This is the situation where the hierarchical 
model needs to be updated: probabilistic representations at the higher levels are 
modified to allow the next top-down predictions to cancel the prediction-error and to 
yield an appropriate perceptual inference. 
 An example of these models at work is Rao and Ballard’s model of visual 
processes (1999). The visual cortex is here characterised in terms of top-down and 
bottom-up signals. In particular, it has been suggested that area V2 in the visual 
cortex might send top-down predictions of the activity in V1, and that V1 might send 
bottom-up error signals to V2. 
 These ideas have been tested on a hierarchical neural network, showing that it 
could successfully predict the external causes of the sensory inputs by computing 
algorithms that reduced prediction-errors within a cascade of processing stages. The 






features of the cause: lower-level stages could encode simple features of the stimulus 
(e.g. the object’s orientation), and higher levels could encode more general and 
abstract features of it (e.g. the object’s larger spatial configuration). 
 In this network, at the lowest level, there is some pattern of energetic 
stimulation produced by the patterns of light in the current visual scene. These 
signals are then processed via a multilevel cascade where each level attempts to 
predict the activity of the level below. The predictions allow the activity at one level 
to become the input to the level below. As long as the predictions are successful, no 
further action is required. If, instead, there is prediction-error, the error-indicating 
activity gets propagated higher up in the hierarchy. This process adjusts the 
probabilistic representations at the higher level so that the following predictions can 
cancel the prediction-error at the lower level. As Rao and Ballard put it: 
“The prediction and error-correction cycles occur concurrently 
throughout the hierarchy, so top-down information influences lower-level 
estimates, and bottom-up information influences higher-level estimates 
of the input signal. Lower levels operate on smaller spatial (and possibly 
temporal) time scales, whereas higher levels estimate signal properties at 
larger time scales because a higher-level module predicts and estimates 
the responses of several lower-level modules […].” (Rao & Ballard, 
1999, p. 80) 
Rao and Ballard specifically worked on a three-level hierarchical network of 
predictive estimators, which was trained on image patches extracted from five 

















Figure 1: General architecture of the hierarchical predictive coding model. At 
each hierarchical level, feedback pathways carry predictions of neural activity at 
the lower level, whereas feedforward pathways carry errors between the 
predictions and actual neural activity. These errors are used by the predictive 
estimator (PE) at each level to correct its current estimate of the input signal and 
generate the next prediction. (Rao & Ballard, 1999, p. 80) 
 
 
Using learning algorithms that progressively reduced the prediction-error across the 
cascade of processes, the network successfully learned to use the responses of the 
first level to infer features of the natural scenes, such as oriented bars and edges. The 
second level, instead, learned to capture the various combinations of features 
represented at the lower level. These combinations corresponded to patterns 
involving larger spatial configurations (see Figure 2). This means that the network 
was able to construct a generative model of the structure of the sensory information 
by relying only on the statistical properties of such information. 
 These were early and relatively low-level results, but the learning model itself 
has proven useful and highly applicable. Further studies (Knill et al., 1996; Knill & 
Pouget, 2004; Friston & Stephan, 2007) have shown that people seem to perform in a 









Figure 2: (a) First bottom level that represents basic features of natural scenes, 
such as oriented bars and edges. (b) Second higher level that represents larger 
spatial configurations of features of the stimuli. (c) Another image of the 
representing activity of level 1. 
 
 
6.3.1 – Binocular rivalry 
 
Hohwy and colleagues’ hierarchical predictive coding model of binocular rivalry 
(2008) is a particularly good example that doesn’t restrict to very low-level visual 
phenomena. 
 Binocular rivalry is a striking visual phenomenon that occurs in experimental 
conditions when the eyes are presented with two different images and the resulting 
subjective perception alternates between the two. The right eye might, for instance, 
be presented with the image of a house, while the left eye receives an image of a 
face. Under these conditions, subjective experience is “bi-stable”, that is, it alternates 
between the house and the face. 






responsible mechanisms at play are not well understood. Hohwy et al. believe that 
adopting a different theoretical framework could help to make sense of apparently 
many different findings related to binocular rivalry, thus advancing our 
understanding of it. In particular, they argue, within this alternative framework the 
phenomenon becomes a reasonable response to an unusual stimulus condition. 
 The idea here is that the Hierarchical Bayesian framework can provide the 
computational mechanism that best explains binocular rivalry. Accordingly, the 
cognitive system tries to match top-down predictions with bottom-up signals, which 
are caused by the states of affairs in the environment. When the matching is good, 
the bottom-up signal is “explained away” (ibid., p. 694). In this context, the best 
hypothesis is the one that makes the best prediction and that, ultimately, determines 
the content of the resulting perception. Other possible hypotheses are effectively 
inhibited. In the case of binocular rivalry, this means that top-down predictions 
explain away only the elements of the bottom-up signal that conform to the current 
best hypothesis; however, bottom-up signals contain information of both images 
(house and face). When one of the two images is selected as the best hypothesis, 
there remain certain elements of the driving signals that the current winning 
hypothesis doesn’t predict. This results in an increase of prediction-error for the 
alternative hypothesis that gets propagated upward in the hierarchy. To suppress this 
prediction-error, the system needs to change hypothesis. But again, a large 
prediction-error signal emerges. 
 The persistent presence of prediction-error makes the perceptual inference 
unstable. This, in turn, causes perceptual alternation: 
“Alternation ensues in rivalry conditions specifically where there is a 
large unexplained but explainable error signal. In Bayesian terms, in this 
situation no one hypothesis has both high likelihood and high prior, and 
inference becomes unstable.” (ibid., p. 697) 






hyperpriors, that is, “a priori, our brain has learnt that there can be only one cause of 
sensory input at the same place and time. This generic prior constraint reflects the 
way we sample the visual world; binocular vision, in primates, rests upon both eyes 
foveating the same part of visual space” (ibid., p. 692). 
 
6.3.2 – Cue integration 
 
People behave in a manner similar to that predicted by Bayesian models in many 
different perceptual and motor tasks. However, little is known about the nature of 
probability distributions in the brain (e.g. how they are encoded, how they are 
transformed, how neural circuits can represent Bayesian inference, and so on). 
 Ma and colleagues (2006) aimed at uncovering something about the neural 
basis of Bayesian optimality by exploring the following two predictions: 
 Neural circuits must represent probability distributions 
 Neural circuits must be able to combine probabilistic representations in a 
nearly-optimal Bayesian way 
The first challenge consisted in understanding how neurons could encode values of 
unique states of the world given their high variability. If neurons fire differently even 
in correspondence to the same state of the world, how can we understand which 
neuron encodes information about a specific environmental variable? 
 Ma et al. thought that one way to overcome this problem could be to study the 
firing profiles of population of neurons, rather than the activities of single neurons. If 
the stimuli are often noisy, then a plausible strategy that the brain might use to 
represent states of the world could be to encode the same stimulus’ feature with 
several neurons. In this way, information could get encoded redundantly among 
neurons and this, in turn, could help to avoid problems due to, for instance, the loss 
of one specific neuron: if information about a state of affair in the world is encoded 






normally, there won’t be negative consequences for the overall functioning of the 
system. For this reason, researchers usually consider populations of neurons denoted 
via vectors of firing rates as loci of representation: population averaging helps 
reducing the network noise (e.g. Butts & Goldman, 2006) by relying on the 
cooperative encoding of multiple close neurons. 
 The first part of their study consisted in identifying the population activity (r) 
of a certain number (n) of neurons in a certain brain area (MT). This population’s 








}. The spike count of 
a given neuron i in a certain time interval () was formalised as ri
MT
(tn). When a 
stimulus (S) was presented, MT generated a series of patterns of activities that varied 
over time under the influence of neuronal variability. These patterns could be 
captured in terms of a probability distribution P(r|s). The optimal strategy for 
inferring the value of the stimulus from the probability distribution was to apply 
Bayes’ rule to obtain the posterior probability distribution P(s|r). 
 Different methods can be used to extract one single estimated value from the 
posterior distribution. The most common method is the Maximum-Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE). This method allows the maximisation of the probability of the 
observed data given the distribution. 
 The typical way to assess the variability of spike trains is provided by the 
variance/mean ratio
27
 of spike trains across trials. In the case of cortical neurons, 
such variability appeared to be described by Poisson-like statistics (i.e. the spike 
count’s variance was proportional to the mean). 
 Ma and colleagues found that this kind of variability allowed neurons to 
represent probability distributions in a way that reduced optimal Bayesian inference 
to simple linear combination of neural activities. 
 The target of their study was cue combination, a perceptual task where the 
system needs to infer the value of a stimulus (S = spatial location of an object) from 
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noisy and ambiguous visual cues (C1) and auditory cues (C2). 
 According to Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability (i.e. the location of the 
object) can be found by performing the following computation: 
 
P(S| C1, C2) = P (C1|S)P(C2|S)P(S) 
 
Ma et al. found that, when the prior was flat (i.e. when the subject didn’t have prior 
expectations about the nature of the stimulus), the sum of the two Gaussian 
probability distributions P(C1|S) and P(C2|S), with variances and means  proportional 
to each other, was equivalent to Bayesian inference. This means that neurons with 
higher firing rates (i.e. neurons that produced more spikes in a given amount of time) 
had lower levels of noise. 
 They then wondered how, given this particular kind of noise observed in the 
cortex, optimal inference could be achieved. Their suggestion was that Poisson-like 
variability allowed the computation of optimal inference in a particularly easy way: 
optimal Bayesian inference was reduced to linear combination of neural activities (r3 
= r1 + r2). 
 Ma and colleagues’ study generated a number of predictions about neural 
activities and about behavioural performances, both of which could be tested via 
further experiments. One of these predictions was the following: if people behave in 
a Bayesian way in cue integration and their neural activity is Poisson-like, then the 
inference will result from a linear combination of neural activities. 
 The security of these predictions depends on both psychophysical studies and 
studies at the neural level (e.g. specific neural circuits must exhibit Poisson-like 
variability). The more secure these predictions are, the more information we have 
about the mechanism responsible for cue integration. 
 This and similar experiments seem to suggest that working within a 
neurocomputational framework allow to test models, to generate predictions that 






and, ultimately, to bridge information-processing theories to activities at the level of 
the brain. 
 In the following section, I will consider another piece of neurocomputational 
machinery that is often used to explain why and how agents can choose actions 





6.4 – Decision-making processes: model-based and model-free 
 
As I have already showed in discussing some of the previous examples, prediction-
error minimisation seems to be the main building block of a mechanism that allows 
agents to perceive their environment. In this section I will claim that (reward) 
prediction-error minimisation seems also to be relevant to account for how agents 
learn to predict the consequences of their behaviours so as to optimize them.  
 Prediction-error stands for a signal of the mismatch between the expected and 
the actual outcome of a given action that an agent can use to update her expectations 
so as to make future predictions more accurate. 
The Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework offers models of optimal and 
approximately-optimal learning of which action to perform to achieve a goal in face 
of uncertainty and rewards. In RL, action-decision is based on each action’s 
predicted value, which is defined in terms of the amount of reward that the action is 
expected to bring. These predictions pose statistical and computational problems 
when the reward depends on a sequence of actions and when early actions only cause 
deferred rewards. 
 RL models, which have been extensively used in neuroscience to understand 
possible computational roles of certain neural signals within brain activity (Daw et 







 One class of model-free RL approaches is the temporal-difference learning 
(TD). This learning is assumed to be responsible for habitual behaviours. TD 
learning considers the flow of experience that cannot be easily divided into discrete 
steps because the predictive stimuli and the rewards happen at different points in 
time. In this case, an action is selected on the basis of its associated scalar summary 
of long-run feature values. The goal of the system consists in predicting all the future 
rewards that are expected to occur given the current and the previous stimuli it 
receives. 
 TD learning is a variant of the Rescorla-Wagner model of classical 
conditioning, where the system is said to make predictions about the reward of a 
given future event, then to observe the actual event and, in case the expectation 
doesn’t match the observation, to update its knowledge to make future predictions 
more accurate.  
 The key computational quantity at the basis of this form of learning is reward 
prediction-error. The Rescorla-Wagner learning rule is the following: 
 
Vnew = Vold + (outcome - prediction) 
   Vold + (R - Vold) 
 
In the formula, Vold is the prediction of the future reward that the system makes at a 
certain point in time,  is the learning rate of the action plan that determines the 
degree to which each experience affects the prediction for the future, R is the actual 
reward obtained, and Vnew is the updated reward based on the reward prediction-
error. 
 According to the Rescorla-Wagner model, the rule is applied at the end of each 
conditioning trial to all stimuli present in the trial. On the contrary, TD learning takes 
into consideration the continuous flow of experience: predictive stimuli and 
rewarding outcomes occur at different points in time. At each point, the goal of the 






This means that, if the system predicts an incorrect reward value at time t, it will 
have a temporal difference prediction-error at time t + 1 due to the fact that the 
immediate reward plus the future expected rewards will be higher or lower than 
those originally predicted. 
 The prediction-error  at time t + 1 is formalised as: 
 
( t + 1) = outcome (t + 1) + prediction (t + 1) - prediction (t) 
 
The system uses this TD prediction-error to update its original prediction made only 
on the basis of the stimulus at time t. This update allows the system to learn the 
correct value of that stimulus: 
 
V(t)new = V(t)old +   ( t + 1) 
or 
V(t)new  = V(t)old + [ outcome (t + 1) + prediction (t + 1) - prediction (t)] 
 
How can this model help us to explain the computations performed by the brain to 
decide which action to take in a particular situation? 
 Interestingly, neuroscientists (Houk et al., 1995; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 
2010) have identified certain neural substrates that appear to confirm to the TD 
mathematical model. In particular, they found that the majority of midbrain 
dopamine neurons (75–80%) in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and the 
ventral tegmental area (VTA) show a rather stereotyped phasic activation following 
unpredicted rewards, which indicates that they might encode a reward prediction-
error. This burst is supposed to play a crucial role in learning. 
 An example of these studies runs as follows. By examining subjects 
performing on a reward-guided decision task, investigators extrapolate the values of 
the parameters to be fitted into the TD model. In particular, they estimate the 






behaviour and to other rival models to evaluate its adequacy. Once parameters are 
chosen and set, the model starts making predictions about the reward prediction-error 
signals that the subject is expected to generate on each trial if she is operating on the 
basis of the TD model under consideration. The estimation of the amount of 
prediction-error signal in each trail is then compared to the variation in BOLD signal 
(i.e. the flow of oxygenated blood in the brain that can be measured via fMRI 
techniques) at each step of the task to establish whether there is a co-variation 
between the two. This methodology consistently finds reward prediction-error 
signals in the VTA and in areas of the striatum (Shea, forthcoming). 
 Dopamine neurons’ response occurs irrespectively of the sensory modality and 
of the spatial position of the stimuli. Rather, their activation depends only on the 
reward’s probability and magnitude such that: 
 If a reward is better than predicted, dopamine neurons get activated (i.e 
positive prediction-error) 
 If a predicted reward doesn’t obtain or if it is worse than predicted, dopamine 
neurons are depressed (i.e. negative prediction-error) 
 If a predicted reward obtains as expected, there is no response in dopamine 
neurons 
Neuroscientists interpreted these results by saying that dopamine responses appear to 
resemble the teaching signal of efficient temporal-difference reinforcement learning 
models. The same reward obtained by the system at different times does not activate 
dopamine neurons. Only increasing rewards provide continuing reinforcement via 
the dopamine mechanism. 
 It is important to highlight, though, that not all forms of learning and decision 
processes, as modelled by RL, are dependent on dopamine. There is both behavioural 
and neural evidence for a multiplicity of mechanisms for decision-making, some of 
which don’t seem to involve dopaminergic activity. Daw and colleagues (2005) have 






locus for model-free strategies, such as the TD learning, while the prefrontal cortex 
might implement model-based strategies, thereby supporting goal-directed 
behaviour. 
 In contrast to the model-free approach, the model-based RL method doesn’t 
operate by representing the rewards associated to different possible actions. A system 
working with a model-based approach relies on a source of internal knowledge about 
the causal structure of the domain of action (i.e. the contingencies between actions 
and their possible outcomes) to construct real-time predictions of long-term 
outcomes. This is achieved by chaining together the predictions of the immediate 
consequences of each action and by using a particular desired outcome to flexibly 
determine the complex sequence of actions that are needed to achieve it. To do this, 
the system explores all possible future situations. The model-based strategy can be 
computationally expensive in terms of memory used and time required to do the 
searching. 
 Since predictions are made on the fly, the system can react to outcome 
devaluation in a more straightforward way than in the model-free approach: when 
contingencies change, predictions change too. A model-based method then results in 
more flexible, hence context-appropriate, behaviour, without needing extensive 
training. 
 Consider a classic experiment where hungry rats were trained to press a lever 
in order to get food in a food magazine. This sequence of actions was usually 
followed by a reward (i.e. food pellet). To successfully perform the task, rats needed 
to represent possible actions, the transitions between steps underlying possible 
actions and the reward that was available from an appropriate sequence of actions. In 
the next phase of the experiment, the reward value of the food pellet was reduced by, 
for instance, giving food to rats or by making the food poisoned. At this stage, rats 
were tested to see whether their behavioural choice would change in the presence of 






 Experimenters hoped to understand whether rats behaved on the basis of a 
model-free or a model-based strategy. If they acted on the basis of a model-free 
strategy, they would continue to behave in the same way even after the food was 
devalued. If, instead, they operated on the basis of a model-based strategy, they 
would change their sequence of actions in accordance to the new reward. 
 Interestingly, Daw and colleagues found that animals performed on the basis of 
both strategies in different situations. When animals were only moderately trained on 
the task, their decisions were sensitive to outcome devaluation. When animals were, 
instead, extensively trained on a given task, the selection became insensitive to 
devaluation. These results suggested that animals could change their selection 
strategies from model-based to model-free on the basis of training and experience in 
a certain environment and with respect to a given task. Lesions to dopaminergic 
inputs to dorsolateral areas of the striatum seem to block the transfer from model-
based to model-free strategies (Yin et al., 2004; Faure et al., 2005). 
 Daw and colleagues also found that the strategy employed depended on the 
complexity of the actions animals were supposed to perform and on the proximity of 
the actions to the rewards. In more complex tasks (e.g. animals were extensively 
trained but could perform various actions to get reward), they remained sensitive to 
devaluation. 
 Daw et al. concluded with a very interesting claim: given that animals switch 
between the two strategies on different circumstances and given that both strategies 
aim at rational goals, the two approaches are normatively similar. In some cases, the 
model-free strategy can more efficiently accomplish the goal with respect to the 
model-based one. 
In contrast to the model-free approach, the putative mechanism for model-
based strategies is not well understood. Some evidence seems to suggest the 
existence of distributed neural areas that might be implicated in it, such as the 
dorsomedial striatum, the prelimbic prefrontal cortex, the orbifrontal cortex, the 






 In line with Shea (forthcoming) and consistent with the claims I have made in 
previous chapters, these and other studies don’t show that the brain operates on 
prediction-error signals, represents rewards and uncertainties and computes over 
them with TD or model-based algorithms; rather, the results indicate that there are at 
least some quantities similar to prediction-error and to the expected values that are 
processed in the brain and that probably play an important role in generating 
decisions.
28
 Accordingly, instead of concluding that there is an identity between the 
TD model and the brain processes, we can say that some features of the phenomenon 





6.5 – Empirical evidence 
 
There are accumulating data indicating that the cortical network might implement 
Bayesian inference (Doya et al., 2007; Knill & Richards, 1996; Rao et al., 2002). 
Specifically, there are three main sources of evidence: psychophysical findings, 
computational models and known structural features of sensory systems. 
 Psychophysical experiments, which have motivated the search for correlates of 
Bayesian algorithms in the first place, are the most telling evidence for Bayesian 
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 “The ubiquitous problem with imaging methods that the brain activity 
being recorded may just be a side effect of, rather than the constitutive basis of, the 
information processing which gives rise to the behaviour in question has been partly 
addressed by obtaining converging evidence from a variety of sources 
(neurophysiology, fMRI, EEG, TMS, etc.).  A more important problem concerns the 
validity of model-based analysis of fMRI data […]. It is likely that a whole family of 
algorithmic models would show a reasonable match to the empirical data […]. It is 
hard to differentiate the particular temporal difference learning model that is used to 
account for trial-by-trial variations in neural activity from other reinforcement 






models (e.g. Berniker & Kording, 2008; Kording et al., 2007). The cue integration 
task I have considered above is one of these examples. 
 There are also a number of computational models that show how approximate 
Bayesian inference could be implemented in biological neural networks as well as 
some structural features of sensory systems that speak in favour of hierarchical 
Bayesian models. Indeed, sensory processes take place over a cascade of processing 
stages among hierarchical cortical areas. These areas are not only hierarchically 
organised, but they also present certain important asymmetries in their connections 
(see Friston, 2005, 2010). In particular, there seem to be forward connections 
running from lower to higher regions, and backward connections going the other 
way around. A possible functional interpretation of these asymmetries can be found 
in Friston’s model of cortical hierarchies according to which backward connections 
transport information about the expected causes of the activities at the lower levels 
(i.e. priors), and forward connections play a modulator role by transmitting 
prediction-error information higher up in the hierarchy. Perception would then result 
from the interrelation of these forward and backward signals. 
 An additional source of evidence comes from studies on mental disorders, such 
as schizophrenia and psychosis. The key idea in the case of schizophrenia is that 
understanding its positive symptoms requires understanding the disturbances in the 
generation and in the precision of the prediction-error signals. The hypothesis 
(Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009) is that malfunctions in the working of 
the hierarchical models can yield continuous and persistent false prediction-errors, 
which then propagate all the way up into the hierarchy and, in severe cases, deeply 
modify and affect our model of the world. As a consequence, what should be 
experienced as improbable becomes the less surprising. Given that perception is 
influenced by a continuous cascade of top-down signals matching bottom-up signals, 
in these cases the cascade of misinformation reaches the lower-level processes, thus 
yielding false perception and wrong beliefs about the state of the world. In the case 






with which they perceive the world (e.g. acknowledging a much louder background 
noise or brighter colours — Corlett et al., 2007, 2011) before becoming psychotic. 
Even normal everyday life experiences appear to be more vivid, novel and important 
(Kapur, 2003). 
 Among the symptoms of psychosis we can find: misrepresentation of reality, 
delusions, hallucinations and experience of one’s action as under the control of 
external agents. Some have suggested that all these symptoms could find an 
explanation within the Bayesian framework. 
 Consider the case of delusion of alien control (Hohwy, 2004, 2013; Hohwy & 
Rosenberg, 2005; Fletcher & Frith, 2009), that is, the false belief that someone else is 
controlling our actions. This delusion can be seen as a result of anomalous 
prediction-errors. When I am engaged in self-generating actions, the precision-
weighting on the relevant proprioceptive prediction-error must be set high. If the 
proprioceptive prediction-error is set high and my top-down predictions can resolve 
it, I feel that I am the agent of my own actions (Blakemore et al., 2002). Problems 
arise when there is no match between predictions and actual proprioceptive inputs. In 
these cases, an agent’s experience becomes surprising. These mismatches could 
depend on mistakes in the generation of prediction-errors or in their weighting. 
While the subject knows that she wanted to move and that she acted on that 
intention, the signals she receives, which are not attenuated, indicate that someone 
else made her move. A prediction-error that cannot get explained away by top-down 
signals emerges and gets propagated upwards in the cortical system. The system 
must now find another hypothesis that can account for the data, thus explaining away 
the prediction-error (e.g. “someone else made me move”). 
 These malfunctions, which at first arise as rational responses to unusual 
situations (Hohwy & Rosenberg, 2005), can result in persistent and highly false 
prediction-errors that force, in severe cases, extremely deep revisions in our model of 
the world. In these severe cases, what should appear as improbable (e.g. persecution) 






 Within the Hierarchical Bayesian framework, hallucinations and delusions (and 
perception and belief), which are normally considered the result of two different 
processes, both involve a similar mechanism that allows top-down predictions to 
match sensory signals.  
 A Bayesian hierarchical model also makes explicit and testable predictions 
about the role of different neurotransmitters in signalling prediction-errors and their 
precision or uncertainty. There are studies indicating that dopaminergic activity 
might encode the degree of precision or uncertainty of certain prediction-errors, 
while errors could be carried by glutamatergic neurotransmitters (i.e. Corlett et al., 
2011). Much work still needs to be done, but, interestingly, the Bayesian 





6.6 – Neural representations 
 
I have shown so far how (Bayesian) neurocomputational models can be used to make 
sense of some aspects of perception, decision-making and mental illness. In this 
section I will focus my attention on the nature of the internal neural representations, 
which are the building blocks of Bayesian inference. 
 Bayesian internal representations are understood as neural states that carry 
information about some variables in the word and about the past experience of the 
agent. 
 Neuroscientists usually identify representations in a certain brain region by 
working out how the response profiles of certain neurons (i.e. their patterns of action 
potentials, or spikes) connect to the agent’s behavioural outcome and to the state of 
affairs in the world. Since neural activity is often noisy and variable, the informative 
aspect of neural responses can only be captured in terms of probabilities over a 






any environmental state; rather, populations of neurons might represent probabilities 
of the possible values of the stimulus.
29
 The aim of the cognitive system is to infer 
the nature of the signal source on the basis of the probability distribution of the 
neural response and of the prior probability of the causal structure of the 
environment. 
 Neural representations could be individuated in terms of encoding-decoding 
mappings (Eliasmith, 2003). Neural encoding identifies the functional dependence of 
some neural property on some property of the stimulus. As argued above, action 
potentials could specify the neural encoding. Neural decoding, instead, refers to the 
process of inferring, or estimating, the property of the stimulus from the specific type 
of neural encoding, that is, from the property of some neural response. Physical 
features of neural populations’ firing responses might count as the basic units of 
neural decoding. The estimated value of the stimulus that results from the neural 
decoding process is then used by the system to carry out the cognitive task. 
 The way in which the decoding process could estimate the value of the 
stimulus that led to a certain firing pattern depends both on the prior information of 
the system and on the likelihood of stimulus, that is, the estimation depends on the 
generative model that the system could use, and on how prediction-error is weighted. 
Given a certain neural pattern of activation, then, the decoding process estimates how 
likely it is that a certain stimulus is indeed in the environment by relying on the 
activity of predictions carried by the activity of neurons from higher to lower levels 
in the hierarchy. 
 Consider Hubel and Wiesel’s (1962) experiment. They moved a bar of light at 
different angles across the region of the visual field where cells responded to light 
(i.e. the cells’ receptive field) to find out whether there were cells representing 
features of the stimulus. They observed that the number of cell’s action potentials 
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 As Eliasmith clearly puts it: “Neurons don’t ‘detect’ things [they don’t determine 
that there is an edge or there isn’t one], they respond selectively to input, the more 






that fired depended on the angle of orientation of the bar. In other words, they 
discovered that the response tuning curves of the cells (i.e. a plot of the average 
firing rate of the neuron as a function of the relevant stimulus’ feature) could be 
indicative of the orientation of the stimulus: the maximum average response of the 
cells corresponded to a specific angle orientation. They then called the angle that 
evoked the maximum average response “the preferred orientation” angle of the 
neuron. 
Within the Bayesian neurocomputational framework, the content of an internal 
representation is then characterised by the neural turning curve, by the maximum 
average response and also by the way in which the representation is used within the 
system. The content can then be adjusted within the generative model via the 
interaction of top-down and bottom-up signals, which makes it highly dynamic and 
context-sensitive.  
 If we grant that spikes of neurons can represent basic physical features, such as 
the orientation of a bar of light, we can expect larger populations of neurons to 
encode more complex and abstract representations at higher levels in the cortical 
hierarchy (see Eliasmith, 2003). Lower-level representations would then be 
influenced and shaped by higher-levels ones while remaining highly sensitive to raw 
incoming sensory information, and higher-level more complex representations would 
depend on the lower-levels ones via prediction-error signals. This way, the sensory 
system could incorporate statistical dependencies between representations at 
different levels of complexity and abstraction. 
 Saying that a system carries out cognitive functions in an optimal or 
approximately-optimal way means that the system can take into account the 
uncertainty in the available information to maximise the probability of understanding 
what is in the environment. Understanding the cause of its sensory inputs is, then, 
required to appropriately achieve the desired result. Optimality is, therefore, not a 







 Referring to representations and representational content does explanatory 
work, as I will argue in the next chapter, because it shows “how the system connects 
with its environment: with the real-world objects and properties with which it is 
interacting, and with the problem space in which it is embedded” (Shea, 2013, p. 
499). 
 Neural evidence shows that actual neural variation is less disparate than it 
might appear at first. fMRI studies, for instance, seem to suggest that there are 
similarities in patterns of activation across individuals and trials such that a same 
representation can be realised in similar ways across subjects and trials. This, in turn, 
opens up the possibility to infer an agent’s psychological state from observations of 
certain brain properties and to predict, with reasonable accuracy, a subject’s 
performance in similar tasks. 
 Discovering correlations between components of Bayesian algorithms and 
neural signals is important because: 
 It points out that some kind of neural algorithm that computes over a specific 
component (or a similar one) is indeed realised in the brain (Mars et al., 
2012, p. 259) 
 It indicates that, when a certain component is neurally represented, it is 
possible to discover some similarities in the specific activation pattern 
produced 
As shown in the case of reward decision-making processes, fMRI techniques help to 
uncover the neural presence of prediction-error (or of a similar quantity) in neural 
circuits: specific BOLD signals seem to relate quantitatively to representations of 
prediction-errors in a quite linear way. 
Although many studies are now trying to specify the nature, role and format of 
neural representations, the exact way in which they are learnt, encoded and updated 
through neural activity is, at the moment, largely unknown. Researchers have only 






relatively simple perceptual tasks (see section 7.5) and the way(s) the brain 
represents uncertainty and computes over it to perform Bayesian inference is still 
poorly understood. With respect to this, the Bayesian neurocomputational framework 
seems to offer some additional means to better understand the nature of internal 
representations. Leading figures of this approach (i.e. Griffiths et al., 2010; 
Tenenbaum et al., 2011) claim that Bayesian models allow researchers to explore the 
nature of representations, thus opening up the possibility for representational 
pluralism: 
“Probabilistic models […] provide a transparent account of the 
assumptions that allow a problem to be solved and make it easy to 
explore the consequences of different assumptions. Hypotheses can take 
any form, from weights in a neural network, to structured symbolic 
representations, as long as they specify a probability distribution over 
observable data. […] The approach makes no a priori commitment to 
any class of representations or inductive biases, but provides a 
framework for evaluating different proposals.” (Griffiths et al., 2010, p. 
358) 
There is much ongoing work devoted to uncover which algorithms the mind does use 
and how they are realised in neural circuits. Some studies indicate that the brain 
might use Monte Carlo or stochastic sampling-based approximations to approximate 
optimal Bayesian statistical inference. 
 Another big obstacle consists in understanding if and how structured symbolic 
knowledge, which is often considered essential for certain forms of cognition and 
thought, can be represented in the brain. In contrast to connectionism, which 
sidesteps these challenges by denying that the brain can actually encode this kind of 
knowledge, the Bayesian neurocomputational framework leaves room for the 
possibility that the brain might compute over more structured symbolic 






wired; rather, they would grow dynamically in response to noisy data from the 
environment while remaining embedded in hierarchical generative models (e.g. 




6.7 – Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I examined the structure and the methodology of the 
neurocomputational framework of explanation mostly by analysing a family of 
models — the Bayesian models — that belongs to it. 
 By discussing various examples of these models in practice, I showed that 
neurocomputational explanations are a special kind of subpersonal explanations that 
aim at explaining cognitive behaviour in terms of the various ways in which the 
brain, which is seen as a processor of information that traffics in representations, 
copes with its environment. In particular, neurocomputational explanations look for 
correspondences between stages of information processing and biological 
transactions among neural populations. 
 I focused on various cognitive behaviours that appear to result from some sort 
of prediction-error minimisation process and I showed why this process seems to be 
a central building block of a mechanism that allows agents to perceive what is in the 
environment, to learn how to predict the consequences of their behaviours and to 
perform in a nearly-optimal way. I then discussed various empirical data that speak 
in favour of the existence in the brain of some quantities similar to the prediction-
error and to the stimulus’ expected values that appear to play important roles in 
























7.1 – Introduction 
 
A good explanation of cognitive behaviour needs to be predictive and mechanistic. 
This is the claim that I made at the beginning of the thesis and that has accompanied 
our journey so far. 
 In this chapter I will examine whether the neurocomputational framework can 
provide explanations of cognitive behaviour that are better than those offered by the 
folk-psychological, the anti-representational and the physiological subpersonal 
frameworks. 
 I will argue that the neurocomputational framework can better account for 
cognitive behaviour and I will highlight the features that make it different and 
superior with respect to the other three frameworks. 
 I will claim that, in contrast to the folk-psychological and the anti-
representational frameworks, the neurocomputational framework successfully meets 
the predictive criterion and offers useful means to arrive at a full mechanistic 
identification of the responsible process(es) underlying cognitive phenomena. In 






framework and that the framework’s openness to an analysis of the possible 
implementation of cognitive processes together with the growing operationalisations 
of some of its central claims make it the most adequate framework to explain various 
aspects of our cognitive life. In addition to this, I will argue that, in contrast to the 
purely subpersonal framework, the neurocomputational framework offers 
explanations of cognitive phenomena that incorporate both personal and subpersonal 




7.2 – Predictions 
 
Predictive power is central in the neurocomputational framework and it is used to 
evaluate the goodness of explanations. 
 The important role attributed to prediction is first of all reflected in modelling 
design: neurocomputational models are designed to avoid the risk of being too 
sensitive to the peculiarities and noise characteristic of a given data set, which are 
unlikely to get generalised to other cases. One way in which models avoid being too 
sensitive to a given set of data is by being simpler (e.g. by containing fewer 
parameters) than other models used to account for the same data (see e.g. Chalk et 
al., 2010; Weiss et al., 2002). 
 Despite the centrality of predictions, the choice of ad-hoc parameters (e.g. 
priors and likelihoods in the case of Bayesian models) can limit neurocomputational 
models’ predictive power. If parameters are selected for their mathematical 
tractability (e.g. flat prior, Gaussian distributions, and so on) rather than for their 
empirical adequacy, models don’t incorporate real aspects of the biological 
mechanisms responsible for the phenomena under study. Assuming that people 
operate on the basis of flat priors, for instance, consists in assuming that people 
approach cognitive tasks without any prior expectation. This is an implausible 






similar to others they have previously encountered, and, even when they approach 
new scenarios or face new tasks, expectations from their evolutionary and 
developmental history might be in place, thus affecting their performances (e.g. 
perceptual and motor systems are often already geared towards certain responses in 
specific contexts). 
 If the predictive success of neurocomputational models depended solely on 
mathematical tractability, we wouldn’t have reasons to conclude that these models 
shed light on the real mechanisms responsible for cognitive performances. If this 
were the case, then Bayesian explanations would not be so different from folk-
psychological or anti-representational explanations. As I have shown in previous 
chapters, folk-psychological explanations are often more useful to predict behaviours 
than to explain them, and dynamical and anti-representational explanations can 
predict how a system evolves through time, but not why it has a certain capacity in 
the first place. 
 The claim I want to make in this chapter is that the neurocomputational 
framework can offer more than just predictions: by making “good” predictions, the 




7.3 – The search for mechanisms 
 
Researchers working within the neurocomputational framework are becoming 
increasingly aware of potential limits of the framework’s modelling design: models 
can explain cognitive behaviour only to the extent that they incorporate ecological 
and biological considerations in their construction. When models are adequately 
constrained, they can yield secure and informative predictions, and, ultimately, 
explain cognitive phenomena. 
 To this end, some investigators have started designing psychophysical 






in certain tasks (e.g. Maloney & Mamassian, 2009). Knowing this information means 
being able to predict how subjects will perform in similar tasks. Let me briefly 
discuss this kind of experiments. 
 As I have examined in the previous chapter, according to the Bayesian 
neurocomputational framework, subjects face a task with a certain hypothesis space 
and priors. In the case of Hierarchical Bayesian models, the origin of the hypothesis 
space and priors is addressed by positing not just one single level of hypotheses, but 
multiple levels, each one generating a probability distribution on variables at the 
level below. The hypotheses and priors required for a specific task are learnt by the 
system via Bayesian inference across levels. Once the hypothesis space and the 
priors are learnt, a subject can perform a cognitive task by computing the correct 
posterior distribution via Bayesian operations. The acquired posterior distribution 
will then constrain, in the form of a new prior, the subject’s future performance in 
the same or in similar tasks. The subject is therefore expected to perform better and 
faster in tasks where this new prior is required. 
 Consider the case of perception. Imagine a subject who is learning how to 
perform two different tasks. In Bayesian terms, we would say that the subject is 
learning two combinations of priors and likelihoods that can account for the states of 
affairs in the world. Now, if perception is Bayesian, the subject will be able to use 
the knowledge acquired in the two perceptual tasks to perform in a new task that 
requires the combination of the previously encountered priors, likelihoods and 
posteriors. If the subject’s performance in the new task is close to optimal and in 
accordance with the model’s predictions without much practice, then we will have 
evidence that the subject performs on the basis of internal representations in a 
Bayesian fashion. 
 This form of “transfer learning”, which has already been useful in machine 
learning and artificial intelligence, is critical for humans as well (Tenenbaum et al., 
2011). Transfer learning is a methodology that allows us to envisage a future where 






performances in psychophysical tasks based also on knowledge of the internal 
process (and its components) that leads a subject to behave in a way rather than in 
another. These predictions will be more secure than those based solely on 
psychophysical data. 
 Whether neurocomputational models can provide this kind of prediction for 
humans is still an open question. It might turn out that the quantities needed for a 
subject to perform in a certain task cannot be easily generalised to novel tasks. This, 
however, wouldn’t affect the explanatory goodness of the overall 
neurocomputational framework. The capacity of the framework to suggest 
predictions that can be experimentally tested to help uncovering the real components 
and their interactions responsible for certain cognitive performances is enough for us 
to consider the neurocomputational framework as more fruitful than the others in 
advancing our understanding of cognition. Indeed, its model-based approach 
provides tools to discover the unobservable nature of internal mechanisms for 
cognitive behaviour, by suggesting predictions, by operationalising claims, and by 
performing experiments to confirm or disconfirm them. 
 The cue integration study (Ma et al., 2006), which was originally motivated by 
psychophysical results, can be of help to clarify the point. This study aimed at 
uncovering the neural basis of subjects’ Bayesian nearly-optimal performance in cue 
integration tasks. By relying on neural data, Ma and colleagues suggested that the 
Poisson-like variability of certain cortical neurons allow a network of neurons to 
carry out cue integration using linear operations on population activities. This 
interpretation, far from being merely a description of the mechanism underlying cue 
integration, was important to generate novel and potentially informative predictions 
concerning features of neural activities and specific organisations of neural circuits 
that could turn out to be necessary to perform cue integration in a Bayesian nearly-
optimal way. Ma and colleagues could, for instance, predict that if subjects 
performed in a Bayesian fashion in cue integration tasks and if neurons have a 






neurons to be equal to the response of multisensory neurons. If correct, these 
predictions would be informative (i.e. they would uncover the nature of some aspects 
of the mechanism of which we were unaware) and secure (i.e. they would be based 
on reliable, well-evidential grounds).
30
 In particular, they would be secure as long as 
they would depend on both psychophysical studies (i.e. identification of the 
particular types of circumstances where people behave as ideal Bayesian observers) 




7.4 – Pay-offs of the Bayesian neurocomputational framework 
 
So far, I have argued that: 
 Predictive power is central in the Bayesian neurocomputational framework 
 Predictability is used to evaluate the goodness of explanations 
 The Bayesian neurocomputational methodology can be used to identify the 
mechanisms responsible for cognitive performances 
What about the Bayesian neurocomputational framework’s explanatory goodness, 
then? 
 Throughout the thesis I asked the same questions with respect to the folk-
psychological, the anti-representational and the purely subpersonal frameworks. Let 
me briefly recapitulate the results of my analysis so far. 
In chapter 1, I tried to understand why folk-psychological explanations, which 
are based on beliefs and desires (and their connections), are often predictive, and I 
concluded my analysis claiming that the folk-psychological framework cannot 
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 Secure predictions are based on solid, reliable grounds. A model can yield secure 
predictions when it specifies under what circumstances a phenomenon is likely to 
obtain. If a model identifies under what conditions, in virtue of which components 
and relationships among components a phenomenon is to be expected, then the 






provide good explanations of cognitive behaviour. By analysing belief-desires 
models of explanations, I showed that the central notion of cause that they employ is 
problematic and I highlighted how this negatively affects our ability to distinguish 
rational re-descriptions from real explanations within the folk-psychological 
framework. In particular, I claimed that in order to justify that certain beliefs and 
desires cause a behaviour it is not sufficient to show that hadn’t they occurred, the 
behaviour wouldn’t have occurred either. Counterfactuals statements can be used as 
evidences for the existence of certain causal relations, but they can’t establish the 
truth of causal claims. Related to this, I argued that another problematic aspect of the 
folk-psychological framework is the purely functional characterisation of the causes 
of cognitive behaviour, and I suggested that causes need to be characterised both 
functionally and structurally. In chapter 4 I analysed folk-psychological normative 
explanations and I showed that they need to be supplemented by information from 
lower levels of analysis, both to uncover what is constitutive of personal phenomena, 
and to explain, rather than redescribe, cognitive behaviour. 
In chapter 2, I examined the anti-representational framework. According to this 
framework, it is possible to explain cognitive behaviour by studying the way in 
which cognitive systems interact with their environment. Anti-representationalists 
claim that a good explanation of a cognitive capacity is possible when brain, body 
and world are considered as a unique system that changes through time. I showed 
how this assumption makes the framework unable to account for why a system has a 
certain capacity in the first place. I highlighted some problems related to: (i) the use 
of lumped parameters that can’t be mapped onto any biological component; (ii) the 
weak relationship of instantiation between mathematical models and systems that 
doesn’t allow the identification of the responsible processes underlying cognitive 
behaviour. 
In chapter 4 I analysed the purely subpersonal framework and I argued that it 
cannot provide good explanations of cognitive behaviour because folk psychology 






constitutive role in explaining cognitive behaviour. An adequate explanation of 
cognitive behaviour requires both the personal and the subpersonal level of analysis. 
 In what follows, I will provide some reasons for why we should be optimistic 
about the explanatory pay-offs of the neurocomputational approach. If I can show 
that the Bayesian neurocomputational framework can offer an account of how 
subjects performs cognitively that doesn’t have, or that can overcome, some of the 
other frameworks’ limits, then I will be justified in concluding that this framework is 
the most apt to generate good explanations of cognitive behaviour. In particular, I 
will try to answer the following questions: 
 Can the Bayesian neurocomputational framework suggest a better account of 
cause? 
 Can the framework provide a better analysis of the relationships between 
different levels of analysis? 
 
7.4.1 – Functions and structures 
 
The methodology adopted within the Bayesian neurocomputational framework is 
based on the assumption that, if a system has a certain property, that property 
depends on the nature and on the organisation of its component parts. This 
methodology is different from that of folk psychology where explanations are based 
solely on behavioural data and little attention is devoted to the study of the inner 
workings of the brain. The neurocomputational methodology is also different from 
that of anti-representationalism that identifies lumped parameters independently from 
their biological counterparts. 
 Working within a neurocomputational framework implies a deep study of the 
functional (e.g. the ability to carry a certain type of information transaction) and 
structural (e.g. neural type, anatomical position, and so on) features that characterise 
components and processes responsible for cognitive phenomena. Structural and 






that each one draws on specific properties of the other: to get a comprehensive 
mechanism, activities must be localised in parts so that working parts can be 
established. This aspect of the neurocomputational methodology gets particularly 




The case of reward-guided decision-making is a good example of how a 
model-based strategy, as the one offered by the neurocomputational framework, can 
help to specify unobservable components and important features of neural 
mechanisms. 
Neuroscientists studying habitual decision processes have shown that there are 
certain neural circuits that work in ways that resemble those of the temporal-different 
(TD) learning mathematical model. In particular, they argue that it is possible to 
establish a correlation between the reward prediction-error in a TD learning model 
and a BOLD signal in specific neural circuits. This signal, which corresponds to a 
specific activation of dopamine neurons, is understood as playing a crucial role in 
learning. Accordingly: 
“[…] when a correlation is found between a model components and a 
neural signal, that is taken as evidence that the brain implements an 
algorithm that involves calculating over that component.” (Mars et al., 
2012, p. 256) 
These data, despite not being the ultimate evidence that the brain is computing over 
internal representations and prediction-errors by employing a TD learning algorithm, 
at least suggest that some quantities of that algorithm are realised in the brain and are 
computed over to enable the system to perform appropriately. 
 The methodology adopted by the neurocomputational framework is full of 
potential for uncovering the mechanisms underlying cognitive phenomena, thus 
yielding good explanations. Despite being only recently adopted to study the brain, it 
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has already been proven useful. This gives us sufficient reasons to believe that, in the 
future, its strategy will “yield conclusions about the class of algorithms that it is 
likely that the brain uses in performing a given task, including identifying neural 
structures that are involved in representing some of the quantities over which the 
algorithms compute” (ibid., p. 258). 
 
7.4.2 – Top-down approach 
 
A second reason why we are justified in considering the Bayesian 
neurocomputational framework superior to the other frameworks is that it employs a 
top-down approach to the analysis of how cognitive systems perform in various 
tasks. Thanks to this approach, the framework can allow testable predictions, leave 
room for exploring a broad range of different assumptions about how cognitive 
systems might perform certain cognitive behaviours and open up the possibility for 
representational diversity. 
 The neurocomputational top-down approach starts with defining possible ways 
in which systems can perform cognitively, and then generates experimentally 
testable predictions (e.g. Griffiths et al., 2010; Pellicano & Burr, 2012) to confirm or 
disconfirm the hypotheses. 
 As a matter of fact, there are “myriads of ways in which human observers 
behave as Bayesian observers” (Knill & Pouget, 2004). This has fundamental 
implications for neuroscience, particularly for how we conceive of neural 
computations and the nature of neural representations of perceptual and motor 
variables. Within the Bayesian neurocomputational framework, for instance, the fact 
that background knowledge is encoded in probabilistic generative models doesn’t 
mean that the hypotheses constituting this background knowledge need to be in a 
single format. Rather, by operating on a broad range of possible formats of 
representations, Bayesian models can search and evaluate different proposals within 






representations in a particular format specified. If the model doesn’t fit the 
behavioural data, a different model with representations in a different format can be 
suggested and tested (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008). 
 Leaving room for assessing different hypotheses and for representational 
diversity are two positive features of the neurocomputational approach that show 
how the search for mechanisms can be potentially free from too strong a priori 
commitments. In this sense, hypotheses and priors can take any form, from weights 
in a neural network to structured symbolic representations, which are those that 
might be involved in the most complicated and demanded cognitive tasks. 
 
7.4.3 – Answers to the interface problem 
 
A third reason to prefer the neurocomputational framework is that it offers 
interesting means to understand the relationship between personal and subpersonal-
levels of analysis under a new light. This is a clear advantage with respect to the 
folk-psychological, the anti-representational and the purely subpersonal frameworks, 
and it is particularly crucial now that scientific disciplines studying the workings of 
the brain are rapidly growing. 
 In chapter 4 I discussed the relationship between personal and subpersonal 
explanations by adopting the lens of the interface problem, that is, the problem of 
how we should relate explanations couched in different vocabularies and belonging 
to different levels of analysis. I followed Bermudez’s (2005) in defining the interface 
problem as a problem about the relationships among various disciplines of study, 
such as folk psychology, scientific psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience. I 
argued that solely personal-level explanations and solely subpersonal-level 
explanations are not suitable to explain cognitive behaviour, and I concluded that a 
better understanding of the relationships between levels of explanation is needed. In 
this section I will explore the position of the neurocomputational explanations with 






 The peculiarities of this approach that, I believe, can clarify its position with 
respect to this problem are the followings: 
 It employs a top-down, function-first methodology 
 It adopts both the vocabulary of the brain (e.g. neurons, activations of 
neurons and neurotransmitters) and notions that commonly belong to the 
personal-level vocabulary (e.g. belief, expectation, internal representations, 
rationality and inference) 
 Some studies within this framework attempt to uncover something about the 
nature of the processes through which agents come to behave in a way that is 
Bayesian-rational 
I believe that these features make the neurocomputational framework a good starting 
point to shed new and potentially interesting light on the interface problem. Let me 
clarify this claim. 
 The framework incorporates quite naturally the methodological stance 
according to which neuroscience should ultimately offer some contribution to the 
way in which we think about the basic phenomena of the mind (see chapter 4). 
Employing a top-down approach means that, in order to allow neuroscience to say 
something about cognitive phenomena, we should first of all observe the phenomena 
and then hypothesise ways in which cognitive systems might perform them. This 
first step (i.e. a computational analysis for a specific cognitive task) is necessary to 
discover something potentially informative inside the brain. Having a top-down 
methodology allows the exploration of the possible connections between the 
functional level and the level of the brain because, with a description of the task at 
hand, we can consider which processes could approximate the required computations 
and then investigate the kinds of neural components and neural interactions needed 
for those approximations to be carried out. 
 Accordingly, the neurocomputational framework seems suitable for the co-






that information at different level of analysis can interact and constrain each other. I 
have already discussed why co-evolution is a good strategy to understand cognitive 
phenomena previously. Here I intend to stress how the neurocomputationalism can 
allow it. 
 Someone might wonder whether the neurocomputational framework adopts a 
reductionist or materialist methodology: if scientists can tell us how cognitive 
processes are realised in the brain, then cognitive explanations won’t require 
personal-level folk-psychological notions anymore. I want to argue that this is not, 
and it doesn’t have to be, the methodology adopted within the Bayesian 
neurocomputational framework for even once we do have an implementational 
description of a cognitive behaviour, notions such as that of expectation and internal 
representation will still be required to make the cognitive behaviour intelligible. 
Indeed, it is peculiar to this approach the idea that cognitive behaviours are possible 
because cognitive systems can deploy internal generative models as surrogates of 
some aspects of the environment. These internal models are made out of internal 
representations, whose transformations allow cognitive systems to behave 
appropriately. The notions of internal models and internal representations are, 
therefore, central in neurocomputational explanations. What the framework can offer 
is, rather, a better (structural and functional) specification of the nature of these 
notions. As Patricia Churchland (2004, p. 49) claims “these discoveries begin to 
forge the explanatory bridge between the experience-dependent changes in neurons 
and the experience-dependence guidance of behaviours”. 
 From the personal-level of explanation, the (Bayesian) neurocomputational 
framework inherits, for instance, the notions of expectation and inference. Bayesian 
studies also show the existence of a much closer correspondence between optimal 
statistical inference and everyday cognition than commonly supposed: the brain 
seems to approximate quite neatly in fundamental aspects of its operations a certain 
kind of ideal, that is, the Bayesian rational ideal. This suggests that the Bayesian top-






practical rationality is possible thanks to predictions made on internal representations 
and generative models in accordance with a rational norm — that of maximisation of 
expected utility. Working within the neurocomputational framework, then, allows us 
to say something about why — and not only how — people behave in certain tasks in 
a Bayesian-like fashion. 
 To sum up, the neurocomputational framework allows the personal level and 
the subpersonal level to interact in multiple ways: 
 The personal level guides and motivates the search for mechanisms and 
components in the brain and it offers important conceptual tools to 
understand the nature of cognitive phenomena 
 The subpersonal level offers grounds to justify personal-level claims, to 
uncover something about the constitutive nature of certain personal-level 
phenomena (e.g. mental illnesses, rationality and inference) and to identify 
the neural mechanisms responsible for them 
Consider the case of delusions analysed in chapter 6. Delusions are usually 
considered to be results of malfunctions in a putative belief-formation mechanism. 
Delusions are commonly distinguished from hallucinations, which are, instead, seen 
as consequences of breakdowns in the mechanism responsible for perception. 
Although there remain important differences between perceptual anomalies and 
delusions, the (Bayesian) neurocomputational model suggests an interesting link 
between perception and belief-formation mechanisms: they both involve the attempt 
to match the incoming sensory stimuli with top-down predictions about the causes of 
those stimuli. 
 Whether or not delusions and hallucinations result from the operation of very 
similar mechanisms, these studies show that working within the neurocomputational 
framework allows us to partially answer important constitutive questions about the 






 By suggesting a new, multilevel and model-based account of the interactions 
between inferences, expectations and learning, we have reasons to hope that this 
framework will, one day, offer a better understanding even of our own agent-level 
experience than that afforded by folk psychology.  
 To summarise, the neurocomputational framework has the following 
explanatory pay-offs: 
 It values predictive power, which is adopted to evaluate the goodness of 
explanations 
 It has the potential to characterise the causes of certain cognitive phenomena 
both functionally and structurally 
 It leaves room for exploring a broad range of different assumptions about 
how people might solve certain tasks and it opens up the possibility for 
representational diversity 
 It aims at identifying neural mechanisms, that is, the components and their 
regular interactions responsible for cognitive performances 
 It can shed new light on the interface problem by letting the personal and the 




7.5 – Neural representations and behavioural intelligibility 
 
So far I have offered some reasons for why we should be optimistic about the 
explanatory pay-offs of the neurocomputational framework. In this section I will 
highlight that such explanatory purchase is also due to the central role that a special 
notion of representation, that of neural representation, plays in it.   
 My argument will be twofold. I will first show why neural representations are 
necessary for good predictions and I will then discuss why these representations can 






performances. The neurocomputational framework, I will claim, allows a better 
specification of the notion of representation and of it role in cognition. 
 Within the neurocomputational framework, neural representations are 
understood as neural states that carry information about some variable in the world 
and that retain information about the past experience of an agent. Neural 
representations enter into causal processes in ways that depend on their physical 
properties. 
 At the beginning of the chapter, I argued that the ultimate goal of the 
neurocomputational framework consists in establishing bridges between the personal 
(and functional) level and the subpersonal (and neural) level of analysis. By 
connecting the two levels, the framework aims at making the functional and the 
neural vocabularies symmetrical. For this reason, neurocomputationalists try to 
understand how representations are encoded by neural activities and transformed by 
neural operations.  
 In section 7.2 I showed that the search for bridges between levels is motivated 
by the need to gain not only predictions, but good predictions of people’s behaviour 
in cognitive tasks. By suggesting good predictions, I claimed, Bayesian models can 
aim at explaining cognitive phenomena in a genuine sense. I then suggested that 
predictions can be good (i.e. secure and informative) if they are based on knowledge 
of the brain too. By examining various applications of Bayesian models and 
empirical data, I claimed that there are reasons to believe that, in the future, 
neurocomputational models will make predictions about behavioural performances 
that will be secure because they will be based not only on behavioural data, but also 
on empirical data concerning the internal workings of the brain. In other words, good 
predictions will be possible when neural representations will be characterised both 
functionally and structurally: the level of the brain offers further evidence, control 
and testability that the system is indeed operating on a certain process and on certain 
components. This, in turn, allows more informative and precise confirmations (or 






“transfer learning” (see section 7.3) is a starting point in this direction. The 
identification of the information that subjects really have when performing cognitive 
tasks provides an important further source of evidence that can tell us whether 
subjects perform on the basis of internal representations in a Bayesian way. Transfer 
learning indicates, then, the beginning of a process that will uncover more and more 
about the internal nature of the mechanisms that underlie our cognitive abilities. 
 The fact that important components of putative mechanisms can be 
characterised both structurally and functionally is probably most evident in the work 
on reward-guided decision-making. This work provides one of the best cases of 
convergence between a functional description and a description of what goes on in 
the brain: investigators found co-variation between the amount of reward prediction-
error predicted by the model and the BOLD signal in certain neural circuits of 
subjects performing on the same task (see chapter 6).  
 The rise of spatially-detailed imaging techniques (e.g. fMRI, PET) has indeed 
opened up the possibility to identify how certain functions are realised in the brain. 
There are already examples showing that there is a rather consistent effect on the 
measurements of BOLD signals, which are coupled to differences in neuronal firing 
rates, when a subject is representing the same content on different occasions 
(Mukamel et al., 2005). These preliminary results indicate that a same representation 
might get implemented in the brain in a similar way across individuals and trials. If 
this were the case, we might, one day, be able to generalise and predict behavioural 
performance on the basis of subjects’ neural activities.  
 Attributing content to certain neural activations is therefore required to explain 
the ability of an agent to generalise her correct performance to new tasks and to 
make sense of why a subject performs in a specific task in a way consistent with the 
performance of a Bayesian observer. I have previously shown that the existence of 
internal generative models, whose components are internal representations, is 
essential to account for how subjects can experience the world and not just sense 






with a top-down cascade of representing interacting causes. The use of internal 
knowledge has several advantages: it enables us to hear what is said despite noisy 
surroundings, to adjudicate between alternative possibilities each one consistent with 
the stimuli, and so on. 
 If this is the case, then, we are justified in saying that neural representations are 
real in a very specific sense: they are real because they are explanatory inevitable 
when the explanandum phenomenon is formulated in functional or representational 
terms. In other words, neural representations are real elements of subjects’ internal 
models because invoking them is necessary to explain why they can perform in the 
ways predicted by the neurocomputational models. Invoking neural representations 
shows how cognitive systems are connected with their environments and with the 
tasks in which they are embedded (Shea, 2013). 
 This claim is in line with the conclusion that I have drawn in chapter 3 with 
respect to William Ramsey’s partial eliminativist proposal. There, I argued that we 
should understand a system as representational when there are enough reasons to do 
so, even in the absence of a full-blown theory of representation. If we can show that 
we can predict and generalise a cognitive system’s behaviour by attributing 
representations to it, then the system is employing representations: representations 
are genuinely real components of the mechanism that the system uses to perform 
successfully in its environment. Identifying mechanisms is, therefore, a necessary 
step to generate good cognitive explanations, which are explanations that need to 
account both for why cognitive systems behave in certain ways and for how they do 
so. 
 Accordingly, even if we constrain our theory of representation on the basis of 
explanatory usefulness, this is still consistent with representations being real internal 
entities. They are real, even if it is not clear yet how exactly they are realised within 
the system. 
 When representations are interpreted in this way, they are a departure from 






 They don’t depend solely on the sensory inputs from the environment; rather, 
they are also influenced by inputs from within the brain, and, in particular, by 
inputs from other cortical areas 
 They are not static. The neuronal responses following a certain stimulus may 
vary according to the context and to the background knowledge a subject can 
bear on the task (in Bayesian models, this knowledge is in the form of the 
current winning top-down prior prediction). In this sense, even if the system 
makes use of structured symbolic representations, these representations don’t 
need to be rigid or hard-wired, but can grow dynamically in response to noisy 
data from the world 
Whether or not we will find one-to-one mappings between functional states and 
neural states, the study of the brain — motivated by the goal of finding bridges 
between the personal and the subpersonal levels — will still be useful to gain a better 
understanding of our mental life. As claimed above, by suggesting a model-based 
and multilevel account of the interactions between inferences, expectations and 
learning, the framework could, one day, offer a better understanding even of our own 
agent-level experience than the one afforded by folk psychology. 
 If mappings between functional states and states in the brain are identified, the 
framework will be able to offer predictive and mechanistic explanations of cognitive 
behaviour. The personal level of analysis will still be necessary to account for 
cognitive phenomena when these will be formulated in functional and 
representational terms. The subpersonal level of analysis, instead, will be adopted to 
explain phenomena formulated in neural or physiological terms or to achieve 
different epistemic or practical goals. The computer analogy might be of help here. 
The functional level of analysis is necessary when our aim is to program the 
computer, while the implementational level is required when we need to intervene on 
it to fix some problems. 
 Working within the neurocomputational framework, then, allows the 






to the folk-psychological and anti-representational ones. If the best models, and, 
consequently, the explanations they can achieve, are those that can be best confirmed 
and justified through evidence, then the neurocomputational framework is the most 
apt to genuinely explain cognitive phenomena by integrating personal and 




7.6 – Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I argued that we can make progress in understanding cognitive 
behaviour by adopting the neurocomputational framework. I claimed that, although 
we don’t have any fully worked out mechanistic explanation at present, we have 
sufficient reasons to believe that neurocomputational explanations will be good 
explanations, that is, predictive and mechanistic. 
 I argued that a central component of neurocomputational explanations is the 
notion of neural representation. Such notion, that still needs to be properly 
understood, is necessary to account for how a cognitive system can approach the 
world, handle its uncertainty and perform cognitively. In particular, I showed that 
neural representations are necessary for an explanation of cognitive phenomena to be 
predictive and mechanistic. When representations are defined both functionally and 
structurally, the resulting neurocomputational model can generate more secure 
predictions. Neural representations are also necessary for an explanation to be 
mechanistic because they are the components over which inferences can be 
performed. In this sense, I argued that the notion of cause employed within the 
neurocomputational framework is more precise than that of other frameworks 
previously analysed. Accordingly, I showed how the Bayesian neurocomputational 
framework values the search of neural mechanisms by incorporating ecological and 






predictions not only about behavioural performances, but also about internal 
mechanistic features. 
 In addition, I stressed the importance of the model-based top-down strategy as 
a means to explore a broad range of assumptions and hypotheses about the possible 
mechanisms underlying cognitive abilities. This advantageous methodology is also 
capable of shedding new light on the explanatory interface problem by uncovering 
something about the constitutive nature of certain mental phenomena. 
 For all these reasons, I conclude that working within the neurocomputational 
framework can help us to make progress in our understanding of cognitive 
behaviour. 
 I would like to stress that the goodness of the neurocomputational framework 
doesn’t depend on the success of a model or of a family of models that belongs to it. 
My analysis of Bayesian models has been instrumental to a broader discussion over 
the structural, methodological and explanatory features of the neurocomputational 
framework. In this sense, whether Bayesian models will explain the mechanisms 
underlying cognitive abilities or not, whether the brain does implement Bayesian 
inference and whether internal representations do encode probability distribution are 
issues that are not directly relevant to the main conclusion of the thesis. The project 
has aimed at identifying certain features of explanatory frameworks that could 
generate adequate explanations in cognitive science. With regard to this goal, I have 
argued that good explanations of cognitive behaviour need to be predictive and 
mechanistic. I then indicated a framework — the neurocomputational framework —
that can allow the search for this kind of explanations better than others. My 
conclusions are, therefore, not directly affected by the empirical success of Bayesian 
models. Rather, they depend on a different sense of “success” of the 
neurocomputational framework. For it to be able to identify proper mechanisms 
underlying cognitive behaviour, it needs to provide scientists with, for instance, a 
much clearer notion of what it means for an algorithm or for a specific quantity to be 






negatively affects the goodness of the overall framework and, in turn, the 
experiments and the interpretations that scientists are allowed to carry out. On the 
positive side, the framework clearly strives for such clarification, as I have 
exemplified in my analysis of various cognitive behaviours. 
 In conclusion, despite the open questions and the specifications that are still 
required, adopting the neurocomputational can make progress in our understanding 



















Various disciplines of study are devoted to understanding the processes underlying 
cognition, but there is still little consensus on the features that distinguish adequate 
from inadequate explanations of cognitive behaviour. There are currently four major 
frameworks that try to explain cognitive behaviour: the folk-psychological, the anti-
representational, the subpersonal physiological and the neurocomputational 
frameworks. The goals and standards adopted by investigators working within these 
different frameworks are, however, largely lacking explicit articulation. This makes 
it difficult to understand whether these frameworks offer incompatible rather than 
complementary attempts to explain aspects of our cognitive life, thus limiting the 
progress in this field. 
 I opened this thesis with the following questions and answers: 
 
Q1: Which norms and values are used to construct, evaluate and justify models and 
explanations in cognitive science? 
A1: Currently there are at least four different frameworks that try to explain 
cognitive phenomena. Each of these frameworks adopts different values and 
standards. 






A2: A good explanation in cognitive science should be predictive and 
mechanistic. 
Q3: How can we make progress in our understanding of cognitive behaviours? 
A3: Adopting the neurocomputational framework is one way to make progress 
in our understanding of cognitive behaviours and their underlying processes. 
 
I wish to conclude by showing the questions and answers in light of the claims 
addressed and defended in the chapters. 
 The first claim defended in this thesis is that the four frameworks pursue 
different explanatory goals and adopt different standards to evaluate the adequacy of 
cognitive explanations. Chapter 1 shows that the folk-psychological framework 
values predictability. Cognitive behaviour is explained by a generalisation of the 
form “if a person A desires B and believes that by doing C she will get B, then, 
ceteris paribus, she will do C”. Chapter 2 discusses the anti-representational 
framework and argues that its explanatory goals are predictability and unification. 
Anti-representational models aim at predicting systems’ behaviours — specifically 
how they vary through time — by importing theoretical, methodological and 
descriptive tools from other sciences. Chapter 4 examines purely folk-psychological 
rational explanations and purely physiological subpersonal explanations. The first 
part of the chapter shows how rational explanations aim at making behaviour 
intelligible. The second part of the chapter analyses solely subpersonal explanations. 
Explaining cognitive behaviour in purely neural physiological terms is shown to be 
the main goal of these explanations. Chapter 6 introduces and discusses the 
neurocomputational framework, which is based on the assumption that, if a system 
has a certain property, that property depends on the nature and on the organisation of 
its component parts. Chapter 7 argues that the neurocomputational framework aims 
at both predictability and identification of mechanism. Indeed, the framework values 






the implementation of cognitive processes made possible by the operationalisations 
of some of its central statements. 
 The second claim advanced in this thesis is that good explanations of cognitive 
behaviour need to be predictive and mechanistic. Predictability is a necessary feature 
of an adequate explanation because a good explanation has to provide us with 
information about the explanandum phenomenon that we could not have before. We 
need, for instance, to know that, given specific conditions, we should expect a certain 
phenomenon. However, predictability is not, by itself, a sufficient criterion to 
distinguish adequate from inadequate explanations; rather, it needs to be 
complemented by the identification of mechanisms. 
 Chapter 1 starts by discussing the major positions on the nature of scientific 
explanation and begins justifying why the ability to predict and to identify 
mechanisms are two necessary desiderata of adequate explanations of cognitive 
phenomena. It argues that a predictive description is not necessary also a good 
explanation by drawing on the well-known critique to the deductive-nomological 
model of explanation (e.g. Salmon, 1984). The identification of mechanisms, which 
requires both functional and structural analysis, is here suggested as a way to 
distinguish predictive descriptions from good explanations of cognitive behaviour. 
Chapter 3 provides further arguments for why the ability to predict is insufficient to 
validate the goodness of an explanation. The chapter also shows that the 
identification of mechanisms is necessary to better specify the relationship between 
models and modelled systems. Setting up correspondences on the basis of predictions 
between numerical sequences contained in the model and those of the real system’s 
data is insufficient to explain these data. Rather, mathematical variables need to be 
identified in the physical substrate of the system for them to have real counterparts in 
the system performing a certain task. At the same time, revealing, as anti-
representational dynamical models do, the existence of widespread patterns that 
apply to various physical systems does not bear on whether these models explain the 






description of the responsible mechanisms, purely rational explanations at the 
personal level of analysis run the risk of being mere hermeneutic descriptions. The 
chapter also shows that solely physiological subpersonal explanations cannot 
adequately explain cognitive phenomena because they require the employment of 
certain personal-level notions (e.g. knowledge, information) to properly explain 
cognitive behaviour, and they need to start with a functional description of the 
cognitive process under study. Chapter 5 provides further arguments in favour of the 
identification of mechanisms by examining Jose Luis Bermudez’s tripartite account 
of rationality (e.g. Bermudez, 2003). The chapter shows that the analysis of cognitive 
performances based on external behavioural criteria has to be supplemented by a 
deep study of how information is encoded and manipulated inside the brain. This 
information is necessary to confirm or disconfirm possible explanations. 
 Drawing upon this descriptive and normative analysis, it is argued that 
progress with respect to our understanding of cognitive behaviour is possible thanks 
to empirical discoveries, mathematical advances and also to the adoption of a 
framework that can play a genuine heuristic role. The third claim defended in this 
thesis is that cognitive behaviour can be effectively understood within the 
neurocomputational framework, which aims at identifying the workings of the 
mechanisms underlying cognitive performances. Mathematical and conceptual tools 
from statistical decision theory and reinforcement learning have been increasingly 
used to account for data concerning the neural basis of various cognitive behaviours, 
ranging from perception to action, to decision processes. The simultaneous reliance 
on theoretical and empirical approaches has allowed investigators to address more 
complex empirical questions about how cognitive systems can perform certain 
behaviours in more reliable and precise ways. 
 In chapter 7 these motivations were addressed in support of the claim that our 
understanding of cognitive processes can advance by working within a 
neurocomputational framework. This framework plays an important heuristic role in 






conceptual schemes. Looking for bridges between functional and neural explanations 
and aiming at making the functional and the neural vocabularies symmetrical by 
assessing the existence of correlations between mental states and neural states are, 
indeed, useful strategies in their own right, but they also provide ways to revise 
concepts at both levels of descriptions. In addition, the capacity of the framework to 
suggest predictions that can be empirically tested to uncover the components and 
processes responsible for certain cognitive behaviours makes the neurocomputational 
framework more progressive than the others in advancing our understanding of 
cognitive phenomena. If correct, these predictions would be informative (i.e. they 
would uncover something about the underlying mechanisms of which we were 
unaware) and also secure (i.e. they would depend on both psychophysical studies and 
on some features of neural circuits). 
 The thesis provides also a better understanding of some theoretical terms often 
adopted in cognitive science: cause and representation. Chapter 1 analyses the notion 
of cause within the context of causal explanations of cognitive behaviour and argues 
that causal statements cannot be grounded solely in counterfactual statements (e.g. 
Woodward, 2003, 2008). While counterfactuals are important epistemic tools, it is 
the identification and description of mechanisms that justify the existence of causes 
and causal relations. Chapter 3 examines the arguments used by advocates of the 
anti-representational framework against the usefulness of the notion of representation 
in explaining cognitive phenomena and shows that representations are required to 
explain a wide range of cognitive phenomena that do not result from a direct 
coupling between a system and its environment (i.e. representation-hungry 
problems). Chapter 4 discusses William Ramsey’s attack to the notion of 
representation in connectionism and cognitive neuroscience (Ramsey, 2007). It 
argues that we are justified in treating a system as trafficking in representations when 
we explain its cognitive success in terms of internal models that the system employs 
to draw inferences about the world. These kinds of explanations are common within 






genuinely considered representational even in the absence of a full-blown theory of 
representation. Indeed, attributing representations to a system allows us to make its 
cognitive performance intelligible and predictable. Chapters 6 and 7 argue that the 
neurocomputational framework, thanks to its model-based methodology, allows the 
(empirical) exploration of various formats of representation. In particular, it leaves 
room for representational diversity and provides ways to deepen our understanding 
of the notion of representation in light of discoveries about the structure and 
functioning of the brain. 
 Good explanations of cognitive behaviour are, however, far from being simple. 
Given that models can explain to the extent that they incorporate ecological and 
biological considerations in their construction, two important challenges for 
neurocomputational models arise. First, if, as I suggested in chapters 6 and 7, neural 
systems carry out Bayesian and Reinforcement Learning algorithms to perform 
cognitively, then these algorithms must run quickly and efficiently. Yet, a system 
that implements Bayesian computations requires a significant amount of time and 
resources. This means that approximate forms of Bayesian computations have to be 
investigated and that new algorithms must be discovered. Second, for the framework 
to genuinely allow the identification of mechanisms underlying cognitive behaviour, 
it needs to provide researchers with a much clearer idea of what it means for specific 
neural circuits to realise an algorithm or some of its variables. The lack of a neat 
understanding of neural realisation negatively affects the goodness of the framework 
by limiting the effectiveness of the experiments and of the interpretations that 
scientists can make. On the positive side, the framework clearly strives for such 
clarification, as I have exemplified in my analysis of various cognitive behaviours in 
chapters 6 and 7. The top-down approach peculiar of the neurocomputational 
framework allows testable predictions, leaves room for exploring a broad range of 
different assumptions about how a cognitive system might perform a certain task and 
opens up the possibility for representational diversity. It also sheds new light on the 






personal level guides and motivates the search for mechanisms and provides 
important conceptual tools to understand the nature of cognitive phenomena, and the 
subpersonal level justifies the validity of personal-level claims through mechanisms, 























Anderson, J.R. (1990). Rational Analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Bechtel, W. (1998). “Representations and cognitive explanations: Assessing the 
dynamic challenge in cognitive science”, Cognitive Science, vol.22, pp. 295–
318. 
Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspective in cognitive 
neuroscience. Routledge, London. 
Bechtel, W., and Abrahamsen, A. (2005). “Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative”. 
In C. Craver, and L. Darden (Eds.). Special Issue: “Mechanisms in Biology” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 
vol.36, pp. 421–441. 
Bechtel, W., and Richardson, R.C. (1993). Discovering complexity: Decomposition 
and localization as strategies in scientific research. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
Beck, J.M., Ma, W.J., Kiani, R., Hanks, T., Churchland, A.K., Roitman, J., Shadlen, 
M.N., Latham, P.E., and Pouget, A. (2008). “Probabilistic population coded 






Bermudez, J.L. (2000). “Personal and Sub-personal: A Difference without a 
distinction”, Philosophical Explorations, vol.3, pp. 63–82. 
Bermudez, J.L. (2003). Thinking without words. Oxford University Press. 
Bermudez, J.L. (2005). Philosophy of Psychology: a contemporary introduction. 
Routledge, New York.  
Bermudez, J.L. (2009). Decision Theory and Rationality. Oxford University Press. 
Berniker, M, and Kording, K. (2008). “Estimating the sources of motor errors for 
adaptation and generalization”, Nature Neuroscience, vol.11(12), pp. 1454–
1461. 
Bickle, J. (2003). Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. 
Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishing. 
Bickle, J. (2006). “Reducing mind to molecular pathways: explicating the 
reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience”, 
Synthese, vol.151, pp. 411–434. 
Bickle, J. (2007). “Ruthless reductionism and social cognition”, Journal of 
Physiology-Paris, vol.101, pp. 230–235. 
Blackemore, S.J., Wolpert, D.M., and Frith, C.D. (2002). “Abnormalities in the 
awareness of action”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol.6(6), pp. 237–242. 
Brooks, R. (1991). “Intelligence without representation”, Artificial Intelligence, 
vol.47, pp. 139–159. 
Burge, T. (2010). Origins of Objectivity. Oxford University Press, New York.  
Butts, D.A., and Goldman, M.S. (2006). “Tuning Curves, Neuronal Variability, and 
Sensory Coding”, PLoS Biology, vol.4(4):e92, pp. 0639–0646. 
Chalk, M., Seitz, A.R., and Series, P. (2010). “Rapidly learned stimulus expectations 






Chater, N., Oaksford, M., Nikisa, R., and Redington, M. (2003). “Fast, frugal, and 
rational: How rational norms explain behaviour”, Organizational Behaviour 
and Human Decision Processes, vol.90, pp. 63–86. 
Chemero, A. (2000). “Anti-representationalism and the Dynamical Stance”, 
Philosophy of Science, vol.67(4), pp. 625–647. 
Chemero, A. (2001). “Dynamic Explanations and Mental Representation”, Trends in 
Cognitive Science, vol.5(4), pp.141–142. 
Churchland, P. (2004). “How do neurons know”, Daedalus, vol.133(1), pp. 42–50. 
Churchland, P.M. (1981). “Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes”, 
The Journal of Philosophy, vol.78(2), pp. 67–90. 
Churchland, P.M. (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press. 
Churchland, P.M. (1998). “Conceptual Similarity across Sensory and Neural 
Diversity: the Fodor/Lepore Challenge Answered”, The Journal of Philosophy, 
vol.XCV(1), pp. 5–32. 
Churchland, P.S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science of the mind-
brain. MIT Press. 
Churchland, P.S. (1990). “Is neuroscience relevant to philosophy?”, Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, vol.16, pp. 323–341. 
Clark, A. (1993). Associative Engines. MIT Press. 
Clark, A. (1998). Being there: putting brain, body and world together again. MIT 
Press. 
Clark, A. (2001). Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science. 
Oxford University Press. 







Corlett, P.R., Honey, G.D., and Fletcher, P.C. (2007). “From prediction error to 
psychosis: ketamine as a pharmacological model of delusions”, Journal of 
Psychopharmacology, vol.21(3), pp. 238–252. 
Corlett, P.R., Honey, G.D., Krystal, J.H., and Fletcher, P.C. (2011). “Glutamatergic 
Model Psychoses: Prediction Error, Learning, and Inference”, 
Neuropsychopharmacology, vol.36(1), pp. 294–315. 
Corlett, P.R., Krystal, J.H., Taylor, J.R., and Fletcher, P.C. (2009). “Why do 
delusions persist?”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol.3, p. 12. 
Craver, C. (2002). “Interlevel Experiments and multilevel mechanisms”, Philosophy 
of Science, vol.69, pp. S83–S97. 
Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of 
Neuroscience. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
Craver, C., and Darden, L. (2005). “Introduction: Mechanisms Then and Now”. In C. 
Craver, and L. Darden (Eds.). Special Issue: “Mechanisms in Biology,” Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, vol.36, pp. 
233–244. 
Datteri, E., and Laudisa, F. (2012). “Model testing, prediction and experimental 
protocols in neuroscience: A case study”, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biology and Biomedical Sciences, vol.43, pp. 602–610. 
Davidson, D. (1963). “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, The Journal of Philosophy, 
vol.XL(23), pp. 685–700. 
Davidson, D. (1970). “Mental Events”, re-published in Davidson (1980). Essays on 
Actions and Events. pp. 207–227. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
Daw, N.D., Niv, Y., and Dayan, P. (2005). "Uncertainty-based competition between 
prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioural control", Nature 






Dayan, P., and Niv, Y. (2008). “Reinforcement Learning: The Good, The Bad and 
The Ugly”, Current Opinion in Neurobiology, vol.18, pp. 185–196. 
De Jong, H.L., and Schouten, M.K.D. (2005). “Ruthless Reductionism: a review of 
John Bickle’s Philosophy and Neuroscience: a ruthlessly reductive account”, 
Philosophical Psychology, vol.18(4), pp. 437–486. 
Dennett, D. (1969). Content and Consciousness. Routledge. London.  
Doya, K., Ishii, S., Pouget, A., and Rao, R.P.N. (2007). Bayesian Brain: 
Probabilistic Approaches to Neural Coding. MIT Press. 
Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining Behavior: Reasons in A Word of Causes. MIT press. 
Earman, J., Roberts, J., and Smith, S. (2002). “Ceteris paribus lost”, Erkenntnis, 
vol.53(3), pp. 281–301. 
Eliasmith, C. (2003). “Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what 
it is”, Journal of Philosophy, vol.100(10), pp. 493–520. 
Eliasmith, C. (2005). "A new perspective on representational problems", Journal of 
Cognitive Science, vol.6, pp. 97–123. 
Ernst, M.O., and Banks, M.S. (2002). "Humans integrate visual and haptic 
information in a statistically optimal fashion", Nature, vol.415(24), pp. 429–
433. 
Evans, J., and Over, D.E. (1996). “Rationality in the selection task: Epistemic utility 
versus uncertainty reduction”, Psychological Review, vol.103, pp. 356–363. 
Evans, J., and Over, D.E. (1996). Rationality and Reasoning, Psychology Press. 
Evans, J., and Over, D.E. (1997). “Rationality in reasoning: The problem of 






Faure, A., Haberland, U., Conde’, F., and Massioui, N.E. (2005). “Lesion to the 
nigrostriatal dopamine system disrupts stimulus-response habit formation”, 
Journal of Neuroscience, vol.25(11), pp. 2771–2780. 
Fletcher, P.C., and Frith, C.D. (2009). “Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach 
to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia”, Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, vol.10(1), pp. 48–58. 
Fodor, J. (1968). Psychological Explanation. New York, Random House. 
Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.  
Fodor, J. (1987). The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press. 
Fodor, J., and Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A 
Critical Analysis”, Cognition, vol.28, pp. 3–71. 
Friedman, M. (1974). “Explanation and Scientific Understanding”, The Journal of 
Philosophy, vol.71(1), pp. 5–19. 
Friston, K. (2005). “A theory of cortical responses”, Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society London B Biological Sciences, vol.360, pp. 815–836. 
Friston, K. (2010). “The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?”, Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience, vol.11(2), pp. 127–138. 
Friston, K., and Stephan, K. (2007). “Free energy and the brain”, Synthese, 
vol.159(3), pp. 417–458. 
Gazzaniga, M. (1988). Perspectives in Memory Research. MIT Press.  
Gibson, J.J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton 
Mifflin. Boston. 
Gigerenzer, G. (2000). Adaptive Thinking. Rationality in the Real World. New York. 






Gigerenzer, G., and Goldstein, D.G. (1996). “Reasoning the fast and frugal way: 
Models of bounded rationality”, Psychological Review, vol.103, pp. 650–669. 
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M., and the ABC Group (1999). Simple heuristics that make 
us smart. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Giunti, M. (1995). “Dynamical Models of Cognition”. In R. Port, and T. van Gelder 
(Eds.). Mind as Motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition. pp. 549–
571, MIT Press.  
Glennan, S. (1996). “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation”, Erkenntnis, vol.44, 
pp. 49–71. 
Glennan, S. (2005). “Modeling Mechanisms”. In C. Craver and L. Darden (Eds.). 
Special Issue: “Mechanisms in Biology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, vol.36, pp. 443–464. 
Glennan, S. (2010). "Mechanisms, causes and the layered model of the world", 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol.81, pp. 362–381. 
Gold, I., and Stoljar, D. (1999). “A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of 
neuroscience”, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, vol.22, pp. 809–869. 
Gould, S.J., and Gould, C.J. (1998). “Reasoning in animals”, Scientific American, 
vol.9, pp. 52–59. 
Griffiths, T.L., Chater, N., Kemp, C., Perfors, A., and Tenenbaum, J.B. (2010). 
"Probabilistic models of cognition: exploring representations and inductive 
biases", Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol.14(8), pp. 357–364. 
Grush, R. (2003). “In defence of some 'Cartesian' assumptions concerning the brain 
and its operation”, Biology and Philosophy, vol.18, pp. 53–93. 
Grush, R. (2004). “The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, 
and perception”, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, vol.27, pp. 377–442. 






transitions in human hand movements”, Biological Cybernetics, vol.51, pp. 
347–356. 
Hawkins, R.D., and Kandel, E.R. (1984). “Is there a cell-biological alphabet for 
simple forms of learning?”, Psychological Review, vol.91, pp. 376–391. 
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York. Free Press. 
Hirstein, W. (2005). Brain Fiction: Self-deception and the Riddle of Confabulation. 
MIT Press.  
Hohwy, J. (2004). “Top-down and bottom-up in delusion formation”, Philosophy, 
Psychiatry and Psychology, vol.11(1), pp. 65–70. 
Hohwy, J. (2012). “Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing 
brain”, Frontiers in Psychology, vol.3(96), pp. 1–14. 
Hohwy, J. (2013). “Delusions, illusions, and inference under uncertainty”, Mind & 
Language, vol.28, pp. 57–71. 
Hohwy, J., and Rosenberg, R. (2005). “Unusual experiences, reality testing and 
delusions of alien control”, Mind & Language, vol.20(2), pp. 141–162. 
Hohwy, J., Roepstorff, A., and Friston, K. (2008). “Predictive coding explains 
binocular rivalry: an epistemological review”, Cognition, vol.108(3), pp. 687–
701. 
Hornsby, J. (2000). “Personal and subpersonal. A defence of Dennett’s early early 
distinction”, Philosophical Explorations, vol.3, pp. 6–24. 
Houk, J.C., Adams, J.L., and Barto, A.G. (1995). “A model of how the basal ganglia 
generate and use neural signals that predict reinforcement”. In, J.C. Houk, J.L. 
Davis, and D.G. Beiser (Eds.). Models of information processing in the basal 
ganglia. pp. 249–270, MIT Press. 
Hubel, D.H., and Wiesel, T.N. (1962). "Receptive fields, binocular interaction and 






vol.160, pp. 106–154. 
Jeannerod, M. (1995). "Mental Imagery in The Motor Context", Neuropsychologia, 
vol.11, pp. 1419–1432. 
Kandel, E.R., and Schwartz, J.H. (1982). “Molecular biology of learning: modulation 
of neurotransmitter release”, Science, vol.218(4571), pp. 433–443. 
Kaplan, D.M., and Bechtel, W. (2011). “Dynamical Models: An Alternative or 
Complement to Mechanistic Explanations”, Topics in Cognitive Science, 
vol.3, pp. 438–444. 
Kapur, S. (2003). “Psychosis as a State of Aberrant Salience: A Framework Linking 
Biology, Phenomenology, and Pharmacology in Schizophrenia”, The 
American Journal of Psychiatry, vol.160, pp. 13–23. 
Keijzer, F. (1998). "Doing without representations which specify what to do", 
Philosophical Psychology, vol.11(3), pp. 269–302. 
Keijzer, F. (2005). "Theoretical Behaviourism Meets Embodied Cognition: Two 
Theoretical Analysis of Behaviour", Philosophical Psychology, vol.18(1), pp. 
128–143. 
Kelso, J.A.S. (1995). Dynamic Patterns: The Self Organization of Brain and 
Behaviour. MIT Press. 
Kemp, C., and Tenenbaum, J.B. (2008). “The discovery of structural form”, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, vol.105(31), pp. 10687–
10692.  
Kitcher, P. (1981). “Explanatory Unification”, Philosophy of Science, vol.48, pp. 
507–531. 
Knill, D.C., and Pouget, A. (2004). "The Bayesian brain: the role of uncertainty in 







Knill, D.C., and Richards, W. (1996). Perception as Bayesian Inference. New York. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Knill, D.C., Kersten, D., and Yuille, A. (1996). “A Bayesian formulation of visual 
perception”. In D.C. Knill, and W. Richards (Eds.). Perception as  Bayesian 
Inference. pp. 1–21. Cambridge University Press. 
Kogan, J.H., Franklandand, P.W., and Silva, A.J. (2000). “Long-term memory 
underlying hippocampus-dependent social recognition in mice”, 
Hippocampus, vol.10(1), pp. 47–56. 
Kording, K.P., Beierholm, U., Ma, W.J., Quartz, S., Tenenbaum, J.B., and Shams, L. 
(2007). "Causal Inference in Multisensory Perception", PLoS ONE, 
vol.2(9):e943, pp. 1–10. 
Lettvin, J.Y., Maturana, H.R., McCulloch, W.S., and Pitts, W.H. (1959). “What the 
frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain”, Journal of the Institute of Radio Engineers, 
vol.47, pp. 1940–1951. 
Lewis, D. (1973). “Causation”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol.70(17), pp. 556–567. 
Ma, W.J., Beck, J.M., Lathan, P.E., and Pouget, A. (2006). "Bayesian inference with 
probabilistic population codes", Nature Neuroscience, vol.9(11), pp. 1432–
1438. 
Machamer, P. (2004). “Activities and Causation: The Metaphysics and Epistemology 
of Mechanisms”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol.18, 
pp. 27–39. 
Maloney, L. T., and Mamassian, P. (2009). “Bayesian decision theory as a model of 
human visual perception: Testing Bayesian transfer”, Visual Neuroscience, 
vol.26, pp. 147–155. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Investigation in to the Human 






Mars, R.B., Shea, N., Kolling, N., and Rushworth, M.F.S. (2012). "Model-based 
analyses: Promises, pitfalls, and example applications to the study of 
cognitive control", Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol.65(2), 
pp. 252–267. 
McCauley, R.N., and Bechtel, W. (2001). “Explanatory Pluralism and Heuristic 
Identity Theory”, Theory Psychology, vol.11(6), pp. 736–760. 
McDowell, J. (1994). “The content of perceptual experience”, The Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol.44(175), pp. 190–205. 
Mercier, H., and Sperber, D. (2011). “Why do humans reason? Arguments for an 
argumentative theory”, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, vol.34, pp. 57–111. 
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought and other Biological Categories. MIT Press. 
Montague, P.R., Hyman, S.E., and Cohen, J.D. (2004). "Computational roles for 
dopamine in behavioural control", Nature Publishing Group, vol.431, pp. 
760–767. 
Mukamel, R., Gelbard, H., Arieli, A., Hasson, U., Fried, I., and Malach, R. (2005). 
“Coupling between neuronal firing, field potentials, and fMRI in human 
auditory cortex”, Science, vol.309, pp. 951–954. 
Musallam, S., Corneil, B., Greger, B., Scherberger, H., and Andersen, R. (2004). 
“Cognitive control signals for neural prostethics”, Science, vol.305, pp. 258–
262. 
Nisbett, R.E., and Wilson, T.D. (1977). “Telling more than we can know: Verbal 
reports on mental processes”, Psychological Review, vol.84(3), pp. 231–259. 
Nisbett, R.E., and Wilson, T.D. (1978). “The accuracy of verbal reports about the 
effects of stimuli on evaluations and behavior”, Social Psychology, vol.41(2), 






Niv, Y., and Schoenbaum, G. (2008). "Dialogues on prediction error", Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, vol.12(7), pp. 265–272. 
O’Keefe, J., and Conway, D.H. (1978). “Hippocampal place units in the freely 
moving rat: Why they fire when they fire”, Experimental Brain Research, 
vol.31(4), pp. 573–590. 
Pellicano, E., and Burr, D. (2012). “When the world becomes too real: a Bayesian 
explanation of autistic perception”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol.16, pp. 
504–510. 
Piccinini, G. (2007). “Computational Explanation and Mechanistic Explanation of 
Mind”. In M. de Caro, F. Ferretti, and M. Marraffa (Eds.). Cartographies of 
the Mind: The Interface between Philosophy and Cognitive Science. pp. 23–
36, Dordrecht: Springer. 
Piccinini, G., and Craver, C. (2011). “Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: 
Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches”, Synthese, vol.183(3), pp. 283–
311. 
Port, R., and van Gelder, T. (1995). Mind as Motion: Explorations in the dynamics of 
cognition. MIT Press. 
Psillos, S. (2004). “A Glimpse of the Secret Connexion: Harmonizing Mechanisms 
with Counterfactuals”, Perspectives on Science, vol.12, pp. 288–319. 
Psillos, S. (2007). “Causal Explanation and Manipulation”. In J. Person, and P. 
Ylikoski. Rethinking Explanation. pp. 97–112, Boston Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, Springer. 
Ramsey, W. (2007). Representation Reconsidered. Cambridge University Press. 
Ramsey, W., and Stich, S. (1990). “Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of 






Rao, R.P.N., and Ballard, D.H. (1999). "Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a 
functional interpretation of some extra-classical receptive field effects", 
Nature Neuroscience, vol.2(1), pp. 79–87. 
Rao, R.P.N., Olshausen, B., and Lewicki, M. (2002). Probabilistic Models of the 
Brain: Perception and Neural Function. MIT Press. 
Rescorla, R.A. (1968). “Probability of shock in the presence and absence of CS in 
fear conditioning”, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 
vol.66(1), pp. 1–5. 
Rescorla, R.A., and Skucy, J.C. (1969). “Effect of Response-Independent 
Reinforcers During Extinction”, Journal of Comparative and Physiological 
Psychology, vol.67, pp. 381–389.   
Salmon, W. (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. 
Princeton University Press. 
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., and Montague, P.R. (1997). “A neural substrate of prediction 
and reward”, Science, vol.275(5306), pp. 1593–1599. 
Seidenberg, M., and McClelland, J. (1989). “A Distributed Developmental Model of 
Word Recognition and Naming”, Psychological Review, vol.96, pp. 523–568. 
Shagrir, O. (2012). “Structural Representations and the Brain”, British Journal of 
Philosophy of Science, vol.0, pp. 1–27. 
Shea, N. (2007). “Content and Its Vehicles in Connectionist Systems”, Mind & 
Language, vol.22(3), pp. 246–269. 
Shea, N. (2013). "Naturalising representational content", Philosophy Compass, 
vol.8(5), pp. 496–509. 
Shea, N. (forthcoming), “Neural mechanisms of decision-making and the personal 






and T. Thornton (Eds.). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. 
Oxford University Press. 
Smolensky, P. (1988). “On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism”, Behavioural 
and Brain Sciences, vol.11, pp. 1–74. 
Snow, N. (2006). “Habitual virtuous actions and automaticity”, Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice, vol.9(5), pp. 545–561. 
Sprevak, M. (2011). “William M. Ramsey, Representations Reconsidered”, British 
Journal of Philosophy of Science, vol.62, pp. 669–675. 
Stich, S., and Nichols, S. (2003). “Folk Psychology”. In S. Stich, and T.A. Warfield 
(Eds.). The Oxford Guide to Philosophy of Mind. pp. 235–255, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Sullivan, J.A. (2009). “The multiplicity of experimental protocols: a challenge to 
reductionist and non–reductionist models of the unity of neuroscience”, 
Synthese, vol.167, pp. 511–539. 
Swenson, R., and Turvey, M.T. (1991). “Thermodynamic reasons for perception-
action cycles”, Ecological Psychology, vol.3, pp. 317–348. 
Tenenbaum, J.B., Kemp, C., Griffiths, T.L., and Goodman, N.D. (2011). "How to 
grow a mind: statistics, structure, and abstraction", Science, vol.331, pp. 
1279–1285. 
Turvey, M. T., and Carello, C. (1981). “Cognition: The view from ecological 
realism”, Cognition, vol.10, pp. 313–321. 
van Gelder, T. (1995). “What might cognition be, if not computation?”, Journal of 
Philosophy, vol.91, pp. 345–381. 
van Gelder, T. (1998). "The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science", 






Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E.I., and Adelson, E.H. (2002). “Motion illusions as optimal 
percepts”, Nature Neuroscience, vol.5, pp. 598–604.   
Schultz, W. (2010). “Dopamine signals for reward value and risk: basic and recent 
data”, Behavioural and Brain Functions, vol.6(24), pp. 1–9. 
Woodward, J. (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. 
Oxford University Press. 
Woodward, J. (2008). “Mental Causation and Neural Mechanism”. In J. Hohwy, and 
J. Kallestrup (Eds.). Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, 
and Causation. pp. 218–262, Oxford University Press. 
Yin, H.H., Knowlton, B.J., and Balleine, B.W. (2004). “Lesions of dorsolateral 
striatum preserve outcome expectancy but disrupt habit formation in 
instrumental learning”, European Journal of Neuroscience, vol.19, pp. 181–
189.  
 
